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XXI\textsuperscript{ST} CENTURY’S CLAUSEWITZ IN FRANCE

Hervé Coutau-Bégarie

Clausewitz’s glory has experienced highs and lows since the first publication of \textit{Vom Kriege} in 1832, but it never waned completely and it is currently in an ascending phase. The turning point intervened in 1976, with the almost simultaneous translation by Peter Paret and Michael Howard in the Anglo-Saxon world and master book of Raymond Aron, \textit{Penser la guerre. Clausewitz in France}. But for France, it is only an episode in a very long history, begun as early as the 1830s. It is no exaggeration to say that France was second election Earth of the Clausewitz work. Nowhere else, except of course in Germany, it was so extensively and so constantly commented, with significant deformation due to the relation with Germany, the long designated enemy.

This story was, so far, poorly understood. France did not produce the equivalent of well-known studies of Ulrich Marwedel or Christopher Bassford on the reception of Clausewitz. Things radically changed with the monumental \textit{Clausewitz in France. Two centuries of reflection on war, 1807-2007}, published in 2009\textsuperscript{1}. This master book replaced fragmentary annotations by a global picture on a remarkable scale.

\textbf{Aron’s Era}

Clausewitz was \textit{quasi absent} in the French strategic debate from the Second World War to the early 1970s. It was then a rediscovery, embodied in the emblematic figure of Raymond Aron, but Aron had some predecessors.

In 1967, André Glucksmann, who is not yet known as a “new philosopher”, publishes \textit{Le Discours de la guerre}\textsuperscript{2}. Glucksmann is not a strategist and seems to have no knowledge of Clausewitz predecessors or contemporaries\textsuperscript{3} (Guibert and Jomini are absent), while he cites several contemporary writers. He retains from Clausewitz what may be useful for his demonstration, which borrows at least as much to Hegel, \textit{Philosophy of history}, constantly cited. From the leftmost, and having not yet broken with it, he conducts in-depth Clausewitz and Mao comparison. It is difficult today to determine the influence of this book, which will be commented later, when the author came to fame for other reasons.
A totally unexpected figure rediscovers Clausewitz: Gérard Lebovici, cinema producer, show biz and Parisian nightclubs personality, who will be mysteriously murdered in 1984. Extreme-left businessman, he creates the publishing house Champ libre, which publishes anarchists, but also military authors. In 1973, after decades of absence, he reprints the *Précis de l’art de la guerre* by Jomini. And he undertakes the reprint, without any editing work, of forgotten Clausewitz texts translated at the beginning of the XXth century. It begins with *The campaign of 1814 in France* in 1972, followed by *Campaign of 1815 in France* the following year, *Notes on Prussia in its great catastrophe* in 1976, and finally by *The campaign of 1799 in Italy and Switzerland* in 1979. His death will not end in the existence of his publishing house, which will continue its activity under the name of editions Gerard Lebovici and then Ivrea.

There is a revival of interest for Clausewitz when Raymond Aron, the French specialist in international relations, begins his *magnum opus*. Aron explained his choice in his *Memoirs*. While everyone expected a book on Marx, he wished to deviate somewhat from the registry of his previous works. Moreover, he wanted to write a genuine Treaty, he had no more practiced since *Paix et guerre entre les nations*, published in 1960, in which he quoted Clausewitz sparsely. Originally, Clausewitz was the theme of lectures at the Collège de France, since a teacher must never repeat lectures and must propose a different topic every year. Aron returned to an author he had much frequented, but superficially. As often, the investigation gave rise to new questions and resulted in a much more ample book, published five years after the course. Aron wanted to apprehend Clausewitz in his own context, but also follow his posterity and discuss its validity in the nuclear age. The division of the book in two volumes: “European age” and “Global age”, was not absolutely necessary in terms of volume (the two volumes are not larger than *Paix et guerre*...), but corresponded to a difference in content and even tone between the two volumes: the first follows the thinking of Clausewitz, the second takes a free approach: Aron expresses his ideas under the mask of Clausewitz.

