




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CLAUSEWITZ AND THE NETHERLANDS

Paul Donker

On the eve of the French revolution there was also unrest in the Republic of the Seven United Provinces, the present-day Netherlands. Although a republic in name, the country was ruled in a fairly authoritarian manner by stadtholder William V. Like in France, the patriots demanded more democracy. When they briefly incarcerated Wilhelmina, William's spouse, on 28 June 1787, he had had enough. He asked her brother, King Frederick William II of Prussia, to launch a military intervention, upon which the latter dispatched an intervention force of approximately 25,000 men. This Prussian army was commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, who in 1792 was to command the invasion of France, an intervention that would be stopped by the revolutionaries near Valmy. In 1787, however, Brunswick managed to restore the authority of the stadtholder in less than a month.

Clausewitz studied Brunswick's campaign in the Republic of the Seven United Provinces in detail, and this case study, still very much worth reading today, forms part of the historical foundation on which his principal work *Vom Kriege* rests. Together with several other short studies the *Feldzug des Herzogs von Braunschweig gegen die Holländer in 1787* was incorporated in the last, the tenth volume of his posthumous works. His analysis has a modern ring to it; after all, it relates to a military intervention in a civil war. One of the most important conclusions Clausewitz drew from this case study was that a military intervention in a war-torn country may never be underestimated. He believed the Prussian cabinet had sent far too few troops in view of the chaotic situation, the option of the patriots to inundate the country and the possibility of France coming to their rescue. Also, an intervention should be based on a worst-case scenario and it could be assumed that the majority of the factions would be well-disposed towards the force.¹ Except for these inundations, there are many parallels with the recent operations in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan, as will be seen below.

Conversely, there has been an interest from the Netherlands for Clausewitz work from the very first. The first Dutch translation of *Vom Kriege* dates back to as early as 1846, and in that same year his entire posthumous works, except for the last two volumes, became available in Dutch. So, this was

before the original work had gone through its second edition in Prussia. But, did this mutual interest and early availability in the native language mean that Clausewitz gathered a following in the Netherlands? Did he have a lasting influence on the political-military thinking and practice?

In order to answer these questions, this contribution will follow two subsequent approaches. First, it will be investigated how Clausewitz and his *Vom Kriege* have been cited in the military-scientific periodical *De Militaire Spectator* since 1832. This venerable periodical has been in existence for almost 180 years, and, by comparing the articles dealing with the subject, the extent of Clausewitz's following among the Dutch officers can be ascertained, and, by extension, his influence on the military thinking.

The second part of this contribution, subsequently, will focus on the extent of Clausewitz's influence on the political-military practice in the Netherlands. Of course, within the scope of this article it is impossible to cover all Dutch military operations since 1833. Therefore, this will be limited to three crucial political-military decisions of the past few years: the decision in 1994 to send an air-mobile battalion to the Srebrenica enclave; the decision to support the American-British invasion of Iraq politically but not militarily, and the decision in 2010 to terminate the mission in Afghanistan. As with the Prussian intervention of 1787 in the Netherlands, these three cases concern internally divided countries. In accordance with Clausewitz's method, it is possible to consider the fine-tuning of ends, ways and means.

The first Dutch translation

As is known, Clausewitz's widow published her husband's posthumous work in ten volumes between 1832 and 1837. The first three volumes together form *Vom Kriege*, the remaining seven are of an historical nature. At the same time the first issue of military-scientific periodical *De Militaire Spectator* was published on 29 January 1833.² Already in the first volume there was some brief attention for *Vom Kriege*, which the reviewer called the most scientific book so far on the art of war, praising the manner in which it was described by Clausewitz.³ In the years to follow chief editor J. C. van Rijnveld repeatedly referred to *Vom Kriege* in his articles.⁴

The then librarian of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, E. H. Brouwer, translated the first eight volumes of the posthumous work and they were published in a somewhat different composition between 1839 and 1846.⁵

What is striking is that he started with the more historical works and ended with *Vom Kriege*. Apart from that, it is not clear why he skipped the last two volumes, which oddly enough deal with the Prussian invasion of the Netherlands of 1787. One explanation for this is that Brouwer thought that there would mainly be interest in the then recent French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and not in the earlier campaigns described by Clausewitz in volumes 9 and 10. The overview below presents the first editions of the original and translated volumes. Shortly after the publication of this first Dutch translation First Lieutenant J. L. Wagner published a Dutch summary of *Vom Kriege* intended for a broader public.⁶

All in all, with this early translation by Brouwer and summary by Wagner the Netherlands was one of the first countries, if not the very first, to have the virtually complete works of Clausewitz available in the native language. In spite of this, this promising start was not to lead to a large influence during the nineteenth century. First of all, Brouwer was not very much interested in Clausewitz's thinking. Tradition has it that he had a large family and that translating military science works was a bitter necessity to sustain it. Apart from Clausewitz he also translated many other military science works and, as far as is known, always for a small audience. Secondly, the sales of the translation stagnated and in 1859 the publisher tried to rekindle the fire somewhat by issuing it under a new title.⁷ There are no indications that this was a really successful move and today only a few copies of this Dutch translation have survived. Finally, in actual fact, there is only a modest number of references to Clausewitz's work in *De Militaire Spectator* between 1832 and 1870.

So, while in most European countries Clausewitz was discovered and translated rather late, after von Moltke had referred to him around 1870, he was noticed almost straightaway in Dutch military science circles and his work was translated almost immediately.

The period between 1870 and 1945

In the Netherlands, too, interest in Clausewitz increased after von Moltke had adopted him as his source of inspiration. The Prussian-German success against France in 1870 had of course not gone unnoticed and the concept of a war fought offensively, full of surprise and with all available force in order to be decisive, did not fall on deaf ears here. Still, even now there was no real breakthrough. Thus, up to World War II Clausewitz was referred to in the study

books at officer education institutes, but Jomini received relatively more attention.⁸

One reason for this limited impact may well have been that in these years the Netherlands pursued a policy of non-interference with regard the European major powers, which in times of crisis changed into a strict neutrality. After all, such a political strategy implied a purely defensive role of the armed forces, and offensive warfare, which was Clausewitz's hallmark, was the prerogative of the major powers. On top of that, this constant policy ensured that there would only be few new strategic challenges for the strategic thinkers in the Netherlands.

In a general respect, Clausewitz and his *Vom Kriege* were cited in *De Militaire Spectator* on a very regular basis until the outbreak of World War II. In articles and series of articles on strategy his name was never absent, and each time the reference was to the original German version of his work. Apparently, Brouwer's Dutch translation was not used. Between 1905 and 1909 then First Lieutenant C. C. de Gelder wrote an elaborate series, entitled *Strategische Studien*, in which numerous strategic problems of a general nature were discussed and in which Clausewitz was regularly cited.⁹ Captain Wilson followed suit in 1931 with a series of four articles in which a general description was given of the military strategy.¹⁰ In these and comparable articles the offensive conduct of war featured prominently and Clausewitz was consistently given his place in the line that runs from Frederick the Great to Napoleon, Jomini, von Moltke and von Schlieffen. As far as can be ascertained, the famous formula that war is a continuation of politics with other means was used for the first time in *De Militaire Spectator* in 1900.¹¹ Clearly, that aspect of his theory evoked less interest. Another striking absentee in the years leading up to World War II was his *wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit*. This important concept did not receive any attention although the relation between politics, society and the armed forces was an object of study. His views, too, on the chaotic side of war, the element of friction and his concept of *Schwerpunkt*, the subject of much present-day writing, were almost completely ignored.

