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CLAUSEWITZ IN A POST-COMMUNIST STATE: A CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA

Vladimir Prebilič and Jelena Juvan

Introduction

When discussing the influence and importance of the prominent military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, we can easily compare him and his findings with Sigmund Freud in the field of psychology, Adam Smith in economy, Justice Marshall in law, Thomas Jefferson or Karl Marx in governance. The 19th century Prussian soldier and theorist is regarded a prophet whose views on the character and nature of war have held up over the past two centuries. However, for the intent of this paper we will not focus on his work on understanding and waging war, but on the so-called Clausewitzian trinity: the relationship between the state, the army and the people. Certain extremely successful defence systems were organized (e.g. USA) on his conclusions, and they represent a role model for developing countries. The Republic of Slovenia (hereafter RS) underwent an extremely intense period in which it reformed its national defence system. However, in order to understand the continuity of the reformation of the Slovene defence system, one has to keep in mind the very intense historical development on the territory of RS.

The Republic of Slovenia is one of the youngest and smallest states in Europe. It ensured its independence and sovereignty through a legitimate and legal use of force that lead to the rapid recognition of the newly formed state and full membership in the United Nations in 1992. Even though military conflicts and wars are not likely to occur on this territory today, the area was marked by numerous conflicts, many of which have changed the political map of Europe. The first conflicts reach back even before the rise of the Roman Empire, while the last took place as late as 1991. The reason behind these conflicts lies in the geostrategic importance of the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, for these 20,500 km represent the meeting point of four basic geomorphologic units: the Mediterranean, the Alps, the Dinaric-Karst and the Pannonian plains. Each one of them is defined by its own physical geographic characteristics such as relief, climate, vegetation and soil. This is why contemporary geo-politicians include the territory of the Republic of Slovenia amongst the contact areas, i.e. areas of transition between larger geostrategic regions.
Cohen\textsuperscript{2} defines this territory as a bridge between the various regions that enables a direct and indirect communication between them. As a consequence the geostrategic value of the area was on a constant increase, which continuously led to conflicts for dominance between the various regional forces. Numerous defence lines were constructed. The first amongst them was the Claustra Alpium Iuliarum that was built as early as the 3\textsuperscript{rd} century AD.\textsuperscript{3} The border role of the area was also clear as the Frankonian Empire was emerging under Charles the Great and continued to be clear as it saw the rise of the Austrian Empire. With the fall of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, its border role changed. This territory no longer represented the southern edge of Western Europe, but the northern edge of the newly founded Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This position became even more important in the post 1945 period, when the Socialist Republic of Slovenia represented the western most part of the new social order and ideology – socialism and communism. Today, when RS is a full member of the European Union and NATO, the situation has not really changed. Its position and role has once again obtained the before mentioned geopolitical connotation – it represents the south-eastern edge of the Central European community, which is often perceived by European politicians as the gateway into the restless western Balkans.

The changing security environment and the Slovenian defence system

All of the mentioned geostrategic characteristics had a direct influence on the formation of the current defence system in the independent RS. It is clear that the first origins of the Slovenian armed forces reach back to the fall of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1918. On 1\textsuperscript{st} November 1918 general Rudolf Maister took command of the military units that were returning from the various fronts and used them to create the Slovenian army. The 4,000 soldiers and 200 officers were sufficient for the disarmament of the German security guard and taking over Slovenian Styria and Carinthia (cover the Slovenian national border). Until the peace treaty was signed this also represented the border between the Republic of Austria and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During World War II the territory of Slovenia saw the formation of the resistance movement that consisted of partisan units. These units gained in strength right up to the liberation when they were organisationally transformed into the Slovenian army. The liberation was followed by great disappointment, for the
formation of the People's Federative Republic of Yugoslavia also saw the formation of a single military force – the Yugoslav army - which meant that the Slovenian army was incorporated into the joint army. The 1948 period of tension between the blocs which saw the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia step out of the Soviet bloc, the extreme tension in relations between 1948 and 1953, the promotion of the third political and development option (the formation of the movement of independence) from 1961 onwards and the 1968 military intervention of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia, all represented reasons behind the restructuration of the Yugoslav defence capabilities. In 1968 the Yugoslav federal assembly adopted the legislation which transferred a part of the defence responsibilities to the republics. This change also led to the formation of the Slovenian Territorial Army (TA). This opportunity to form a limited armed force was rigorously enforced by the Slovenian political leadership. Even though TA units were foreseen as a territorial component that would offer support in the defence off a certain territory to the Federative Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), great differences existed between the various TAs. SR Slovenia was the most diligent in putting aside funds for constant training, education, armament and organisation of its TA. Thus, the Slovenian TA was qualitative leaps ahead of other TA organisations in the other republics. At the beginning of 1990 the Slovenian TA units consisted of approximately 75,000 reserves that could be called in at any time.