The central thesis of the book is the affirmation of Clausewitz as a theorist of the war who was concealed by successive layers of doctrinaire Clausewitz, used by the military of each era to their needs. It absolves Clausewitz of the charges brought against him by Liddell Hart and his successors to be responsible for the transition to total war. The pivot is the intrinsic link between politics and war, conceived as instrument or continuation of the policy. Aron takes the famous sentence: “war is the continuation of politics by other means” which becomes, under his pen, the Formula, from which the entire work must be assessed.
Aron’s fame was so great that the book is immediately received as a classic. It has a large international vogue: it is translated into English, Italian, German, and Portuguese. Reviews are numerous. At the forefront of defenders of Aron, his disciple Julien Freund gives to *Revue française de sociologie*, a penetrating and detailed comment, highlighting a background disagreement on the formula itself however: where Aron retains that war is the continuation of politics by other means, Freund prefers translation “war is only the continuation of policy with other means”. But there are also more critical reviews, such as politist Michel Dobry. However, their impact remains very limited and Aron’s Magisterium will prevail during a generation, due to the prestige of its author and to the unique character of the work: articles in scientific journals can’t compete with such a masterpiece; it will enjoy a monopoly up to the end of the century.

There is the crosswalk between Raymond Aron’s book and the new English translation, published by Paret and Howard this year, which will definitely impose Clausewitz as the central strategic reference to the detriment of Jomini, who had been, until then, the hub of U.S. strategic culture. Both Aron and Paret and Howard are pursuing the same goal: to present a modernized Clausewitz. The English translation therefore adopts the concepts that can be understood by the contemporary reader, in preference to those that would be more faithful to the original but less accessible; Aron wants to substitute for the militaristic Clausewitz a humanist Clausewitz. This will cause the very energetic reaction of an unknown German scholar, Professor Hepp. He denounces "the emasculation of Clausewitz", emphasizing the difference between Aron’s Clausewitz and historic Clausewitz who, in 1812, wrote an apology for Prussian militarism. Aron is injured by this review published in a German magazine and responds. But German has become a rare language, this criticism has little echo in France, where it is known only through the reply by Aron, published first in German in the same journal, then translated, partly in *Commentaire* and, much later, in *Stratégique*.

Aron’s period will last up to the 1990s. Writings during this period fit virtually all in the lineage of Aron, although some differ somewhat. The main exception is Alain Joxe, whose strategy seminar at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales becomes the rallying point for the anti-aronians. It will give, in addition to the writings of Alain Joxe, Emmanuel Terray’s book, ethnologist specialist in Africa, but curious of everything, who offers a new interpretation of the work of the Prussian master.
Clausewitz 2000

In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union inevitably provoke a recomposition of French strategic thinking. Ailleret, Beaufre, Gallois, Poirier, the four generals of the apocalypse⁸, have no real successors. There are many analysts, some of them accessing visibility in the media, but it is not sure that there are still real theorists. This does not, despite the recurring theme on the crisis of strategic thinking, preclude a rich and varied debate⁹ in which Clausewitz is often called on different and even downright opposed registers. It is possible, using a formula long in vogue in intellectual Parisian circles, to talk about “burst” of Clausewitz French interpretation.

Historic Clausewitz

The historic Clausewitz takes advantage of the rise of French military history since the 1980s under the impetus of masters like André Corvisier, André Martel or Guy Pedroncini¹⁰. Even if they have not necessarily successors to their measurement, they sparked new fields of study, and among them the history of military thought. General Poirier, who is not himself a historian, comments Guibert and Jomini¹¹. Jean Chagniot studied Folard¹². Several authors have cleared the field, until then unknown, of naval thinking¹³. Clausewitz naturally benefits from this rediscovery of classics.

Firstly by the rediscovery of texts of unknown or forgotten. Reprints initiated by Gérard Lebovici, are continued by various authors. Gérard Reber, Professor of German civilization and Reserve Colonel, translated the two last volumes of Hinterlassene Werke, until then unpublished in French and covering the campaigns of the modern era, from Gustavus Adolphus to the Duke of Brunswick. This translation was initiated as part of a project of Clausewitz works, if not complete, at least very substantial, with On War in the translation of Neuens, all campaigns, the theory of combat, the principles of the strategy for the Crown Prince and the course on small war at the Kriegsakademie in 1810-1811, as well as a number of lesser-known texts, published in the three volumes of Werner Hahlweg. The Institut de Stratégie Comparée was the initiator for this project, which was to be published by Editions Economica in ten volumes. Disease of the editor and the failure of some promised funding led to successive delays that prompted Gérard Reber to publish separately these two volumes¹⁴, with a preface by Beatrice Heuser. This separate publication condemned thereby definitively the project, which then aborted as had failed before him the Clausewitz Project in the
United States, not to mention multiple attempts of complete German works. The Institut de Stratégie Comparée, at least, published a translation of the *Theory of Combat*, text which had been totally forgotten since the middle of the xix\textsuperscript{th} century\textsuperscript{15}. The Institute hopes to start a translation of the course on small war. It is an important piece unknown due to its late discovery (it had been published only in 1966). Its volume (approximately 300 pages) represents a significant obstacle. Lieutenant-Colonel Lutz Müller, German student at College Interarmées de Défense, proposed a valuable and meritorious, but unpublishable, first sketch of translation\textsuperscript{16}. Thierry Derbent published some brief excerpts, a dozen pages\textsuperscript{17}.

