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IN THE USA:
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At first glance you wouldn't think Norwegians and Clausewitz had much in common. Clausewitz spent his whole life in the service of Mars while modern Norway has apparently pursued peace at all cost. Norway is in fact one of the very few countries in the world to have gained independence without spilling a drop of blood. In 1905 Norway divorced Sweden under dramatic circumstances, but not a shot was fired in anger. Consequently, while other twentieth-century “newcomers”, such as Finland and Poland, have generals as their founding fathers, in the shape of Carl Gustav Mannerheim and Jósef Pilsudski, the Norwegians have a road maintenance worker and a ship owner as their national father and grandfather, not to mention a range of polar explorers of course. Indeed, you would be hard pressed to find even a statue of a Norwegian general. They exist, but you have to know where to look. Ironically, the only military man on horseback in a public square in Norway is one of Napoleon’s most dubious marshals, Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte who became king of Sweden and Norway in 1818.

To top it all, Norway’s most renowned international brand is of course the Nobel Peace Prize. Even if the Prize for 2009 went to the Commander-in-Chief of a force in the middle of two wars, it is hard to imagine a candidacy for Clausewitz getting very far. Norway and Clausewitz are poles apart, apparently.

The aim of this essay is threefold. First we will map out Clausewitz’s Wirkungsgeschichte in Norway. To what extent have the Prussian’s ideas actually influenced the Norwegian discourse about war and peace? This question could of course be answered by an extensive research project, but the method here is simply to register Clausewitz’s appearances in print. Secondly, we shall look at some important crossroads in Norwegian history in the light of *Vom Kriege*. In my opinion, central elements of Clausewitz’s theories are vindicated by actual events in Norwegian history. Finally, we look at Clausewitz’s impact on strategic thinking in contemporary Norway. Is the Old Prussian still relevant? Or more to the point, does Clausewitz still have important things to say to people willing to listen?
Clausewitz’s Norwegian Wirkungsgeschichte

“The ideas of Clausewitz run like a subterranean river through all of modern military thought”, according to Christopher Bassford. To the extent this is so, it can be extremely difficult to demonstrate exactly where and how Clausewitz influenced Norwegian strategic thinking. And if he is everywhere, however veiled, it would be hard to pinpoint his philosophical bequest. Moreover, military writers have usually not operated with notes and bibliographies, so in both official manuals and in more private utterances you have as a rule to guess which sources the writer bases the arguments on. Our measuring method will thus be judged rather crude. In order to gauge Clausewitz’s impact we will merely look for his name. To say something more substantial about his actual influence on Norwegian military discourse, directly and indirectly, is an order too tall for this particular undertaking.

For a start, Clausewitz’s is by no means a household name to Norwegians at large. Certainly, you encounter it here and there, but rarely as more than a rather facile exercise in namedropping. For instance, an Internet search of more than 70 Norwegian papers and magazines published in 2009 retrieved only 7 articles with the term "Clausewitz". Britney Spears was mentioned in 537 and Jomini in 0, just for comparison.

On War has never been translated and published in Norway, except from a very abridged version issued in 1972, which has been out of print for decades. To the best of my knowledge there has never been a book published about Clausewitz in Norwegian either, just a few research papers. Not even large authoritative anthologies about “great thinkers”, such as for instance the three-volume Vesten tenkere [Western Thinkers] from 1993, which covers almost 100 pages spanning from Homer to Jean Baudrillard, have anything on Clausewitz. Contemporaries like Jefferson, Kant, Burke, Marquis de Sade, Blake, Goethe, Schelling and Hegel have all their own essays, but not Clausewitz.

There are some rare exceptions to Clausewitz’s non-existence in a broader Norwegian discourse, as for instance the book Myten og den irrasjonelle fornuft [Myth and the irrational reason] by the poet Stein Mehren, Jan Ketil Arnulf’s Heltens ansikter: allmakt og heroisme [The face of the hero: Omnipotence and heroism], and even in the song “Generalene” by Odd Børretzen. But the main conclusion remains: to the general public in Norway, Clausewitz is still a rather distant luminary whose work is read only by intellectual war buffs.
One of very few groups outside the military realm in Norway to have dealt with Clausewitz are probably the political radicals. In the socialists’ own encyclopaedia, *PaxLeksikon* from 1979, praise of Clausewitz is unconditional: “Clausewitz [is] the most significant military theorist ever to have lived”. What’s more, even a socialist could learn a lot from him, despite the awkward irony:

Clausewitz has long enjoyed very high status in socialistic thinking; even if it can be hard to praise a noble officer, particularly a Prussian, in circles of more or less true believers. Lenin appreciated Clausewitz immensely. And he is also the only thinker who gets the honour of being cited in the section about war and peace in “Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung”.

That said, however, a cursory reading of a journal that certainly took both Lenin and Mao seriously, i.e. *Røde Fane* [Red banner], a periodical for communist theory and debate, reveals very few references to Clausewitz. During the seventies and early eighties, when the magazine wrote extensively about wars of independence and the lurking danger of a third world war, you find conspicuously few leads to the allegedly greatest military thinker ever – but there are some:

The only scientific tenet about war is the one which originally made by the bourgeois philosopher of war Clausewitz: ‘War is the continuation of politics by other means’ […] Lenin adopted and developed the tenet further based on the most advanced thinking in our time, the historical and dialectical materialism, the ideas about class struggle and history.

The potted version of this became: “Lenin emphasised that politics and war are two sides of the same coin. War is politics by other means.” In other words, Clausewitz’s ideas did play a part in the radicals’ discussion, but his name was by no means ubiquitous.