An important strategic issue for the Netherlands between 1870 and 1940 was the question whether the defensive should be conducted fully statically (i.e. digging in behind the great rivers and inundations) or more dynamically (i.e. by means of an independently operating field army in front of the rivers). In the ongoing discussion on the topic in *De Militaire Spectator* there

were frequent references to Clausewitz, needless to say to beef up the advantages of the latter option.¹²

Another topic in which Clausewitz was regularly quoted was the case study of the Prussian intervention of 1787, described above in the introduction. Both in the Netherlands and Germany new works on this invasion were published on a regular basis during this period and the reviews always contained references to his, by that time, almost 50-year-old study. Clearly, his view constituted a benchmark for Dutch readers.¹³

What is striking is that Clausewitz, in contrast to what happened in Great Britain, was not thrown on the dung heap of history after World War I. No articles were published that linked him to the dramatic course of that war. The problem of a direct versus an indirect strategy was not an issue here, and, besides, there were no first-hand experiences of the horrors of trench warfare. Also the fact that most Dutch officers at the time had a command of the German language, so had direct access to *Vom Kriege* without having to resort to a slanted translation, will have played a part in this. In *De Militaire Spectator*, Clausewitz was studied seriously against the background of World War I. His influence on von Schlieffen's and von Moltke's (the younger) strategies was recognized, but not censured.¹⁴

On the eve of World War II then First Lieutenant Calmeijer wrote a series of articles in which he presented his views on future warfare, and in which he repeatedly referred to *Vom Kriege*.¹⁵ And already in the October issue of 1939 of *De Militaire Spectator* the Polish campaign was discussed and analyzed at length. The anonymous author was convinced that, "[t]he campaign in Poland will forever remain a classic example of the conduct of warfare, which the great German strategists (Clausewitz, Moltke, Schlieffen), emulating the wars waged by Frederick the Great and Napoleon, developed into a system, executed with the present-day munitions of war."¹⁶

The years of the Cold War

After World War II the Netherlands renounced its policy of non-interference and armed neutrality, gearing virtually its entire defence organization to the allied defence. As a consequence the NATO strategy became leading for the Netherlands armed forces and the need for strategic thinkers of their own diminished. Because the three Services, the Royal Netherlands Navy, the Royal Netherlands Army and the Royal Netherlands Air Force were each assigned

their own area of operations, they began to diverge bit by bit. The Royal Netherlands Navy increasingly focussed on counter-submarine warfare in the Atlantic, the Royal Netherlands Army on large-scale land operations on the North German plains and the Royal Netherlands Air Force on the air war over the entire Western Europe. Only occasionally did the three organizations rub shoulders and for that reason there was little point in developing a joint military strategy.

Of course, some strategy was taught at the various staff schools but this was relatively modest and mainly directed at the existing NATO strategy. Nor was there any specific training for operational-strategic planners during this period. Needless to say that in such a restricted environment there was less attention for Clausewitz.

In fact, strategic thinking in the Netherlands during this period found its way to the civilian universities and similar institutions, where the so-called peace studies began to flourish, and within which there was some room for strategy and, by extension, for Clausewitz. In this context the names of H. W. Houweling, J. G. Siccama and P. M. E. Volten, in whose works *Vom Kriege* is often referred to, are certainly worth mentioning.¹⁷ However, the focus of these studies during those years lay on preventing war rather than waging it. The horror of a global nuclear war caused the starting point to be maintaining peace. Clausewitz was mainly studied and quoted from this perspective, and his axiom that the political view prevails over the military one was the *Leitmotiv* in these studies. There was, however, also some attention for the thesis that defence is the strongest form of warfare, which served as a foundation for a completely passive NATO strategy, to be executed with purely defensive weapon systems. Another academic bone of contention was his concept of absolute war, which of course closely touches upon nuclear warfare.

It goes without saying that Clausewitz never disappeared completely from Dutch military thinking. Even during the Cold War he kept appealing to the imagination.¹⁸ In 1971 then Lieutenant Colonel F. C. Spits, lecturer at the *Hogere Krijgsschool*, obtained his Ph. D. on a doctoral thesis in which *Vom Kriege* features prominently. In ten chapters the historical change in the conduct of war around 1800 and Clausewitz's related concept of absolute war were analyzed. Also his views on the primacy of politics were discussed and strongly defended against von Moltke's and Liddell Hart's erroneous interpretations of *Vom Kriege*.¹⁹ What is typical for the Cold War days, incidentally, was that nowhere did the book mention that its author had a military background. Spits,

incidentally, had a weekly radio column in which he commented on current military issues. He was also an extraordinary professor of military history at the University of Utrecht for a number of years.

Clausewitz was also cited on a regular basis in *De Militaire Spectator*. Officers, who had studied at German, British or American staff colleges became intimately acquainted with his works and referred to him in their articles. Thus, in this periodical there were quotes from the original German edition as well as the famed translation by Howard and Paret, but also earlier English translations. The Dutch translation by Brouwer, however, was not used anymore.

As for topics, 1985 saw a remarkable shift. Until that year Clausewitz had regained his historical place in military science, with the addition that there was now more interest in his political-military ideas at the expense of his more operational views.²⁰ Until 1985 there had been only one author to fall back on *Vom Kriege* in his study of an operational problem, in this case the defence behind the great rivers.²¹ It is true, Clausewitz was mentioned in the study of the Sinai war of 1956 and the Vietnam war and like in the civilian world he was regularly quoted in connection with nuclear warfare. What was new in this period was, first of all, the communist-inspired views on Clausewitz, and a comparison, secondly, of his theories with Sun Tzu's. Finally, mention must be made of the article on the guerrilla against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, if only because it was the only article in which also other work of Clausewitz was used, be it ever so modestly.²² For the rest, during the Cold War period his entire oeuvre seemed to have been reduced to *Vom Kriege*.

As was said above, there is a clear watershed as of 1985, when Clausewitz was rediscovered as a source in operational and tactical problems, with a striking preference of authors for English translations of *Vom Kriege*, in particular Howard and Paret. One reason for this may be that the editors of *De Militaire Spectator* included several re-runs of articles by American authors, who, of course, used *On War*.²³ It is clear that the change of direction had everything to do with the change in thinking within NATO. When the 1980s saw an increase of interest in manoeuvre warfare, the step to Clausewitz was only a small one. In a series of articles the case was made for the introduction of the operational level between the existing strategic and tactical levels in order to create room there for manoeuvre, as, for instance, in the FOFA concept (Follow-on-Forces Attack).²⁴ What is interesting in this is that much earlier, in 1963 to be exact, a plea had been made in *De Militaire Spectator* for such a tripartite division, also on the basis of Clausewitz.²⁵ Then Colonel, the later Commander

of the Land Forces, Lieutenant General M. Schouten, further elaborated this idea for the Royal Netherlands Army with R. J. van Vels, using, among others, Clausewitz's culmination point.²⁶ Their proposal invited a reaction from Lieutenant Colonel F. J. D. C. Egter van Wissekerke, who was to show himself one of the Netherlands' best experts on Clausewitz of the period. Egter van Wissekerke was a lecturer at the *Hogere Krijgsschool*, co-author of many doctrine publications and writer of many articles published in *De Militaire Spectator* and the *Carré* periodical. For support or illustration of his ideas he often referred to *Vom Kriege*, and it was thanks to his work that Clausewitz found his way into the Dutch army doctrine.²⁷