Waiting be published someday, this course is under scrutiny, due to the popularity of irregular strategies since the events of September 11, 2001 and asymmetric conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq that followed. Course has first undergone, besides Quiévrain, a post-marxist interpretation by Thierry Derbent, which undertakes situate Clausewitz in a genealogy of the revolutionary war in which include Lenin, Karl Liebknecht, Mao and Che Guevara. Clausewitz, with the idea of *Landsturm*, would be at the origin of this revolutionary war which won successes at xx\textsuperscript{e} century and whose author, clearly of far-left, speaks with sympathy and even nostalgic. The task is difficult: even if Clausewitz was praised by Lenin and read by Mao, his ideas were not openly revolutionary. Indeed Thierry Derbent cites him as a tutelary figure, but then quotes him little. More interesting, because closer to the text, is exegesis proposed by Sandrine Picaud-Monnerat\textsuperscript{18} who places it in the trend of small war in the XVIII\textsuperscript{th} century, i.e. the use of light troops in the service of the great war and not in opposition to it\textsuperscript{19}.

In addition to editing texts, the ISC launched an international research program on Clausewitz culminating in the publication of two issues of its magazine *Stratégique* in 2000 and 2009. The first begins with a “praise of Clausewitz” which clearly indicates the spirit. There are three groups of texts:

1. Unpublished (in French language) or insufficiently known classics: in 2000, a German article in 1915 signed by Lucia Dora Frost on the strategic purpose in Clausewitz\textsuperscript{20}; in 2009, a very important text by the great German strategist, a refugee in the U.S., Herbert Rosinski, on the structure of military strategy\textsuperscript{21}; canvas of a lecture delivered at the Army War College in November 1954 and until then unpublished: it’s a reflection on the general relationship between politics and war and an application of the theory of war: for Rosinski, Clausewitz “too closely focused on campaign and especially on their strategic component operations”; today, we must include “analysis of the organization of the war effort” (industrial mobilization, replenishment, logistics) and consider all dimen-
ions of operational strategy, i.e. land, naval, and air strategy. It’s a penetrating, truly Clausewitzian, reflection, which remains perfectly faithful to Prussian master mind and method expanded to the new dimensions of contemporary strategy. The same issue also contains the response by Raymond Aron to Professor Hepp which was until then partially unpublished in French language.

(2) New epistemological studies: in 2000, a study by Gunther Maschke on the perennial problem of relation between war and politics; a study by Hervé Guineret about Clausewitz and the problem of the method; in 2009, an article by Corentin Brustlein on Clausewitz and the balance of offensive and defensive, which shows that Clausewitz remain infinitely superior to multiple American variations, over the past thirty years, around the security dilemma.

(3) Finally, historical studies: on a ignored but crucial predecessor to Clausewitz: Johann Friedrich Konstantin von Lossau; on commentators of Clausewitz: Raymond Aron, Carl Schmitt, and Werner Hahlweg, and finally various studies on the reception of Clausewitz, in France, in the United States, in Hungary, in Italy, in the Netherlands, in Sweden and in China, to assess the exact audience and interpretation of Clausewitz that has been adapted to radically different contexts and cultures.