Importantly, our interpretation of Clausewitz’s position in strategic and military debates in Norway, especially outside the inner circle of military scholars, does not necessarily say very much about Clausewitz compared to other military thinkers. But it can tell us volumes about Norwegians’ general lack of martial interest. If you don’t bother about military thinking in general, Clausewitz would not be a central figure under any circumstances.

The situation is, of course, a bit different in the military discourse in Norway, but even there, it seems, Clausewitz is not as central as we tend to believe. The adage that Clausewitz is often quoted, but rarely read or under-
stood, is not entirely correct in the Norwegian case. Not because he is widely read, but because he is quoted with some frequency. If you look through the major Norwegian military periodical *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift* (NMT), founded in the fateful year, for friends of Clausewitz, of 1831, you will find sporadic but far from excessive mentions of Clausewitz here and there, and he is hardly ever the main topic of the articles.⁸

The first article I found in the NMT mentioning Clausewitz was from 1840 and called “Om Krigskunst” [On Art of War]. Here Clausewitz is briefly quoted, but he is not given much room to roam: “War is, as Clausewitz states in his posthumous works, *On War*, more a mean for defense than for conquest.”⁹

Fifteen years later there is a squabble between Lieutenant of the Cavalry Hagemann Brandt and Major General Jacob Gerhard Meydell about the merits of Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow. Cavallery Lieutenant Brandt instigated the row in 1855 by publishing a review of the book *Militärische und vermischte Schriften von Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow in einer Auswahl, Leipzig 1853*, to which Meydell responded. Brandt, he complained, had not given Bülow the credit he deserved. What is interesting here, however, is that Clausewitz, Bülow’s chief assassin seen with our generation’s eyes, plays no part in the discussion. People like Berenhorst, Tempelhof, Archduke Charles and Jomini are there in abundance, but not Clausewitz. Instead, it is Jomini who plays the part of the *enfant terrible* and Bülow’s hardest, and for Meydell rather unfair, critic: “Jomini’s critic of Bülow’s theories lacks any sense of logic and is mostly unsubstantiated.”¹⁰ If Norwegian military thinkers had seen Clausewitz as an important thinker in the 1850s he should probably have been enlisted here. In his rebuttal to Meydell, Brandt leaves no doubt as to who the top dog was, and it was certainly not Clausewitz: “I already knew that in this country there still exist militaries that do not accept any suggestion about errors made by Bülow, and who regard such talk as almost blasphemy against this ‘military science’s Holy Spirit’.”¹¹ If you encounter such snappy remarks today they are usually directed against the hero of this particular story, Clausewitz.

Meydell’s own book, his 1837 *Lærebok i Krigskunsten* [Textbook on the Art of War], reinforces the impression of Bülow’s legacy dominating Norwegian military thinking for decades after Clausewitz’s “Bemerkung über die reine und angewandte Strategie des Herrn von Bülow,” in *Neue Bellona* in 1805.
To pick just a few other places where today you would expect to find Clausewitz, but find only silence: In 1890 there was an article about Napoleon’s genius for war, whose main argument was that not even Napoleon was a born leader. He had to go through both a practical and theoretical education to become “the Great Napoleon”. The article ends with a discussion about the leap from Wissen to Können, and the even longer leap from Nichtwissen to Können.12 Read with our “post-Howard-and-Paret’s-translation-eyes” it is amazing anyone could write an article like that without even a tipping of the hat in Clausewitz’s direction.

In 1908 Captain Sinding-Larsen published an article called “Krigen som regnestykke” [“The war as calculation”] where he wrote “The war is not a calculation. It is not numbers which decide the outcome, it is the moral strength. In that must a small nation trust.”13 Today I think it would be rather hard not to mention Clausewitz in such a discussion. Indeed, it would take an act of will not to do so. Not so in 1908, apparently. However, around the turn of the century something was about to happen in this regard.

In 1896 Lieutenant Gudmund Schnitler published an essay in Norsk Militært Tidsskrift called “Moltke, hans samlede skrifter og erindringer om ham” [“Moltke – his collected works and recollection of him”]. The essay is 15 pages long, but Clausewitz is noticeably absent.14 However, in 1911 there is a short review of less than two pages of Moltke’s Kriegslehren. It is signed “G.S.”, which presumably is the very same Gudmund Schnitler. Now, Clausewitz has become the bedrock of Moltke’s ideas: “Through a laborious study, primarily of Frederick the Great’s and Napoleon’s campaigns, Clausewitz’s works, through ample experience and indefatigable work, Moltke has been among those who have proved the justification of the maxim: ‘Genius is diligence’ – the boundless ability to will.”15

What had happened in between was that Schnitler had been in France and Germany from 1898 to 1900, conducting military historical research.16 To what extent he actually met Clausewitz’s ideas there I am in no position to tell. However, the thought is suggestive. Norwegian officers obviously read foreign military journals and Clausewitz’s name was being increasingly invoked following Moltke’s stunning victories, but Schnitler’s personal encounter with the European debate may have been decisive.

The idea that Schnitler was in a process of granting Clausewitz a unique position among military thinkers is also vindicated by reading two editions of
Schnitler’s book *Strategi*. The book was published as a draft in 1911 and then again in 1914. In the first edition Schnitler listed more than a dozen military authors, including Clausewitz, but without highlighting Clausewitz in any way. When we read the same passage in the 1914 edition, we recognize many of the names, but this time Clausewitz is given special treatment: “Clausewitz is perhaps the most influential military author. He succeeded in his wish to write a book that ‘would not be forgotten after two or three years’.”