**Independence and the birth of the Slovenian Armed Forces**

Independence was a long-lasting Slovenian desire that peaked with the first Slovenian multiparty elections at the beginning of 1990, which lead to the SFRY leadership declaring a state of alert. In May 1990 the Territorial Army of Slovenia received an order to hand over its weapons, ammunition, mines and explosives to the YPA. Through this YPA managed to confiscate the TA’s weapons that were stored in military barracks, but not much more of the remaining weaponry, for TA blocked the removal of weapons from their warehouses wherever this was possible. Following the ten days of war (which saw 72 battles and three ceasefire agreements) the defence forces of Slovenia achieved victory. The war cost 76 lives and 326 wounded on both sides. 31 tanks, 22 armoured transporters, 172 transport vehicles, 20 all terrain vehicles and 6 helicopters were destroyed or damaged.
However, during the first steps of the newly formed independent country the opinions as regards the future development of the defence system varied considerably. Immediately after the May 1990 elections the political option that called for the demilitarisation of Slovenia was relatively strong. This initiative was mainly linked to the withdrawal of YPA from Slovenia in the near future, but it also announced the opposition of a part of the public to any armed forces in Slovenia. The same period also saw the emergence of the political option that wanted to see the establishment of the Slovenian army, which would represent direct competition to YPA in establishing the right to legitimate use of armed forces on the territory of Slovenia. This decision was a result of the obvious supremacy of YPA and the fear that a war on a greater scale might erupt, for this could greatly and in all aspects endanger the newly formed country. This also represented a confrontation of two entirely different concepts: the classical state model with a strong military structure and a state without an army in the classical sense. In October 1990 a public opinion poll carried out in Slovenia showed that 25.2% of all respondents were opposed to Slovenia having an army, while in January 1991 as many as 48.8% of all respondents were in favour of a demilitarised Slovenia. The option in favour of the Slovenian army had the advantage of the support of a part of the government, especially the Ministries of Defence and Interior, while the demilitarisation option had strong support in the RS presidency, the opposition and the general public. The difficulty in establishing demilitarisation mainly lay in the accordance of the neighbouring countries – for it was the security systems of the neighbouring countries that could ensure the demilitarisation of RS and not public opinions. The various threats and the YPA’s military intervention certainly reduced the tendencies for demilitarisation, for Slovenia and the Slovenes were faced with the realistic threat of war and social poverty.

The post-independency period (1991-1994) was based on the formation of the national defence as practiced by Western states. This meant that the primary goal of the defence system became the establishment of a partially professional army and the commencement of military duty in its full scope as soon as possible. In 1993 the inclusion into NATO became a strategic goal for the first time. In the following years this goal was included into all development strategic and normative solutions and measures. This resulted in the 1994 Defence Act, which normatively defined the organisation of the defence system and the Slovenian Army. With this Act the Slovenian armed forces (SAF) were de facto established along with its new structure that was divided into the
manoeuvre and territorial part. The final act in the establishment of the army was the formation of the conscript system and general military obligation that accompanied the professional core. Similar to other states with parliamentary democracy the jurisdictions of individual bodies within the defence leadership and administrative system were defined and civil supervision of the armed forces was ensured. The inclusion into NATO became the goal of all Slovenian parliamentary parties, the opposition as well as the governing parties.\textsuperscript{9}