The purpose of this program is accumulating historical and theoretical materials that are necessary to understand in depth Clausewitz and his influence; to see how Clausewitz was received, but also used, the receivers subjugating classics in their own policy and foreign policy goals. The program is expected to continue over the next few years. Next goals are, possibly, a third issue of Stratégique and publishing texts out of print or not yet translated in French, including “The 1813 campaign until the armistice”, currently unavailable (it is true that this is a booklet of circumstance, written in the heat of action, whose theoretical intake is thin enough) and especially Lossau’s On War, whose French translation, published in 1819, had been lost: the common opinion believed that it had ever existed only in the too fertile imagination of General Bardin. However, it exists, even in two versions, under cover of anonymity, and there are here major themes that Clausewitz will later develop. The publication of texts, the study of the dissemination and interpretation of the work is less spectacular than the great comments, but it is the prerequisite to real substantive work in the long term.
Military Clausewitz

Clausewitz was not much analyzed in War Colleges after 1945. It could be quoted by teachers or speakers, but it was cursive references, in support of not really Clausewitzian demonstrations. The appellation of a neo-Clausewitzian school, launched in the 1970s, had content for less fuzzy: under the label are grouped most of the analysts who refused a too technician approach of strategy, especially in vogue in the nuclear field to invade the strategic debate from the 1980s, with the themes of the revolution in military affairs, then the transformation. In the French case, the waning of Clausewitz was compounded by the fragmentation of teaching strategy. In War Colleges (of the Army, Navy and the Air Force) old chairs had disappeared in favor of teachings given by multiple speakers. This atomization of education could give a plurality of viewpoints, but contributed to the disappearance of any guideline. It was still in “recovery time” after a quasi erasure of the strategy from the mid-1960s to the mid 1980s, when fashion was in management and forecast, promotions from the École supérieure de guerre had practically no strategy conferences. Sign of growing uncertainty surrounding discipline, it was no longer defined in the glossary of joint forces which recognized, of course, a strategic level, but without any entry for strategy itself.

A mutation intervened in 1993, with the merger of War Colleges now grouped under a joint defense College (Collège Interarmées de Défense). A chair of geopolitics and strategy was established, but its holder was talking about the first, he was good connoisseur, and not the second, that was almost completely unknown to him. Lack appeared particularly badly in the second promotion, and the chair was split (1995-1996) in two separate chairs: geopolitics on one hand, and strategy on the other. Strategy thus regained its autonomy with an annual teaching course, for a limited time volume, but with a handout finally transformed into a book in 1999. The Treaty of strategy often claims Clausewitz, quoted close to 200 times. Its purpose is to offer a strategy reader which gives first place to the human factor and not to the material factor. It distinguished several methods, including the historical method, whose Jomini would be the archetype; the geographic method, resulting in geopolitics and geostrategy; the material or realist method, that was embodied by the end of the XIXth century in French naval Jeune École, at the end of the XXth century in the school of the RMA; the philosophical method, Clausewitz is a pure representative, striving to understand the war rather than pretend give keys to concretely conduct war.
The *Traité* favors the latter method, naturally combined with others, notably the historical method that provides an empirical validation. It’s an attempt to suggest the complexity of contemporary strategy and the importance of thinking: doctrine remains paramount to technique, as the idea determines the orientations to be followed in the material choices. Very logically, more hardware investment is large, more intellectual investment must be proportionate to precede and accompany material choices. The Treaty keeps a classic view of strategy, understood as a dialectic between enemies using (or ready to use) force, against the new vision that would see strategy as the science of action in any sector of social life, and the idea of friction against the modernist school which transforms war in a purely technician process.

The CID in-depth studies of Clausewitz are rare. There are very few submissions, compared to 181 Clausewitzian subjects deposited in the Führungs Akademie since 2003. Among them, Müller, “Schlieffen plan implemented up to the first battle of the Marne was consistent with the principles of strategy defined by Clausewitz?”, 1997. Pierre-Yves Cormier, “Clausewitz stated that the war was none other than the continuation of politics by other means”, 1998; A. Griffen, “Clausewitz today, 1998.” Lieutenant-Colonel Serra, “What remains of the thinking of Clausewitz in nuclear deterrence strategies?” 1998. Then, apart Benoît Durieux, one expect close to a decade to find two Clausewitzian topics, due both to German students: Lutz Müller tries a first return course on small war, 2007; Carsten Wilhelm Schrehardt engages in a comparison of the teaching of Clausewitz in France and Germany today, 2010.