Given that Schnitler’s ruled supreme as a military textbook in Norway until the Second World War, and that he personally lectured at the Staff College from 1903 to 1925, his endorsement of Clausewitz was in a sense the formal confirmation of Clausewitz’s importance. Consequently, from the interwar years and beyond Clausewitz is, at least apparently, the philosophical kingpin of military thinking in Norway. When Norwegians take the time to write about military questions, you may therefore expect to find Clausewitz, even though he sometimes sparkles more by his absence than by his presence. Indeed, Norwegian military authors, to the extent that they actually exist, may give the impression that Clausewitz is the only military thinker worth considering. To illustrate this desensitizing effect of the “Clausewitz-myopia” I will use the fate of his *bête noir*, Antoine de Jomini.

In 1998 Colonel Sverre Diesen issued a book called *Military Strategy*. According to the publisher, this was the first Norwegian book about military strategy in 80 years. Its predecessor we have already discussed, i.e. Major Gudmund Schnitler’s *Strategy* from 1914. In fact, even Schnitler made history. In a review of his book, it was claimed to be the first about strategy ever written in Norwegian. If we compare Schnitler’s and Diesen’s treatments of Jomini we find, in my opinion, a rather discouraging tendency. Diesen mentions Jomini only once, and then in a very prejudiced and stereotypical way: If we go back to Clausewitz, however, we find several of his contemporaries, among them the Swiss [military authority] Henri Jomini and the German [soldier] Heinrich von Bülow, claiming on the basis of the current faith in rationality to see nearly mathematical relations in strategy, with formulas for recommended angles between the base and lines of operations etc.

Evidently, Jomini would hardly have accepted this as a fair description of his ideas, or at least not of his mature opinions. This was rather Clausewitz’s impression of the man, but Jomini continued to publish long after Clausewitz’s death. True, Jomini was a firm believer in rules for action and theory of war,
but it was also “true that theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case.”

Schnittler on the other hand was careful not to lump Jomini and Bülow together like his modern colleague does. He did not treat all thinkers except Clausewitz *en bloc*: “Others have opposed Bülow’s opinions. Particularly the famous military author Jomini has with a great deal of pungency pointed out the erroneous overrating of outer lines. [Jomini] did not underestimate the mental spiral springs, morale and the power of personality.” Indeed, Schnitller’s general description of Jomini is rather sympathetic:

Jomini – Ney’s competent chief of staff and the famous military author – developed an artificial system for the art of war with meticulous and lined up axioms for guidance. In their solid and lucid form his works have still something extremely attractive to them. They appealed especially to the French spirit, which by its nature sharply distinguishes logically between the concepts.

I think you would have to search long and hard to find anything resembling such effusive praise of Jomini in Norwegian today.

To conclude this section on Clausewitz’s Norwegian Wirkungsgeschichte: around the Great War, defence intellectuals – at least those who left a visible historical trace – installed Clausewitz as the great authority of the philosophy of war. However, the Clausewitz legacy seems also to be of a rather sinister kind. On the one hand his positive influence has certainly not triggered a landslide of books and treatises about military strategy. The entire collection of published books, if we are a bit stingy, amounts to only two volumes in the last century. On the other hand, his “negative” influence has, unfortunately, been considerable. Clausewitz, through no fault of his own, has cast a long, dark shadow across a whole field of systematic thinking. Clausewitz was undoubtedly a great military thinker, possibly the greatest, but he is not the only one, and certainly not the latest.

Bernard Brodie, in a legendary remark, once said of Clausewitz’s *On War*: “His is not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war.” In Norway, there is an impending danger that “truly great” could disappear from the proclamation.
Intermezzo: Through Clausewitz’s monocle

So far we have tried, in an admittedly rather offhanded way, to record and measure Clausewitz’s early impact on Norwegian military discourse. Our conclusion was simple: he hasn’t really stimulated learned strategic discussions in Norway, though he has monopolized the few that nonetheless took place. In this section we leave the question of Clausewitz’s influence on Norwegian military thinking and deeds, and look at two seminal events in Norwegian history through the Clausewitzian monocle with a view to seeing whether Clausewitz can shed some new light on some defining moments in Norway’s history.

In the last century Norway was on the brink of war on two occasions, in 1905 and 1940. On the first occasion the adversary was known and war avoided; in 1940, on the other hand, it came as a bolt out of the blue. Can Clausewitz make us see these affairs in a different light?

At the outset, it is important to remind ourselves that the idea of an imminent war between Sweden and Norway in 1905 is basically a myth. Neither the Swedish nor the Norwegian government wanted war, and people on either sides of the border worked frantically for peace. The question was rather whether Norway should make concessions on its way out of the Union, particularly regarding the Sweden’s insistence that Norway demolish fortresses on the border. Eventually, the Norwegian Government agreed to demolish some of the fortresses, but was allowed to keep the ones with historical interest.

This compromise was like a red rag to military diehards. There were, in fact, officers around with a deep longing for war and saw this as a golden opportunity. To Colonel Henrik Angell, for instance, war was not as a curse, but a blessing: “to bleed for your country is an honour, a precious privilege.” He was not a little disappointed with the attitude of the "spineless" Norwegian government: “My people are weak, the mark of dependency is on their forehead.” We can continue down a similar road:

I believe and confess that a people can value nothing more highly than the dignity and liberty of its existence. That it must defend these to the last drop of its blood. That there is no higher duty to fulfil, no higher law to obey. That the shameful blot of cowardly submission can never be erased. That this drop of poison in the blood of the nation is passed on to posterity, crippling and eroding the strength of future generations. […] That a people courageously struggling for liberty is invincible. That even the destruction of liberty
after a bloody and honourable struggle assures the people’s rebirth. It is the seed of life, which one day will bring forth a new, securely rooted tree.\(^{30}\)

To most readers of this essay, the passage above will be recognizable. It is not Angell speaking here, but Clausewitz. A tempting ‘what if’ is thus what would Clausewitz have done, or said, if he had been in Norway in 1905? Would he have chimed in with “the Angells” or hushed them down?