Clausewitz was also discovered in those years by Air Force officers and they, too, linked his work to practice as well as doctrine. In 1991, the later Commander of the Air Force, B.A.C. Droste, analyzed the air war during the liberation of Kuwait and, among others, focused on Clausewitz's primacy of politics.²⁸ The Gulf War also featured regularly in later articles, but then there were more references to the more operational concepts of *Vom Kriege*, such as the centre of gravity.²⁹

Clausewitz after the Cold War

When around 1990 the Cold War came to an end and the work on new Army and Air Force doctrines began, it appeared that they were in part inspired by Clausewitz's ideas. Various authors referred to *Vom Kriege*, in general sense as well as in the more specific embracing of concepts such as the trinity.³⁰ In his preface to the first *Landmacht Doctrinepublicatie* (LDP-1) the Commander of the Land Forces, Lieutenant General M. Schouten, states that it was in part inspired by Clausewitz and Fuller. In particular, this last name triggered a reaction by military historian J. W. M. Schulten, who explained that a reference to Fuller was unfortunate in view of his political ideas. Besides, Schulten disagreed with Schouten's view and that of others that there had been too little attention for manoeuvre warfare during the Cold War, and that for this reason the new doctrine fell back on Clausewitz.³¹

Schulten received little support and in *De Militaire Spectator* from 2000 onwards the authors kept seeing a clear relation between Clausewitz and the new way of warfare. Former U.S. Marine Corps colonel, N. Pratt, argued that we were living at a watershed comparable to that at the time of Clausewitz around 1800, and, taking this one step further, F. J. J. Princen and M. H. Wi-

jnen claimed that his philosophical, non-linear way of thinking was the only way to hold firm in today's complex world.³²

In particular, Air Force circles embraced the idea that it was not so much *Vom Kriege* as Clausewitz's philosophical method of studying the phenomenon of war that deserved a following. In his article entitled *The road to academic 'critical mass'* D. M. Drew described the co-operation of many years between the American and Netherlands Air Force Staff schools. Dutch air power lecturers were trained in America and in their tailor-made course both Clausewitz and his method of studying the phenomenon of war, called '*the Clausewitzian mindset*' by Drew, were given generous attention.³³ Two of these lecturers, F. H. Meulman and F. Osinga, testified of this mindset in the same theme issue of *De Militaire Spectator*.³⁴ A year later A. C. Tjepkema in his article on Boyd recognized a clear link with Clausewitz's thinking.³⁵

Finally, Clausewitz became involved in the discussion on the present-day forms of warfare. M.W.M. Kitzen is of the opinion that his ideas constitute an important exponent of Western military culture and that this culture is at odds with modern counter-insurgency. B. W. Schuurman, on the other hand, argues that Clausewitz is discarded far too soon by several new war thinkers.³⁶

Clausewitz in the Dutch military thinking

After this survey, which covers almost 180 years, it is time to make a preliminary weigh-up on the question of the extent of Clausewitz's influence on Dutch military thinking. Measured in terms of the number of references made in articles in *De Militaire Spectator*, it may be safely concluded that he has managed to acquire a position of his own. There are roughly two types of readers among Dutch officers; those who make an in-depth study of *Vom Kriege* and those who make occasional references to it. Although Clausewitz did not gather a following in the Netherlands, he and his *Vom Kriege* time and again manage to fascinate a number of officers and to inspire them to further study. The line-up of names like Van Rijneveld, Wilson, Calmeijer, Spits and Egter van Wissekerke shows that in particular officers with a certain intellectual curiosity know where to find him, irrespective of what their immediate environment thinks of that. That position is unequalled and the fact that the '*Clausewitzian mindset*' has enjoyed so much attention again since 2000 clearly shows that this will remain so for some time to come.

The group of officers not only studying *Vom Kriege* sec, but referring to him in their research, is obviously much larger. Clausewitz, his masterpiece and the ideas and concepts it harbours are a clear source of inspiration. In the Dutch military thinking a quote from *Vom Kriege* has the status of axiom that needs no further explanation. Also this position is unique, and, without reservations, may be called special after 180 years.

First of all, the way in which Clausewitz has been studied since 1832 has undergone some change, though. What is striking is that initially his historical works received more attention than his *Vom Kriege*, but the former have been completely forgotten since World War II. Needless to say, within those studies "*Der Feldzug des Herzog von Braunschweig gegen die Holländer 1787*" holds pride of place.

Secondly, just as in other European countries Clausewitz is clearly regarded as an exponent of a way of warfare. He is consistently given a place among Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Jomini, von Moltke (the elder) and the later German strategists. The adoration or revulsion, so noticeable in various other countries, is very rare here, possibly because of the strategic position of the Netherlands, which leads to purely defensive armed forces.

What is striking, thirdly, is that the interest for the more operational side of *Vom Kriege* seems to have waned considerably during the Cold War, only to return rather quickly after 1985. In contrast to Schulten's view, fairly little operational material was published in the forty years after 1945 by his colleagues. For that reason, the term re-discovery is justified for the situation after 1985.

In line with this, finally, it must be said that the political side of *Vom Kriege* received the most attention during the Cold War. Although as early as 1900 it was first pointed out that Clausewitz views war as a political instrument, the number of reference after this is not really great. In other words, for most Dutch officers *Vom Kriege* is mainly an operational book.

Clausewitz in the political-military practice

Now that Clausewitz's special place within the Dutch military *thinking* has become clear, it is time to consider the influence of his work on the political-military *practice*. As was said above, three important post-Cold War decision moments will be analyzed to that end, but before they are discussed, a brief survey of the changes within the Dutch armed forces will be presented. The

so-called *Toetsingskader* (Assessment Framework) which is used in the Netherlands in the decision-making with regard to military missions abroad, will be dealt with in the process.

As was the case for other western militaries the Dutch armed forces had to undergo a process of re-orientation after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but compared to most other European countries, this transformation into a modern fully professional expeditionary organization, capable of being deployed across the entire spectrum of violence, was a relatively fast one.

To begin with, conscription was *de facto* phased out. As there was insufficient political support in 1997 for a change of the Constitution, conscription was, according to good Dutch political mores, retained legally but no longer executed in practice. Thus, conscripts were registered, but not called up or trained. Initially, this solution was chosen in order to be able to return to the large conscript army should the international situation give occasion for this. However, over time the entire infrastructure in the armed forces disappeared, making a re-introduction of conscription virtually impossible.

Along with conscription the phenomenon of the so-called mobilizable units became obsolete. This, too, was an extraordinary choice in the Netherlands. Nowadays, all units are ready or nearly ready and can be sent out on short notice. With the exception of a few CIMIC functions there are no mobilizable functions for the current service personnel when their contracts expire. As a result, all the time and energy spent on their education and specific training is lost. Even in case the armed forces are faced with a temporary increase of tasks, there are no reserve units that can be called up, as is the case in the United States of America.