The most notable exception is Lieutenant-Colonel Benoît Durieux who submitted in 2001 a master on the receipt of Clausewitz in France until 1870, accompanied by a summary of *Vom Kriege* then released in book, on the model of the abstract general Palat published in 1921, but with a modern spirit. Benoît Durieux then expanded his research to the submission of a thesis on the reception of Clausewitz in France in 2007, published the following year under the title: *Clausewitz in France, two centuries of reflection on war*. It is undoubtedly one of the most interesting theses in military history and a major contribution to the history of the French military thought: under the aegis of Clausewitz, the author engages in an interpretation of all of the themes developed by the French military writers since the middle of the XIXth century with a high scholarship. The investigation is probably exhaustive and almost definitive for land military authors, it can be supplemented for naval and air theorists. At least in the naval field, there are a few Clausewitzian voices, admittedly scattered, but not completely negligible. This
author had proposed an interpretation of naval war based on the distinction between annihilation strategy, obtained by sea battle and attrition strategy, obtained by sea\textsuperscript{34} blockade. Corbett and Rosinski\textsuperscript{35} translations now provide French analysts bases for Clausewitzian interpretation of the maritime strategy. Work remains widely to do for air strategy, too often dominated by a technician approach.

The balance is not negative. However, it is true that the study of Clausewitz in French higher military education suffers from a cruel lack of institutionalization. There is no equivalent of Clausewitz-Gesellschaft or the International Clausewitz Zentrum. Thinking about Clausewitz is always the result of individual initiatives and not a planned and systematic approach. On War is not a required reading at the CID. The only institutional record of the Prussian is, if we dare say, the assignment of its name to a room of the CID (with a spelling to his name). It is not a rejection of the German master, but a demonstration, among many others, of the neglect of the military institution towards classics, whose study does not appear as a “burning obligation”.

In this context, most notable is the symposium organized in 2007 by the schools of Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan on Clausewitz and contemporary strategic thinking. All French Clausewitzians (Benoît Durieux, Martin Motte, Christian Malis, Emmanuel Terray, Alain Joxe, Vincent Desportes, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie…) participated, as well as several foreign leading Clausewitzians: Hew Strachan for Britain, Bruno Colson and Christophe Wasinski for Belgium, Jean-Jacques Langeendorf for Switzerland. This very rich conference marked the end of the Aron era, with the desire to break with certainly masterful analysis, but too tied to the personality of the commentator, to find a more historic Clausewitz, closer to the work itself. Against those who, once again, claimed the death of Clausewitz, the participants in the symposium were unanimous to emphasize the relevance of its themes, including friction, to analyze an increasingly shifting and uncertain contemporary strategic situation, with asymmetric conflicts which reveal the failure of a too close technological approach\textsuperscript{36}.

General Vincent Desportes, former Director of the Joint Defense College, is significant for this return of the Clausewitzian themes in policy debate. He participated in the Symposium of Coëtquidan and his books, including Décider dans l’incertitude\textsuperscript{37}, are very Clausewitzian with highlighting of friction, chance, and necessity of not sticking to an American approach too tied to technology. Incomparable connoisseur of American strategic thinking, he attended to very closely during his long U.S. stays, he noted that Clausewitzian ideas\textsuperscript{38} were able to over-
come in United States because they were accommodated in the ambient technologism. It repeats a theme which already developed by Bruno Colson, on the jominisation of Clausewitz.

**Metaphysical Clausewitz**

The big event of the first decade of the XXIst century is the advent of a new Clausewitz, largely unexpected and called, also, to a long posterity: the apocalyptic Clausewitz of René Girard.

*Achever Clausewitz*, published in 2007, is presented in the modest form of interviews. This is a book in which there is many more Girard than Clausewitz. Even more than in Aron, Clausewitz serves as pretext. Jean Guittion said, “we pay tribute, classics, for ideas that they never had but we would not have had without them.” One such book is likely to generate what might be termed the Amadeus syndrome, namely the violent reaction of the specialist who does not accept being exceeded by a more talented newcomer. It seems wiser bowing to superior spirit and recognize René Girard’s book is truly striking and presents a philologically fragile interpretation: it is intuition more than a real demonstration, but with unparalleled power. Grand master of strategic theory is the first time confronted with theology and metaphysics according to one scholar of comparable scale. True or false, the original hypothesis leads to an impressive result.

Girard proposes a religious interpretation of Clausewitz: “it is completely hypocritical to see *On War* as a technical book.” *Vom Kriege* is an inspired book: “Clausewitz is owned as all the great writers of resentment.” This is because he wants to be more rational than strategists who preceded him by fingers an irrational real. “Then he pulls back and starts to not see.” As Aron, but for diametrically opposed reasons, Girard sees a radical hiatus between the chapter first book I and the rest of the book. But, where Aron sees the ultimate state of thinking which should inspire any final overwrite, Girard sees a meteoric intuition that the rest of the book would try to conceal. The formula which serves as a pivot to Aron: “war as a continuation of the politic by other means”, Girard overrides an apocalyptic formula: war as “effort towards the external tenebras.” The idea of reciprocity is at the heart of the thesis: “the modern wars are so violent because they are reciprocal: mobilization involves more people to become complete.” “The interplay is such amplified by globalization, this global reciprocity where any small event can have some impact elsewhere on the globe, that violence is always one step ahead.” “The policy runs behind violence.” This is why Clausewitz becomes the best guide to the
accurate understanding of the contemporary world, beyond the narrow circle of strategists: “because we are in a most positively violent universe that him and where some of his observations on the military thing became observations on the world, everything just”.