As is common with Clausewitz, protagonists on either side of a discussion can find ammunition in *On War* to hammer each other with; so even here. The quote indicates what Norway should have done: stand firm, make no concessions, and fight its way out of the union if need be. On the other hand, however, statements such as “there is a point beyond which persistence becomes desperate folly, and can therefore never be condoned”\(^{31}\) point in the opposite direction.

That Norway actually achieved independence without the use of arms in 1905 indicates that there were other concerns than policy that drove Angell. For Angell, war with Sweden was presumably a golden opportunity to practice his profession, even if it was totally unnecessary to reach the desired political goal. Our temporary conclusion is thus that Clausewitz would have asked Angell to keep quiet and given him a lecture: “War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a serious end”.\(^{32}\)

However, if we jump 35 years ahead and witness the incomprehensible degree of Norwegian gullibility and fumbling on the eve of war in 1940, we may perhaps have cause to reconsider. If Norway had won independence in 1905 with the use of arms, not just pens and diplomacy, the country would presumably have been differently disposed to defend its hard-earned independence. Germany could consequently not have envisaged a cakewalk up north, which was after all the expectation on which the whole operation was based.

Perhaps the rather congenial split of 1905 had left a “drop of poison in the blood of the nation” after all? Perhaps the Norwegians had indeed missed a golden opportunity to invest in the crucial patriotic spirit that can only be instigated by war? Indeed, once that spirit is kindled, it can, according to Clausewitz, serve the nation for generations:

In short, the seed will grow only in the soil of constant activity and exertion, warmed by the sun of victory. Once it has grown into a strong tree, it
will survive the wildest storms of misfortune and defeat, and even the indolent inertia of peace, at least for a while. Thus, this spirit can be created only in war and by great generals, though admittedly it may endure, for several generations at least, even under generals of average ability and through long periods of peace.\textsuperscript{33}

It could be tempting to make a comparison with Finland, which fought a fierce civil war in conjunction with their separation from Russia in 1918, and which 20 years later stunned the world by almost holding the gargantuan Red Army to a draw. There are of course other explanations for this, but it is nonetheless thought provoking that Norwegians, who virtually live on an impregnable rock in the ocean, fell so easily to the conqueror, while Finland, sharing a long border with their enemy, stopped him in his tracks.

So, if we asked Clausewitz, whether he would have preferred a war in 1905 after all, in order to prepare the young Norwegian government for a stormy night in 1940, what would he have said? Now we have of course ventured rather far from what real “Clausewitzologs” deal with, but I think the answer would have been no. Clausewitz would not have opted for a war in 1905.

Presumably it is with war as with most other human activities, the best way to learn is by actually doing it. The best way to prepare for future wars is thus to fight. However, this does not mean that Clausewitz would have preferred to start a war in order to ignite the proper spirit and to train properly. The crucial point of war is to change the enemy, not ourselves: “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”\textsuperscript{34} War can never be treated as a live simulator or spectacular training ground. War is too serious and too unpredictable for that. War’s \textit{wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit} makes it utterly unwise to unleash a war simply to prepare for the next.

As I read Clausewitz, at least, the best thing to do is thus to avoid war altogether, as one did in 1905. And the best way to do that is to prepare thoroughly for it.

If actual warfare is out of the question the next best way to learn the art of war is to learn it from history. However, even if the past is far less uncertain and strenuous than battle, it offers no shortcuts:

Anyone who feels the urge to undertake such a task [i.e. to teach the art of war entirely by historical examples] must dedicate himself for his labours as he would prepare for pilgrimage to distant lands. He must spare no time or
effort, fear no earthly power or rank, and rise above his own vanity or false modesty in order to tell, in accordance with the expression of the *Code Napoléon*, *the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.*

It was here the Norwegians failed so fatally, especially the politicians. After 1905 they lacked the stamina or the honesty to learn from the past even if the experience of 1914-18 should have told them otherwise. The Norwegians should not therefore have provoked a war in 1905 in order to educate themselves, but they should have educated themselves in order not to provoke, however inadvertently, the war that came in 1940. All the major powers could, *unilaterally* speaking, have pulverized the Norwegian armed forces, but the race to the north cannot be seen in isolation. All major powers had bigger bones to pick than Norway, so a bit more strategic dexterity, on top of the already unfriendly Norwegian terrain, would probably have persuaded Hitler to look another way, at least for the time being.

After the war the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief General Otto Ruge wrote a book about the campaign. At the end of the book he says something particularly interesting in this regard. If he were given responsibility for teaching young officers again, he would concentrate even more on history. The reason was simple: “Most people, even us military, are too inclined to accept the situation as it is at the moment, thinking it will be the situation for ever, and not remember that life goes on and the situation tomorrow will always be different from the one today, and there is therefore no reason to lose faith, even after a bad start. That is what we learn from history.”

The Norwegian armed forces’ main problem was not their lack of training, lack of air defence capability or lack of anti-tank guns, but lack of historical knowledge and awareness. The crucial problem for the Norwegian Labour government was that it knew nothing about strategy and was proud of it. The foreign minister’s iconoclastic statement that if you want peace you have to prepare for peace, became a classic for all the wrong reasons. What brought war to Norway in April 1940 was therefore not lack of martial skills and military resources, but lack of strategic understanding.