Officially, the Dutch armed forces have three main tasks: protecting the integrity of national and Alliance territory; promoting the international rule of law and international stability; and supporting civil authorities in upholding the law, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, both nationally and internationally. In practice the emphasis lies on the second task. The Netherlands is one among the few countries to even have incorporated this task in the Constitution.

Precisely because the military missions abroad have become so important and experience has shown that decision making in this area is extremely complex, a so-called *Toetsingskader* (Assessment Framework) has been developed. This important document is used to facilitate the communication

between Government and Parliament and over time it has been adapted several times on the basis of experiences gained. In the context of the present study it is important to recognize that this *Toetsingskader* has a distinct Clausewitzian ring to it. The Assessment Framework has two main themes – the political advisability of a mission and its military feasibility. Here, *Vom Kriege* is just around the corner. It was Clausewitz, in particular, who taught us that ends, ways and means should be in line with each other in a (military) campaign. As is known, the bulk of Book 8 is devoted to that theme.

When dealing with the political aspects, the Framework examines the legal bases, the mandate, other participating countries, the possibilities for development aid and the room for the Netherlands to exert political influence on the mission. Apart from obvious considerations regarding weather and terrain, the military aspects pertain to the stance of the parties in the conflict, the concept of operations, the rules of engagement, the command structure, possible risks, duration of participation, availability of units and financial consequences. The Clausewitzian influence is evident, all the more so as the Assessment Framework assumes that the elements mentioned are considered in their mutual dependency.

In sum, it can be said that the transformed armed forces have given the Dutch politics a unique and extremely effective instrument in view of the nature of today's conflicts and threats. The *Toetsingskader* provides a Clausewitzian frame of mind to be applied in the political-military decision making on the actual use of that instrument.

Important aspects of the Dutch decision making

Still, the question remains whether Clausewitz would be entirely satisfied about the system that is currently applied in the Netherlands for taking strategic decisions. It is evident that he lived in a different political-societal climate from that 180 years later. As concerns political-military decision making, *Vom Kriege* broadly starts from fully sovereign states within which a small and select group of people are fully responsible for this strategy. Thus, there is great freedom of action in determining ends, ways and means.

In 2010 the Netherlands is in a different position. First of all, currently there are much more precise international agreements, such as those in the UN Charter, which strongly limit the use of military power. Secondly, a Dutch effort will almost always take place under the auspices of an international organi-

zation such as the UN, NATO or the EU, or within a coalition of the willing. In such contexts the influence of The Hague on the mandate or strategy is limited, and, besides, the Dutch military contribution is only part of a larger effort. In short, Dutch decision making does not concern the entire strategy discussed in *Vom Kriege*, but merely partial aspects of it.

Also, within the Netherlands itself, the situation is totally different from that of Clausewitz's days. No more is there a limited number of decision makers. Only when the Netherlands is attacked directly, the Cabinet may act of its own accord, as a matter of urgency. In all other cases Parliament demands influence. Since 1990 there have been repeated differences of opinion between the Cabinet and Parliament on the borderline cases and the extent of influence. The current Constitution provides in a right of information, but many parliamentarians would rather see the realization of a right of approval, which would of course greatly decrease the decision power of the government.

So, where Clausewitz exclusively had in mind the strategic decision makers, in 2010 also parliamentarians play an important role. Needless to say, the consultations between the two are time-consuming and the transparency of the decision often comes under pressure in the search for compromise. This problem is reinforced in the Netherlands by the relatively large number of political parties, which always leads to the formation of coalition governments. As a mission abroad is a very serious matter, the government tries to find a large majority in Parliament. Therefore, attempts are made not only to get support for the mission from coalition parties, but also from the opposition or at least the bulk of it. Thus, all important decisions in the Netherlands inevitably imply compromise and military missions abroad are no exception. However, transparent military strategies do not go along well with compromise.

The last innovative aspect concerns the role of the media and the population. They, too, have acquired a much more prominent position over the past 180 years. An earlier version of the *Toetsingskader* still specifically took the societal support into account, but this is not the case anymore, the government being convinced now that it is itself expected to convince the public of the correctness of the decision to send out troops. And, of course, Parliament, as the ultimate representative body of the population, may be expected to ensure this support is adequately guaranteed.

The above observations show that, in spite of the Clausewitzian element of the *Toetsingskader*, it will be rather difficult in the Dutch political prac-

tice to arrive at a clear transparent strategy. So, although there may be an ambition to bring ends, ways and means in line, in accordance with Clausewitz's instrumentalist vision, the question is justified whether this can be attained in practice.

Three practical examples of political-military decision making in the Netherlands

After the end of the Cold War the Netherlands participated in many peace missions, most of which were successful, especially the (more classic) peace keeping operations. In a few cases, such as the 2001 UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and operation *Amber Fox* a year later in Macedonia, the Netherlands even acted as lead nation. In other operations this role was fulfilled in cooperation with other nations, such as the deployment of the combined German-Dutch army corps headquarters in Afghanistan.

As long as missions were relatively free of violence, there were hardly any political-military problems in the Netherlands. However, when a mission had a more enforcing character this changed. As soon as there was an uncooperative opposing force which had to be brought under control with military means, things regularly went wrong at that level. This is striking, as a choice was made for armed forces that could be deployed across the spectrum of violence.³⁷ So, precisely in missions that approached Clausewitz's ideas, the decisiveness of The Hague seemed to dwindle.

In order to examine this extraordinary phenomenon, below three cases will be considered that caused some turmoil in the Netherlands as well as abroad.³⁸ They are the decision in 1994 to send an air-mobile battalion to the Srebrenica enclave; the decision to support the American-British invasion of Iraq in 2003 *politically*, but not *militarily*; and the 2010 decision to terminate the mission in Afghanistan. The former two cases have been investigated in the mean time by several commissions, which in the case of Srebrenica eventually led to the fall of the Cabinet, while also Afghanistan recently caused a government crisis.

In the three cases it will be examined whether the Netherlands used its armed forces as a Clausewitzian *instrument*. In an ideal situation an integral strategic assessment would have to yield a balance between ends, ways and means. What must not be forgotten in all this is that the armed forces are a *means of power*, and that consequently there is an opponent who may decide to put up a

resistance. All things considered, Clausewitz's historical study of the Prussian intervention against the Hollanders in 1787 mentioned above may be used as a guideline.

Bosnia (Srebrenica)

The disintegration of Yugoslavia from 1991 onwards coincided with the first phase of the transformation to fully professional armed forces described above. The Netherlands shared the collective international indignation about the violent events and from the first took part in the various missions in the former Yugoslavia. Initially, this participation was limited, as the combat units were still manned by conscripts. Even before the first infantry battalion of the Air Mobile Brigade was fully operational by the end of 1993, strong pressure from politicians and from within the organization itself began to build to send them out immediately. Even before it was clear exactly where and how the battalion was going to be deployed in Bosnia, an official offer was made by the Minister of Defence to the UN. This came at a time when it was also still unclear politically and militarily what precisely the concept of *safe area* entailed. In the end, the unit was only allowed the means for self-protection and a vague promise of air support in case of an emergency.