Violence not war: war is no longer a ritualized institution as it was before the French Revolution, so it fills its traditional function of evacuation pipe of violence; “violence which produced sacred produces nothing more herself”. Absolute war is no longer an abstraction but becomes a reality: “violence seems now deliberate, extreme ascent is served by the science or policy”. René Girard notes with reason the equivalence of illegal wars and regular war revealed by the attacks of September 11 and Iraq U.S. response. He rejoins here the famous theory of Carl Schmitt on the end of the classic international law (jus publicum europaeum). Simply, where Schmitt sees a legal and ideological change, with criminalization of the enemy which prohibits any negotiated settlement, Girard identifies overall dysfunction: “violence is today unleashed at the level of the entire planet, causing what apocalyptic texts announced: confusion between the disasters caused by nature and disasters caused by men, a confusion of the natural and the artificial”.

This disruption is a sign of time and here Girard’s message becomes truly apocalyptic: “the apocalypse has begun”. And it goes very far in this direction since it does not hesitate to say that “the global warming and the rise of violence are two absolutely linked phenomena”. Girard has some very harsh words on the willful blindness Westerners who refuse to see the coming disaster: “Two global wars, the invention of the atomic bomb, several genocides, an imminent ecological catastrophe will not be enough to convince humanity, and Christians in the first place, as the apocalyptic texts, even though they had no value predictive, are related to disaster in course”.

The strength of the warning is such that it is not possible to ignore it. Indeed, he occurs after many other updates in guard, variously reasoned, but convergent: on a more technique plan, disruption of war was analyzed by many recent authors, since the General Le Borgne (La Guerre est morte... mais on ne le sait pas encore, 1990) to General Rupert Smith (The Utility of Force, 2007). In sociological terms, famous thesis Norbert Elias, set out in The Civilisation of morals and The dynamics of the West is undermined today by the debate around the brutalization or the ensauvagement of the world. In a long term perspective, Samuel Huntington clash of civilizations is excessive, but it does not invalidate his central thesis. There is no determinism in history, except demographic and trends in this area are overwhelming. On a metaphysical plane, or metastrategic to speak as Jean Guitton, apocalyptic process described Girard is the logical culmination of a process initiated since at least two centuries.
The impressive nature of the message cannot however disguise superficial reference to Clausewitz. The starting point of Girard is clever, but untenable: If Clausewitz was really frightened by his vision of the outer darkness, he had to remove the offending, passage rather than attempting to drown in a demonstration of several hundred pages. From this point of view, this last interpretation of Clausewitz does not invalidate its predecessors; simply it adds an additional dimension, whose prophetic force equal as the exegetic fragility.

For nearly 200 years, the France has worn cycles of high and low intensity attention almost constant to Clausewitz, sometimes dismissed but most often recognized as a master. One could almost speak of a Freudian couple attraction/repulsion, indifference was rare and brief. Each supposed death of Clausewitz was followed by a renaissance. Today, after the long period of the Magisterium Aron, who brought the French interpretation of Clausewitz in the international forefront, we are witnessing a new bubbling between diverging and even opposite trends. It cannot be said still in what direction the balance will tip. The only certain thing is that the figure of the Prussian master has not finished interweaving in French strategic debate.

Notes:

3 What inspires him a comment at least ill-informed and casual: « before and after Clausewitz, that makes rigorous project, the books on theory of war are rare. Until 1945, a library file was enough”, *Le Discours de la guerre*, Paris, 10-18, 1973, p. 273.


30 It was known only by a mention in the *Dictionnaire militaire* by Bardin (1850).


44 René Girard, *op. cit.*, p. 54.


46 René Girard, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

47 René Girard, *op. cit.*, p. 57.


50 René Girard, *op. cit.*, p. 11.


53 René Girard, *op. cit.*, p. 11.