So would modern Norwegian history have looked any different if Norwegian decision makers had known more history, and above all, known their Clausewitz? If they had managed to learn from books in peace what they were forced to learn through violence in war? I am inclined to think so, but
realise that many of my fellow countrymen would only roll their eyes and shake their head had they heard me.

At least Clausewitz was proven right in his belief that the spirit created in war may last for several generations – even through bumpy times of peace. After the war, and in the shadow of the new threat from the East, Norway became a steadfast member of NATO, although not the most confrontational. Ever since 1945, Norway has kept soldiers abroad, either under the auspices of UN or NATO, and even under that, for Norwegian eyes, strange community called the EU.

The 1940 attack had finally taught Norwegians that if you want peace, you need to prepare for war. They also learned the value of honing the spirit of war, and of showing future generations that “our generation did its utmost to defend freedom.”39 General Ruge seemed to echo Angell when he said on 10 April 1940 that Norway had to continue the war, at least for the sake of national self-esteem. 40 The big difference was that Ruge pleaded for war after the attack, while Angell pleaded for war as a test of the nation and professional escapade.

Clausewitz and Norway in the 21st Century

So far we have strolled along a rather long and winding road to reach the main questions of this text: what about Clausewitz and Norway today? Do his ideas have any impact on Norwegian military discourse today, and in what way? What about the educational institutions? To what extent do they use On War or other texts by Clausewitz? And finally, does he get the attention he deserves? Is the Old Prussian still relevant for a small peace-loving country on the fringes of the civilized world?

Again, answering these questions in a properly academic way is outside the scope of this essay, and again I have to go for the next best thing. I shall measure Clausewitz’s impact by checking his presence in military articles and in the curriculum of the military academies. I will also briefly check to what extent his name echoes in the corridors of the strategic decision makers in Norway.

As stated in the introduction, a very abridged version of On War was translated and published in Norway in 1972, i.e. in the middle of the Cold War. Worthy of note, this time it was not military men who brought Clausewitz to public attention, but political scientists. For most military minds it was hard to
see how war could be the continuation of anything by other means, if those means included thermonuclear annihilation. However, Jens A. Christophersen, a political scientist and the editor of On War, saw matters differently.

Here we are witnessing something modern strategy calls deterrence. Where war in a way ceases to be war, and where policy governs alone. And, we may add, the most important, and even the finest function weapons can have. Logically speaking we are here witnessing a continuation of one of Clausewitz’s most essential thoughts, perhaps the most essential of his whole authorship. Consequently, nuclear weapons had not made Clausewitz irrelevant, on the contrary.

We have to wait until after the favourable ending of the Cold War to find traces of military awareness of Clausewitz’s continuing relevance. Not surprisingly perhaps, in the 1990s there was a small “surge” of Clausewitz-centred articles in Norsk Militært Tidsskrift. It could have been tempting to call this a Clausewitz renaissance, but that would have implied a former golden age of Clausewitz infatuation, of which I have found no evidence.

In the 1990s NMT printed four articles with headings mentioning Clausewitz. We will take a closer look at the first one, Major General Odd Vincent Skjøstad’s “Med Clausewitz inn i framtid, dørfing av fredskapende operasjonen” [Into the Future with Clausewitz. A Discussion of Peace Operations], because it encapsulates the main reasons why Norwegian military intellectuals should (re-)invigorate Clausewitz.

First and foremost, Skjøstad states that the dissolution of the Soviet Union had not yet made the world a more peaceful place. This is the key to all that follows in the article. During the Cold War, Norwegians did not have to think strategically, to put it bluntly. By joining NATO in 1949, Norway had, in effect, become an appendix to greater nations’ strategic considerations. During the Second World War, Norway had also disbanded its General Staff and with it much of the scholarly and reflective traditions that went with that institution. After 1945, to be an officer thus became a job for doers, not for thinkers. Now, however, after 1989, things were different. Even Norwegians had to (re-)learn how to think strategically: “It is only since the end of the Cold War the situation has changed. Today many again talk openly about war to reach political goals – we call it peace operations.” For 40 years Norwegians had prepared for the possibility of war coming to them, now they had to decide whether they wanted to join wars far from home: “Under what circumstances
can we envisage Norway waging war, and what kind of considerations would we have to take into account in order to make such a consideration productive?" In other words, strategy had again entered the scene.

Skjøstad’s article also indicates how even in Norway the rediscovery of Clausewitz was inspired by the preceding American awakening. Another of the article’s main messages is thus a Norwegian version of something Colin Powell discovered after the Vietnam War: “Clausewitz’s greatest lesson for my profession was that the soldier, for all his patriotism, valor, and skill, forms just one leg in a triad. Without all three legs engaged, the military, the government, and the people, the enterprise cannot stand.” Clausewitz’s trinity, taken the American Way, became even the Norwegian way to digest his theories: “Clausewitz established, at the outset of the last century, that war takes place between politics, armed forces and the will of the people. This view on war as a system applies in full even today.” Moreover, when Norwegians scrutinize other aspects of Clausewitz’s heritage, as for instance the concept of centre of gravity, it is usually done in the light of a preceding American debate: “As we know, when there is debate in the USA it has repercussions for us all.”

Even in the first decade of the 21st century we encounter sporadic references to Clausewitz in Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, but he is rarely the main topic of discussion anymore.

The next question we posed was to what extent is he used to educate future officers in Norway today. In the following we will look briefly into that.

To start with, although Clausewitz has been on the shelf of the library of the Military Academy at least since 1863, that does not really say much about how he was used or read. Again, this is a question I have to leave to people better equipped in terms of time and expertise than myself. What I can do is to gauge the current state of affairs.