In January 1994 the first air mobile battalion relieved a Canadian unit in the Srebrenica enclave, and gradually from this moment onwards the mismatch between the intended political objective and the means employed to achieve it became painfully clear. In vain, the new Minister of Defence, Voorhoeve, tried to change this situation. A year later the supply lines of the, by now third, battalion were cut off, followed by General Mladic's offensive in July 1995, during which the entire enclave was overrun, and an estimated 8,000 Muslim men lost their lives.

After the fall of Srebrenica there were several official investigations and when the bulky NIOD (Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie – Netherlands War Documentation Institute) report was presented, then Prime Minister Kok realized that a sweeping political gesture had to be made and, taking full political responsibility, he resigned.

The subsequent parliamentary inquiry commission was extremely critical of the political-military decision making in 1993. There had never been an integral assessment of the strategic situation. On the contrary, the decision making was incremental and strongly dominated by idealistic motives, while

the military possibilities to realize the humanitarian objectives were pushed into the background. The commission ruled that more attention should have been paid to the criticism of the military leadership of the effectiveness of the mission. Finally, the Cabinet lacked a clear international negotiation strategy prior to the sending out of Dutchbat.³⁹

In short, ends, ways and means were never in line, as envisaged by Clausewitz. Apparently, there was insufficient strategic awareness in the UN as well as in the Netherlands. Though the Dutch military leadership did foresee the problems, the urge among politicians to intervene prevailed. The Bosnians had a clear appreciation of this mismatch between objective and means and, in response, went on the offensive.

Iraq 2003

In 2002 the Americans and the British conceived the plan to oust Saddam Hussein and to ask their allies to support this, preferably with military means. Partly due to many internal problems, the decision making in The Hague on this issue was fraught with difficulties. On 16 April 2002 the second Kok government tendered its resignation following the above-mentioned NIOD report on Srebrenica. The subsequent election period was an extremely turbulent one, mainly due to the murder of the populist candidate Pim Fortuyn. The elections caused a political landslide, upon which on 22 July the first Balkenende government took office. Its ministers, especially those from Fortuyn's party, had no or only very little political experience, and on 16 October of the same year this Cabinet fell, and remained outgoing until 27 May 2003. On 22 January 2003 for the second time early elections were held, won by the social-democrat PvdA party. In this same period of internal political turmoil the Americans and the British decided to invade Iraq on 20 March 2003 asking The Hague on several occasions to support this war with military means.⁴⁰

As was the case with Bosnia, the Balkenende government did not draw up a negotiating strategy for itself, either. The directly involved ministers were in favour of the American-British line and up to the elections of 22 January 2003 they were supported by a parliamentary majority. As a result, this line became leading, but in view of the societal and later parliamentary resistance against military participation in the war, it was not followed consistently. From the summer of 2002 onwards the Cabinet had been searching for a compro-

mise in order to be able to take the extraordinary decision on 18 March 2003 to support the invasion of Iraq *politically* but not *militarily*.

The recently published definitive report of the investigative commission into the Iraq issue mostly looked into the international legal aspects. The Davids commission concluded that at the time UNSCR 1441 offered an insufficient mandate for military intervention, so the Balkenende government was wrong to appeal to that resolution in making its decision. It also listened selectively to its own intelligence services, which produced a much more nuanced picture on the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction than the American and British governments.⁴¹

Apart from this criticism of the reasons for and international legal aspects of the decision, Davids also made several interesting observations on the more Clausewitzian question about the relation between the intended political objective and the employment of the military means, such as it was. First of all, the commission pointed at the absence of a fundamental debate in Parliament, society and actually also Cabinet. There was a generally-felt revulsion against Saddam Hussein, but opinions differed as to whether this warranted a war and whether the Netherlands should be militarily involved in that war. As from the summer of 2002 the Cabinet followed the trans-Atlantic policy line and would have preferred to support the war militarily. Opinion polls, however, showed that the majority of the Dutch population rejected a military contribution and also in Parliament there was insufficient support for such a course of action. Doing nothing, however, was not an option either for the Cabinet and for that reason a compromise was struck between proponents and opponents.⁴² The formula adopted, therefore, should be interpreted first and foremost as an intermediate solution for internal use.

Secondly, Davids observed that, through its diplomatic and military channels, the Dutch government had constantly been in the picture about the American and British plans, being well-informed about both their nature and objectives. Still, no national strategic analysis was made. The commission was of the opinion that the Cabinet should have discussed its own policy line sooner and better. Even when the decision was taken in March 2003, the question about the exact meaning of the phrase *political but not military support* was not properly discussed, creating all sorts of misunderstandings as a consequence.⁴³

A similar criticism relates to the objectives of a possible war. The Cabinet knew of the plan for a regime change in Baghdad, but did not think this was legitimate from an international legal perspective. That is why The Hague remained fully focussed on the dismantling of the weapons of mass destruction. The difference between those two war aims was not elaborated on and that is why the commission saw a certain ‘insincerity’ in the Cabinet decision.⁴⁴

In short, the Davids commission sketched an impression of an outgoing, somewhat inexperienced, Cabinet which in turbulent times went out of its way to please Washington, based on only scant support in Parliament as well as among the population. The Cabinet decision led to much political conundrum and, incidentally, also to persistent rumours in the media about secret military support in the guise of Special Forces, F-16s and submarines. The latter were even reinforced by the fact that simultaneously Patriot units were sent to Turkey to help that country cope with any possible Scud attacks. This mission, however, took place within the framework of the NATO treaty, a nuance that was lost on the media. After its investigation the commission subsequently disposed of all rumours as fiction.⁴⁵

Although the adopted formula of political but not military support must be interpreted mainly in the complicated *internal* situation context of those days, what matters for the present study is the external result. Naturally, the Americans and the British were pleased with the political support and even reckoned the Netherlands among the *coalition of the willing*, although this was emphatically not The Hague’s intention. Clausewitz, however, would have asked himself what the impact of the decision had been in Baghdad. Was the Netherlands for or against a military intervention? In the language of *Vom Kriege*: was the war a real instrument for the Netherlands to attain the intended objective, or was it not? The adopted formula left this entirely in the dark, and so Saddam Hussein in any case never worried about this Dutch decision.

Afghanistan 2010

The Dutch contribution to the ISAF mission (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan caused major differences of opinion between the various political parties, too. The problem was there from the very beginning, the moment that The Hague received the request from Brussels to provide a unit for the southern province of Uruzgan. This time the controversy mainly concerned the *nature* of the mission. Virtually every party wanted to support the

Afghans in the reconstruction of their country and that is why in 2004 the Netherlands sent a *Provincial Reconstruction Team* (PRT) to the northern province of Baghlan, where the situation was relatively quiet. One year later NATO requested the Netherlands to assume a similar task in the much more turbulent Uruzgan. In Parliament, however, opinions were greatly divided on this issue. The left SP and GroenLinks parties saw far too many similarities with *Enduring Freedom*, which they so detested. For the Left-Liberal D66 party the Netherlands was running the risk of biting off more than it could chew, just like in Srebrenica, and also the Social-Democrat PvdA, the largest opposition party of the moment, had serious doubts. As a result, the second Balkenende Cabinet, a coalition government of the Christian-Democrat CDA, the Liberal VVD, and the above-mentioned D66, had a hard time finding a parliamentary majority for a mission in Uruzgan. D66 and PvdA held a key position and in order to get these two parties into the fold, the *resources* for the mission were heavily beefed up, while the emphasis in the *tasking* came to lie on reconstruction. In the Parliamentary Letter pertaining to the mission the PRT was central in the Dutch task force, which for the remainder consisted of regular combat troops, F16s and helicopters. Reconstruction, therefore, was at the core of the mission. However, risks were expressly mentioned, though deemed acceptable by the Cabinet. Especially compared to Srebrenica the unit was now equipped 'robustly'. Furthermore, it was pointed out that carrying out offensive actions might be required for the security of the PRT and that they would fall within the mandate.⁴⁶ After seven months of to-ing and fro-ing the mission finally got the go-ahead in February 2006 from a vast parliamentary majority.⁴⁷