An informal survey of the three military academies in Norway reveals that Clausewitz’s spirit is still around, but he is not a particularly towering figure. At the Naval Academy the cadets do not read Clausewitz as part of their curriculum at all, but they do read a few articles about him. At the Air Force Academy the cadets read Clausewitz, but only chapter 1 of Book 1, “What is War?”, in addition to secondary literature. At the Army’s Military Academy the cadets also read parts of Book 8, besides Book 1. The Army’s cadets are also confronted with the content of Book 2 of On War “On the Theory of War”. That the Army places Clausewitz higher than the Navy is presumably not sur-
prising, given his rather landlocked perspective. This is also important to have in mind when measuring Clausewitz’s impact on Norwegian military discourse as a whole. Norway is by nature, so to speak, a seafaring nation, and Clausewitz has no nautical aura.

At the Staff College, which is joint in Norway, Clausewitz is present in the sense of both he and Jomini being introduced from the lecturers, but neither is compulsory reading.\textsuperscript{50} Nearly one in four Master’s theses submitted to the Norwegian Defence University College from 2007 to 2009, mention Clausewitz in one way or another.\textsuperscript{51} This rate of reference shows that Clausewitz is a central thinker, but it is presumably not excessive in any way. I would guess, without being in position to know for sure, that both Plato and Kant score similar, perhaps even higher, results in Master’s theses in philosophy departments.

What is common to all my respondents at the academies, however, is the desire to have more time for Clausewitz. A cynic would of course say that all teachers would say that. If we only had more time we could cater to any hobbyhorse you may think of. Consequently, the fact that scholars want more Clausewitz on the reading lists is not very remarkable. Nonetheless, the reasons they give for wanting more Clausewitz are worth considering further.

The main argument to keep on exposing future officers to Clausewitz is the enduring need to thoroughly understand the philosophy and nature of war and armed conflict. Peace operations and wars of choice emphasise the military profession’s political, ethical and cultural aspects, something a study of Clausewitz could help to provide. Some would of course maintain that Clausewitz said very little about politics, ethics and culture, and that if you want that kind of stuff you should go elsewhere. However, Clausewitz’s contribution lies above such divisions. He provides instead a timeless philosophical underpinning of strategic thinking on which more multifarious, ephemeral or popular concepts can rest. In other words, Clausewitz can be a guide for the perplexed and for all those who want a deeper understanding of strategy.

Clausewitz’s thought can also serve as a badly needed counterweight to the endless acronyms and relentless “more-for-less strategies”. Whether called “manoeuvre warfare”, “effect based approach to operations” or “network centric warfare”, Clausewitz is there whispering the commander in his ear that in war everything is difficult, everything. Strategy offers few “Eurekas”, but many possibilities to test moral stamina and political honesty. As such, preaching
Clausewitz can thus in periods be a particularly ungrateful calling. Telling people who have seen the light that what they saw is probably the light of an oncoming freight train, just like all preceding visionaries who for a moment have thought that they have found the secret of easy victories, can be rather unpleasant and not a way to make friends in high places. Anticipated military cakewalks have a nasty tendency to end up like endless trials of fatigue.

Clausewitz also deserves more attention at the military academies because his main legacy is not his conclusions, but the way he gets to those conclusions. Clausewitz, taken this way, invites us to join him on a journey through a maze of considerations and a labyrinth of concerns. Where he eventually ends up is of relatively little importance, the journey is the goal. Consequently, one must read Clausewitz slowly in order to mature with the text. Presenting Clausewitz’s main ideas as bullet points on a PowerPoint slide is thus prone to convey the wrong ideas, both of the man and of his thoughts.

Finally, spending more time to introduce Clausewitz to future military leaders could also be compared to introducing junior high school students to sex education. The point is not to teach you things you otherwise would not do, but to put you in a better position to reflect upon what you under all circumstances will come across. Even if you do not appreciate the genius of Clausewitz, it may be wise to give future officers some knowledge about the man, his time and his thoughts, because officers will, later if not sooner, encounter quotations and ideas allegedly belonging to the old master. By giving people the opportunity to think beforehand, so to speak, they may become a bit more immune to people hammering them with Clausewitzian wisdom, however tendentious or far fetched. This point was vindicated also by my respondent at the Norwegian MoD.

The problem with Clausewitz in the departmental corridors is not that his ideas are particularly evident in the daily business of strategy and policymaking, but that when occasionally his name does surface it is more often than not counterproductive because all those things Clausewitz said little or nothing about, but which are crucial to our own operations, get too little attention. As mentioned earlier in this essay, staring too intensely at Clausewitz does not make us wiser, but blind to all those theorists who have explicitly interestingly things to say about those situations we run into. As such, Clausewitz is in danger of being used as the proverbial lamppost. It lights up a certain area, but it does not help you a bit if you lose your car keys three blocks away. If you insist
on searching where the light is brightest you will never find what you’re looking for.

So, what is our conclusion so far? Did Clausewitz write a book that ‘would not be forgotten after two or three years’? He certainly did, but his legacy is not as overwhelming as we may be led to believe. Has his eye-catching name, at least seen with Norwegian eyes, perhaps made him a bit more conspicuous than he actually is?