On 14 March 2006 the advance party was despatched and by the summer there were about 1,400 Dutch servicemen in *Task Force Uruzgan*, a number that in the following years was upped several times to around 2,000. During the mission it soon emerged that the situation in the province was extremely unstable and required more fighting than reconstruction. Although in previous missions the Dutch had suffered casualties and fatalities, this time the number increased steadily, to the extent that, soon, the soldiers were speaking of a Counter Insurgency (COIN) operation, while in the media and the Parliament doubts about the decision to go in resurfaced.⁴⁸ In short, the *nature* of the mission was clearly different than expected, or better still, hoped, and the political parties were divided on the issue.

In 2008 the, by then fourth, Balkenende Cabinet, a coalition of CDA, PvdA and Christian CU, had to take a decision for the first time on an exten-

sion of the mission. There was much resistance in the Parliament, as NATO had not lived up to its promise to find a successor for the Netherlands. Besides, the personnel volume had steadily been increasing and some parties had great difficulties with the nature of the mission. This discussion, too, dragged on and on, and it was only after the promise of this being the last extension that the PvdA reluctantly agreed.⁴⁹

By this time a great divide had erupted among the Dutch population between support for the mission and support for the service personnel sent out. While the former had been continuously eroding, the majority of the population had been standing consistently behind its soldiers.⁵⁰ Incidentally, also politicians who were against the mission, always made a similar distinction. From the perspective of Clausewitz's *wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit* such a strict separation of the mission and those who are executing it is an interesting new fact.

In the Dutch media, there was ample appreciation for the manner in which *Task Force Uruzgan* carried out the mission. Like the politicians, the media avoided the term COIN, preferring instead the special *Dutch approach*, or the so-called 3D-concept (Development, Diplomacy and Defence), or, better still, capturing the *hearts and minds* of the Afghan population. Such characterizations went down well, whereas references to fighting were not popular in the Netherlands.⁵¹

Bearing in mind this state of mind, it is not surprising that President Obama's fundamental change of strategy for Afghanistan in December 2009 was not properly registered as such in the Netherlands. The only thing that came through was that an extra 30,000 troops would be sent temporarily. The fact that the Americans, as they had done for Iraq, changed their objectives for Afghanistan, and they moved their modus operandi towards the Dutch approach, largely went unnoticed. What did filter through to the media were the signals from the armed forces to the effect that the servicemen and servicewomen in Afghanistan themselves were eager to stay and finish the job. Also, all signs of international pressure were given ample attention in the press and Parliament.

From the beginning of 2009 onwards the Balkenende Cabinet was divided over the question of a second extension of *Task Force Uruzgan*, whether or not in an adjusted form. The CDA and CU ministers were in favour of such an extension, but those of PvdA were dead against. The various debates in the Parliament did not produce a majority. The proponents pointed at the interna-

tional position of the Netherlands, at what had already been achieved and the requests from the various capitals. The opponents referred to the insufficient societal and political support and earlier agreement to leave Uruzgan at the end of 2010. According to reports, the most concerned ministers met on fourteen occasions in an attempt to find a compromise. For a brief period, a way out seemed to present itself when the PvdA ministers seemed prepared to consider a *civilian* mission. All the while, pressure from abroad to reconsider the departure was increased. Relations within the Cabinet, however, were steadily deteriorating and in the night of 19 and 20 February 2010 the Cabinet fell. After four years *Task Force Uruzgan* terminated its mission in the summer of that year, having suffered 24 fatal casualties.

As was the case with Srebrenica, Afghanistan was conspicuously absent in the subsequent election campaign, which focused exclusively on internal political issues, completely ignoring the occasion for the elections. Seen from the perspective of the *wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit*, this is somewhat odd. In conformity with Clausewitz, the societal support for the mission was presented as a crucial element in the political debate, but the entire mission received only luke-warm interest from the population.

In this issue, too, what became apparent was a great difference of opinion between the various political parties. The majority wanted to do their thing for the reconstruction of a war-torn Afghanistan, which again testifies of the Dutch idealism. That this was a high-risk mission was recognized from the beginning, and that is why *Task Force Uruzgan* was equipped so robustly. This explains why there were no military operational problems when, against expectation, COIN proved to be the actual main task. However, opinions differed greatly in The Hague about this shift in the *nature* of the mission. So, although the armed forces showed that they were up to such complicated operations, there was only limited political support in the Netherlands. In short, although the objective was deemed to be important, it was not important enough to fight for.

Clausewitz would probably not have understood the decision to withdraw and he would have pointed out to the politicians that warfare is always a mutual trial of strength and that its course is unpredictable. As in 1787, the Dutch politicians should have departed from the worst case and attributed an independent role to the Taliban.

Clausewitz in Dutch political-military practice

The three cases show the feeling of discomfort that many Dutch politicians have with the armed forces as an instrument of power. As long as the objective of a mission can be called 'idealistic' there is broad support, which, however, quickly dissipates when it comes down to the exercise of power. In the case of Srebrenica The Hague was completely taken by surprise by the aggressive Bosnians, in Iraq a national military contribution was still unattainable and in Afghanistan there was disappointment about the violent reaction of the local parties.

What is characteristic is the lengthy and cumbersome negotiations between the Cabinet and the political parties. The *Toetsingskader* suggests a Clausewitzian method, but in the Dutch practice coalition politics take pride of place. What is at stake is not a transparent strategy for the military mission, but sufficient political support. In order to obtain, maintain or strengthen it, major concessions must be made by the Cabinet, and from this often later problems ensue.

On top of that, foreign policy in general and military missions in particular are choice issues for political parties to create a distinct profile for themselves. They often adopt a 'principled' stance, keep a close eye on the opinion of the electorate and even do not shy away from a government crisis. This makes finding sufficient political support a risky undertaking for the Cabinet.

So, while the military strategy is best served by a stable political system, the actual situation is totally different. In the period covered there were several regular and intermediate elections that each time led to different coalitions, and every change had great consequences for the military policy. The Netherlands does not differ greatly from other European countries in this respect, but as the country is an eager contributor to military missions abroad, there are more problems here.

Unfortunately, the three recent examples of strategic decision making are not showpieces of a clear grasp of Clausewitz. Although it is evident that the armed forces are an instrument in the hands of politics, as it is perceived in *Vom Kriege*, it is often forgotten that it is an instrument of *power*. As long as the factions in the mission area welcome the Dutch troops or at least tolerate them, there is usually little trouble. After all, in such a situation ends, ways and means of the mission are in line. Peace missions, as the term implies, have a

strong idealistic ring to them and that is precisely the image many Dutch politicians embrace.

But when there are missions with a clearly military character, so with an opponent, who, in Clausewitz's terms, must be subjected to our will with violence, the essence of *Vom Kriege* often seems to be insufficiently grasped in the Netherlands. Clausewitz explains that it is not merely the intended objective and the available means that determine the course of the battle, but first and foremost the effort of the opponent. After all, it is a showdown of strength, in which the will to carry it to its utmost consequence is the determining factor. In the Dutch political debate there is relatively much attention for own objectives, but little for the state of mind of the opponent. That Bosnians, Saddam Hussein and the Taliban may violently *resist* our noble intentions comes as an unpleasant surprise. It seems as if many Dutch politicians, opinion makers, journalists and scientists ignore precisely this aspect of *Vom Kriege* and refuse to see that Clausewitz is mostly speaking about an instrument of power.⁵²

Clausewitz in the Netherlands

In order to determine the extent of Clausewitz's following in the Netherlands, the present study has gone into both his influence on the military thinking and the political-military practice. It seems there is a discrepancy in the Netherlands between thinking and acting.

From the very first beginnings in 1832 *Vom Kriege* was adopted in the Dutch military thinking and it is clear that his work was also known among civilian authors. In military circles Clausewitz almost continually had a small number of interested readers, who made a thorough study of his work out of scientific curiosity. Apart from that, *Vom Kriege* was used by several military authors to shore up their own theories or ideas. As for topics, continuous shifts can be observed, linked to the (strategic) issues of the day that the military thinkers were grappling with. Incidentally, attention for his more historical studies has disappeared almost completely since 1945. All in all, Clausewitz is a milestone in Dutch military thinking.

Also Clausewitz's influence on the *Toetsingskader* is remarkable, and in that sense the ideas from *Vom Kriege* can even be traced back in present-day political-military policy. It is, however, in their translation into practice that a discrepancy emerges, with more the idealistic motives conflicting with Clausewitz's instrumentalist vision on the armed forces.

Almost 180 years ago an unknown military reviewer wrote in *De Militaire Spectator* that “*Vom Kriege* is possibly the most scientific book on the art of war written so far, and it offers an insight into the *internal nature* of the art of war, free from scholastic forms and principles.” These wise words are still true today. However, there is every reason in the Netherlands to demand more attention for that internal nature.

Original version <i>Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung</i>		Dutch translation E.H. Brouwer	
1. Vom Kriege	1832	Over den Oorlog	1846
2. Vom Kriege	1833		
		Over den Oorlog	1846
3. Vom Kriege	1834		
4. Der Feldzug von 1796 in Italien	1833	De Veldtogt van 1796 in Italie	1841
5. Die Feldzüge von 1799 in Italien und in der Schweiz	1833	De Veldtogten van 1799 in Italie en Zwitserland; Eerste deel	1843
6. Die Feldzüge von 1799 in Italien und in der Schweiz	1834	De Veldtogten van 1799 in Italie en Zwitserland; Tweede deel	1845
7. Der Feldzug von 1812 in Russland; Der Feldzug von 1813 bis zum Waffenstillstand; Der Feldzug von 1814 in Frankreich.	1835	De Veldtogt in Rusland, in het jaar 1812	1839
		De Veldtogt van 1813 tot op den Wapenstilstand en de Veldtogt van 1814 in Frankrijk	1839
8. Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich	1835	De Veldtogt van 1815 in Frankrijk	1839

<p>9. Gustav Adolphs Feldzüge von 1630-1632; Historische Materialien zur Strategie; Turenne; Die Feldzüge Luxemburgs in Flandern von 1690-1694; Einige Bemerkungen zum spanischen Erbfolgekriege.</p>	<p>1837</p>	<p><i>Not translated</i></p>	
<p>10. Sobiesky; Krieg der Russen gegen die Türken von 1736-1739; Die Feldzüge Friedrich des Grossen von 1741-1762; Der Feldzug des Herzogs von Braunschweig gegen die Holländer 1787; Übersicht des Krieges in der Vendée 1793.</p>	<p>1837</p>	<p><i>Not translated</i></p>	

Notes:

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *Der Feldzug des Herzogs von Braunschweig gegen die Holländer 1787*. Strategische Beleuchtung mehrerer Feldzüge usw., Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung. Zehnter Band, Zweite Auflage, Berlin 1863.

² The history of this oldest still published periodical in the Netherlands was recently described in: B. Schoenmaker en F. Baudet, *Officieren aan het woord, De geschiedenis van de Militaire Spectator 1832-2007*. Amsterdam, Boom, 2007. On the occasion of *De Militaire Spectator's* 175th anniversary all volumes were digitalized on DVD, of which the author has gratefully made use.

³ *De Militaire Spectator*, 1833, p. 63.

⁴ See, for instance, *Bedenkingen over enkele punten van het Krijgskundig Onderwijs, en voornamelijk der Krijgsgeschiedenis*. MS, 1838, p. 55-65.

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- ⁵ Von Clausewitz, *Over den oorlog*. 2 deelen. 1846. *De oorlogen van 1796, 1798-99, 1812, 1814 en 1815*. 5 deelen. 1839-1845. Nagelaten werk door den generaal Karel Von Clausewitz. Uit het Hoogduitsch vertaald door E. H. Brouwer, Bibliothekaris bij de Koninklijke Militaire Akademie. Breda
- ⁶ J. L. Wagner, *Grondstellingen over den oorlog, vrij gevolgd naar het werk Vom Kriege van den generaal K. von Clausewitz*. Maastricht, Burij Boekverkooper 1853.
- ⁷ Translation by J.J. van Kesteren. Only one copy has survived at the museum of the Royal Netherlands Army at Delft.
- ⁸ For an overview of these books see: G. Teitler e.a., *Militaire Strategie*. Amsterdam, Mets en Schilt, 2002, p. 21.
- ⁹ C.C. de Gelder, *Strategische Studiën*. MS, 1905, p. 614-625 and 751-755. MS, 1906, p. 712-722 and 781-789. MS, 1907, p. 745-759. MS, 1909, p. 581-598.
- ¹⁰ J.J.C.P. Wilson, *Algemeen overzicht van de ontwikkeling der strategische denkbeelden in den loop der jaren*. MS, 1931, p. 237-251, 298-308, 351-370 and 438-457.
- ¹¹ H. Oolgaardt, *Eene inleiding tot de studie der krijgsgeschiedenis*. MS, 1900, p. 298-319.
- ¹² See, for instance, H.L. van Oort, *Actieve of Passieve Verdediging?* MS, 1892, p. 91-106.
- ¹³ See also, L.M.A. von Schmid, *Oude en nieuwe literatuur betreffende den veldtocht van 1787*. MS, 1896, p. 652-662.
- ¹⁴ B. van Slobbe, *Hedendaagsche strategische inzichten*. MS, 1929, p. 106-112. See also note 8.
- ¹⁵ M.R.H. Calmeijer, *De verdediging in het verleden en heden met een blik in de toekomst*. MS, 1935, p. 131-132, and M.R.H. Calmeijer, *De oorlog van morgen*. MS, 1935, p. 179-181 and 267-269.
- ¹⁶ Anonymous, *De Geschiedenis van den Oorlog, deel I. De veldtocht in Polen*. MS, 1939, p. 404-408.
- ¹⁷ H.W. Houweling and J.G. Siccamo, *Studies of war*. Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988. P.M.E. Volten, *De wonderlijke Drievuldigheid*. Inaugural lecture, Utrecht, 1985.
- ¹⁸ See, for instance, A.J. Leijen, *Politiek, Strijd, Oorlog*. Research paper, KMA FMB 94-24, Breda, 1994.
- ¹⁹ F.C. Spits, *De Metamorfose van de Oorlog in de achttiende en negentiende Eeuw*. Assen. Van Gorcum, 1971.