I will round off this essay by leaving the particular Norwegian context, and take a more generic look. The preliminary worry of this essay was that Clausewitz’s influence has apparently been so all-pervading that it is next to impossible to put the finger exactly on where the impact has been greatest. John Shy makes a similar point: No final word on a mode of thinking about warfare that has proved so durable, despite its flaws and momentous changes in the nature of war, seems possible. It has become, during almost two centuries, so deeply imbedded in Western consciousness that many adherents refuse to accept it as a “mode” of thinking at all, but insist that [it] simply offer the Truth about war, or at least about strategy.52

Again, most readers of this essay will recognize that the innocently looking “[it]” in the quotation above does not refer to Clausewitz, but to Jomini.53 So the reason why we do not encounter Clausewitz’s name as often as we perhaps should in Norway, is either because Norwegians have assimilated his ideas so thoroughly it is virtually impossible to say where he ends and we begin, or because Clausewitz has not had that great an impact after all. Consequently, you could make a point that the reason we discuss Clausewitz more than we discuss Jomini is because Jomini created the paradigm of which we are still a part: “[Jomini’s] general approach to the problem of war, abstracting it from its political and social context, emphasizing decision-making rules and operational results, turning warfare into a huge game of chess, has been surprisingly durable. Jomini, more that Clausewitz, deserves the dubious title of founder of modern strategy.”54 As the alleged creator of the paradigm, Jomini’s footprints have been wiped out by all those subsequent theorists who have trodden the same path, however unconsciously. Clausewitz’s footprints, on the other hand, are still vividly visible because almost no one has followed in his tracks, perhaps for good reasons.

That Clausewitz was a path-breaking military thinker is indisputable. However, if we were all like him and did as he did in 1812, that is, defect to the
enemy instead of renouncing personal political convictions, and throw suspi-
cion on the honest work of nearly all military educators but ourselves, the
armed forces would be very hard to train, control and maintain. In a way
Clausewitz thus resembles Socrates. James Madison once said, “had every
Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have
been a mob.”

Equally, had every soldier been a Clausewitz, every army would
still have been a throng, or at least a bunch of capricious know-it-alls.

Clausewitz is relevant, still, and will presumably be so for the foresee-
able future, not because we can build our armed forces and doctrine directly on
his conceptual foundation or our military education directly on his philosophy
of war, but because he offers a constant correction to the reigning way of
thinking militarily.

Clausewitz is relevant in the same way as Plato and Shakespeare are.
You rarely ask what can I use Plato for, or what can I gain by reading Hamlet.
If that is your motivation for approaching them, you will leave them just as
poor as you were when you came. You are far better off if you instead ask
yourself what is my reaction to what I read? What does it make me feel given all
that I have read and seen in world so far? Likewise, I think you are much better
off if you come to Clausewitz to wonder and ponder, not just to grab some-
ting to have in your pocket in case of an academic emergency.

In a certain sense, then, Clausewitz is also not relevant, just like the sun,
the rain or Elvis Presley are not relevant. If you ask a passionate bird watcher
whether what he does is relevant, I think a sad look on his face is all you will
get in return. Perhaps he too poses you a silent question: What kind of life are
you living to make you ask such a question? The things in life we find most
gratifying are not relevant, in any reasonable sense of the word. The same goes
for a fondness for reading Clausewitz. His insights still give us food for
thought, and if that is not reason enough to read and discuss him, then what
is?

Notes:

1 Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English, The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain
2 The book was issued in a series called “Practical philosophy” which included
Nietzsche, Tocqueville, Weber, and Habermas, among others. At the moment
of writing there is a process going on in Norway trying to finance a translation of *Vom Kriege*, but it seems very difficult to find anyone with both money to spend and a wish to see Clausewitz unfolded in Norwegian.

3 The closest we get to a book length treatment of Clausewitz and his legacy is presumably Rolf Hobson’s *Fra kabinettskrigen til den totale krigen. Clausewitz-tolkninger fra Moltke til Aron*, Forsvarstudier nr 6, 1994 [From cabinet wars to the total war. Clausewitz interpretations from Moltke to Aron].


5 Ibid. (“Innen sosialistisk tenkning har Clausewitz lenge hatt en meget høy status; selv om det rent konvensjonelt av og til kan være litt vanskelig å rose en adelig officer, endog en prøyssisk sådan, i kretser av mer eller mindre rettroseende. Lenin satte Clausewitz overmåte hoyt. Og han er også den eneste tenker som får den ære å bli sitert i avsnittet om krig og fred i «Sitater fra Forman Mao Tse-tung»”).


7 O.F. “Sovjet truer Norge” in *Røde Fane*, Nr. 4, 1976, p. 6. (“Lenin understreka at politikk og krig er to sider av samme sak. Krig er politikk med andre midler.”)

8 Obviously, one has to read a lot more than *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift* to fully map Clausewitz’s impact on Norwegian military debate, but that periodical is chosen here as the most likely place to find articles on Clausewitz. The consequence of that choice is that parts of the debate, particularly the naval part of it, must be left to future researchers.

9 “Krig er nemlig,” som Clausewitz i hans efterladte Skrifter, “vom Kringe,” siger, “meer et Middel til Forsvar end til Erobrin”. “Om Krigskunst og deri i senere Tider gjorde Fremskridt” by Christiania militære Samfunds Committee


15 G.S. “Moltkes Kriegslehren” i *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift* 74 Bind, Kristiania, 1911, p.405. (“Gjennem et flittig studium, fornemlig av Fredrik den store og Napoleons felttog, Clausewitz’s verker, gjennom rike erfaringer og utrættelig arbeide har Moltke været en av dem, hvis liv og levnet synes at bevise sandheten av det ord: ‘Geni er fild’ – den ubegrænsede evne til at ville.”


18 An article by the signature S.B. called “The relationship between the art of government and the art of war”, for instance, was published in 1922, without
mentioning Clausewitz with a word. (S.B. “Sammenhengen mellom statskunst og krigskunst” Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, 85. Bind 1922.)