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- ²⁰ R.A. Sleeuw, *Inleiding tot de krijgskunde*. MS, 1955, p. 209-216 and 270-283. H. Oolgaardt, *Eene inleiding tot de studie der krijgsgeschiedenis*. MS, 1976, p. 290-302.
- ²¹ J.M. den Hartog, *De strategische waarde van grote rivieren*. MS, 1962, p. 425-436.
- ²² C.H. Gelok, *Guerrilla in Afghanistan*. MS, 1984, p. 300-311.
- ²³ See, for instance, E. Alterman, *The uses and abuses of Clausewitz*. MS, 1988, p. 416-424.
- ²⁴ See also, D. Jablonsky, *Strategy and the operational level of war*. MS, 1988, p. 88-94 and 132-140. J. Langhenkel, R. Veger and H. P. Ueberschaer, *FOFA, optie voor de Koninklijke Landmacht*. MS, 1986, p. 572-580.
- ²⁵ G. Mensink, *Leer der operatiën*. MS, 1963, p. 546-551. Reprinted in MS, 1988, p. 506-511.
- ²⁶ M. Schouten and R.J. van Vels, *Operatieve kunst en tactiek*. MS, 1988, p. 512-522 and 561-570.
- ²⁷ See, for instance, F.J.D.C. Egter van Wissekerke, *Is aanvallen de beste verdediging van de Europese centrale sector?* MS, 1989, p. 130-140 and 197-209. F.J.D.C. Egter van Wissekerke, *Opdrachtgerichte commandovoering als leidend doctrinebeginsel van de Koninklijke Landmacht*. MS, 1996, p. 481-597.
- ²⁸ B.A.C. Droste, *De Golfoorlog, Breekpunt in de traditionele oorlogvoering?* MS, 1991, p. 521-525.
- ²⁹ A.K. Bijkerk, *Desert Storm, Air campaign versus Saddams strategie*. MS, 1994, p. 155-166.
- ³⁰ See F.H. Meulman, *De aard van crises en conflicten, De rol van air-power in een verander(en)de wereld*. MS, 1994, p. 5-10. J. Hardenbol, *Doctrine-aspecten van vredesoperaties, De toepasbaarheid van grondbeginselen*. MS, 1995, p. 83-89.
- ³¹ J.W.M. Schulten, *Militaire Doctrine, minder nieuw dan het er uitziet*. MS, 2000, p. 464-468.
- ³² N. Pratt, *Small Wars, The Past as Prologue, an Alternative Vision of Future Conflict*. MS, 2002, p. 381-399. F.J.J. Princen and M.H. Wijnen, *Defensie in beweging, Constante verandering door veranderende constanten*. MS, 2004, p. 215-224.
- ³³ D.M. Drew, *The road to academic 'critical mass'*. MS, 2003, p. 272-276.
- ³⁴ F.H. Meulman, *De luchtoorlog in Korea en Vietnam, Overeenkomsten, verschillen en lessen*. MS, 2003, p. 288-300. F. Osinga, *'Airpower' in het postmoderne tijdperk, Revolutie in de lucht*. MS, 2003, p. 338-357.

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- ³⁵ A.C. Tjepkema, *Boyd: jachtulieger en homo universalis*. MS, 2004, p. 301-314.
- ³⁶ M.W.M. Kitzen, *Westerse militaire cultuur en counter-insurgency, Een tegenstrijdige realiteit*. MS, 2008, p. 123-134. B.W. Schuurman, *Clausewitz en de new wars denkers, Een nieuwe kijk op het trinitaire concept en de critici*. MS, 2010, p. 33-43.
- ³⁷ In this context van Wijk speaks of a paradox in the Dutch policy; R. de Wijk, *Defensiebeleid in relatie tot veiligheidsbeleid*, in E.R. Muller (e.a.) *Krijgsmacht, Studies over de organisatie en het optreden*. Alphen aan de Rijn, Kluwer, 2004.
- ³⁸ A fourth case could be the NATO operation *Allied Force* in 1999, where the Royal Netherlands Air Force belonged to the top three as for the number of sorties, but in which Dutch politics were hardly involved according to Van Wijk, hiding behind NATO. See De Wijk, p. 163.
- ³⁹ Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie Srebrenica, *Missie zonder vrede*. Eindrapport. 's-Gravenhage, Sdu Uitgevers, 2003. p. 420-432.
- ⁴⁰ Rapport Commissie van onderzoek besluitvorming Irak. Amsterdam, Boom, 2010, p. 79-123.
- ⁴¹ Ibid. Conclusies nr. 8, 18, 20, 29 en 30, p. 425-427.
- ⁴² Ibid. Conclusies nr. 2, 3, 4, 9, 31 en 43, p. 425-429.
- ⁴³ Ibid. Conclusies nr. 5, 6, 11 and 34, p. 425-428.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid. Conclusie nr. 7, p. 425.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid. Conclusies nr. 11, 36, 38, 39 and 45, p. 426-429.
- ⁴⁶ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 27925, *Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme*, nr. 193, Brief van de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 22 december 2005.
- ⁴⁷ R. de Wijk, *Nederland en de NAVO-operatie in Afghanistan, Politieke besluitvorming en militaire uitvoering*. In B. Bomert e.a. (red), *Jaarboek Vrede en Veiligheid 2006*. Amsterdam, Rozenberg Publishers, 2006. B. Bomert, *Staten Generaal, 1 november 2005 - 31 januari 2006*. In *Vrede en Veiligheid, Tijdschrift voor internationale vraagstukken*, Jaargang 35 nummer 1, 2006, p. 72-74.
- ⁴⁸ R. de Wijk, *Nederland en de NAVO-operatie in Afghanistan*, p. 9-12. B. Bomert, *Staten Generaal, 1 mei 2006 - 31 oktober 2006*. In *Vrede en Veiligheid, Tijdschrift voor internationale vraagstukken*, Jaargang 35 nummer 4, 2006, p. 492-494.

⁴⁹ B. Bomert, *Nederlands defensiebeleid; meer met minder*. In B. Bomert e.a. (red), *Jaarboek Vrede en Veiligheid 2008*. Amsterdam, Rozenberg Publishers, 2008, p. 211-214.

⁵⁰ See P. Everts, *De Nederlandse publieke opinie over oorlog en vrede*. In *Vrede en Veiligheid*, Tijdschrift voor internationale vraagstukken, Jaargang 39 nummer 1-2, 2010, p. 105-108.

⁵¹ See also G.R. Dimitriu and Dr. B.A. De Graaf, *The Dutch COIN approach: Three years in Uruzgan, 2006-2009*. In: *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Volume 21, Issue 3, p. 429-458.

⁵² An contemporary exception: H. Achterhuis, *Met alle geweld, Een filosofische zoektocht*. Rotterdam, Lemniscaat, 2008.