19 Sverre Diesen Militær strategi, En innføring i maktens logikk (Oslo: Cappelen, 1998). For the record: Diesen was later promoted to four stars general and has served as Chief of Defence.


21 Diesen, Militær strategi p. 41. (“Går vi tilbake til Clausewitz var det imidlertid flere av hans samtidige, bl a sveitseren Henri Jomini og tyskeren Heinrich von Bülow, som med utgangspunkt i datidens fornuftstro mente å kunne se tilnærmep mathematiske sammenhenger i strategien, med formler for anbefalte vinkler mellom operasjonsbasis og operasjonslinje osv.”)


23 Schnitler, Strategi, p.112 (“Han undervurderde ikke de aandelige drivfjære, de moralske faktorer og personlighetens makt.”)

24 Ibid., p. 323. (“Jomini – Ney’s dygtige generalstabschef og den kjendte militærforfatter – utvikler i sine arbeider et kunstig system for krigskunsten med opstillede bestemte grundsætninger for deres ledelse. I sin faste, klare form har hans skrifter dog noget særdeles tiltalende ved sig. Særlig maatte de virke paa den franske aand, i hvis væsen det ligger at sondre skarpt logisk mellom begrepe”).


27 By 1900 there were 425 Peace Organisations in the world; no less than 211 of those were in Scandinavia. Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience with a new foreword (London: Hurst & Company, 2008), p. 44.

“Mit folk er veigt, lydrigsstemplet staar paa dets pande” Angell quoted in ibid., p. 166.


Clausewitz, On War, p. 252.

Ibid., p. 86

Ibid., p. 189.

Ibid., p. 75.

Ibid., p. 174.

“If I ever again become involved in the education of young officers, I will thus put even more emphasis on historical studies than I previously did.” Otto Ruge, Felttoget [The Campaign] (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1989, p. 206) (“Får jeg igjen noe å gjøre med oppdragelsen av de unge officerer, vil jeg derfor legge enda mer vekt på studiet av historien enn jeg har gjort tidligere.”)

Ibid. (“Folk flest, også vi militære, er altfor tilbøielige til å akseptere situasjonen som den er i øieblikket og gå ut fra at den situasjonen blir den endelige, i stedet for å huske på at livet går videre og at situasjonen imorgen alltid vil være en annen enn idag, og at det derfor ingen grunn er til å miste troen, selv om det går galt i første omgang. Det er det vi lærer av historien.”)


King Haakon 7th, quoted in Ruge, Felttoget, p. 206.

“Regardless of how it was going to end, we had to pick the fight now with regard to the future. To surrender without a fight would be devastating for the nation’s self-esteem.” Ibid. p. 20 (“Men hvordan det enn så kom til å gå, måtte vi i hvert fall ta op striden nu av hensyn til eftertiden. Det å gi oss uten kamp ville være ødeleggende for nasjonens selvaktelse.”)

“Her er vi over på det omfattende felt som med et uttrykk fra moderne strategi er kjent som deterrence, eller avskrekking. Hvor krig på sett og vis opphører
å være krig, og hvor politikken rår grunnen alene. Og vi kan vel innskyte, den viktigste, og også den fineste funksjonen våpen i det hele tatt kan ha. – Rent logisk står vi her overfor en videreføring av en vesentlig tanke hos Clausewitz, kanskje også det mest essensielle i hele hans forfatterskap.” Jens A. Christophersen, “Clausewitz og vår egen tid” [“Clausewitz and our own era”] in Om Krigen, p. xxiii.


44 “Det er først etter avslutningen av den kalde krigen at situasjonen har forandret seg. I dag snakker mange igjen åpent om krigen for å oppnå politiske mål – vi kaller det fredskapende operasjoner.” Ibid., p. 27.

45 “Under hvilke forutsetninger kan vi tenke oss at Norge vil føre krig og hvilke faktorer må vi minimum ta med for å gjøre en slik drøfting fruktbar?” Ibid.


47 Skjøstad “Med Clausewitz inn i framtid, drøfting av fredskapende operasjoner” p. 29. [“Clausewitz slo fast, ved starten av det forrige århundre, at krig finner sted i et forhold mellom politikk, stridskrefter og folkeviljen. Denne oppfatning av krig som et system gjelder uavkortet også i dag.”]


49 Katalog over Den kongelige norske krigskoles bibliothek, Christiania 1863, p. 40.

50 In danger of breaching “client confidentiality”, I quote an anonymous note from one of the staff college’s former students: “It is unfortunate that On War is not included in our syllabus, since it is claimed that this is the most quoted,
but least read book. When shall we (officers) then read/study Clausewitz?” To be a bit impertinent; both the salary and the time Norwegian officers spend off duty should allow for an encounter with Clausewitz, if they want to have one, even without the employer’s encouragement and support.

51 Just for the sake of comparison; Jomini is mentioned in less than 5% of the Master’s theses and Liddell Hart in less than 10%. (The Master’s programme commenced in 2007.)


53 The [it] substitutes “–correctly understood–Jomini and latter-day Jomini-ans”. Ibid., p. 185.

54 Ibid., p. 144.


56 The author wants to thank Håkan Edström, Øistein Espenes, Tor-Erik Hanssen, Rune Haugdal, John Andreas Olsen, Karl Rommeteveit, Bjørn Tore Solberg and Hans Jørgen Wiborg, for stimulating discussions about Clausewitz, Mette Guderud for helping out in The Norwegian Armed Forces Museum’s library and archives, and especially Gullow Gjeseth, Chris Saunders and Anita and Frank Carroll who made several suggestions for the article’s improvement.