The period between 1994 and 2004 was marked by vast organisational changes that took place throughout the Slovenian defence system. Following 2001 the structural and organisational changes were essential for the development of SAF which was influenced by a number of factors: the increase in global terrorism, the spread of arms for mass destruction, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and consequentially the increased need for cooperation in defence (between resources as well as states). The otherwise solid and majority public opinion support as regards Slovenian NATO membership was tested in 1999 when the allies attacked Serbia without a UN mandate. Up until 2001 the armed forces grew (in 2001 there were 73,000 military conscripts in the Slovenian armed forces), the years 2002-2003 saw a sharp fall in the number of conscripts (to 39,000 conscripts). This led to the decision that the armed forces should consists entirely of professionals. Thus the last generation of conscripts performed its military duty in 2003.\textsuperscript{10}

The period following the inclusion into NATO\textsuperscript{11} led to a new structure and organisation of the Slovenian army, for it became a professional army (with a contractual reserve) in 2003. At this we were not merely dealing with the change in the manner of filling the numbers, but also with foreseen functional changes – the various systems for educating and training professional soldiers and members of the contractual reserves.\textsuperscript{12}

Through the years the ratio between the representatives of the permanent and reserve forces changed in favour of the permanent forces.

Alongside these structural changes a functional transformation of the SAF also took place. In the 1990s the armed forces were divided with a simple division into manoeuvre and territorial forces, in 2001 the SAF was divided into mediating forces, main and additional forces, and once we joined NATO in 2004 total NATO standardisation and classification took place.\textsuperscript{13}
The Republic of Slovenia has at its disposal 7,500 soldiers, while the war time forces established themselves at a total of 14,000 soldiers. Due to NATO membership we have renounced the right to develop certain defence capabilities, for the defence of RS is based on the use of the shared allied forces, which also incorporate the SAF forces. This led to Slovenia being dedicated to the modernisation process of the armed forces which lead to better efficiency, shared operations and easier deployment. The transformation to professional defence forces has also transformed the reserve forces. Thus the SAF currently has a voluntary contractual reserve\(^{15}\), which in 2010 consists of 1,661 members which is below the 5,500 contractual reserves planned for this year. (On Slovenian Army, Programme for the Development and Equipment of the Slovenian Army).

**The applicability of Clausewitz in Slovenia**

There is no doubt that the importance of Clausewitz’s contribution to the theory of military interventions surpasses his practical contribution, and yet both, the practical experience as well as theory are inseparably linked as the experience gained on the battlefield encouraged Clausewitz in his intense contemplation as regards the nature of warfare. Clausewitz is believed to be the founder of the classical political war theory and it is this theory that kept Clausewitz a common name studied and lectured at educational institutions even today. His main work *On War* is considered a classic, which »is in a certain sphere of hu-
man activity so important that the coming generations of scientists use it as a basis for the construction of their theories, while the experienced and established scientists consider it a standard that enables them to evaluate their own work«. One could say that the work On War is for military science what Machiavelli’s The Prince is for politics, Thucydides’ History of Peloponnese Wars for history and Smith’s The Wealth of Nations for economy. In the opinion of certain authors the greatness of Clausewitz’s work lies in the fact that it is interdisciplinary as it reaches into the field of philosophy, epistemology, methodology of social sciences, history, political theory, psychology, military strategy as well as tactics. »The concepts of strategy, military force, military organisation, all of which are usually considered to be self-evident were in fact defined by Clausewitz«. Until Clausewitz all dealings linked to war and politics remained partial and did not reach the level of unified scientific theory. »What the renowned philosophers and wise men could not construct, was established by the almost unknown (during his lifetime) Prussian professional soldier Carl von Clausewitz«. By gathering and comparing data on a number of different wars Clausewitz wanted to learn about the true face of war, ascertain its basic characteristics and laws. Through this he wished to compile a theory that would offer a key for scientifically led wars. Clausewitz’s work can be divided onto two levels: on the first level he leaned upon the findings of the military history until then and his personal observations of military practice; on the second level he originated from the classical German philosophy revelations that were at his disposal. Following fifteen years of work he reached the conclusion that the logic of war cannot be sought in the military activities. He realised that »war does not have its own logic and that politics (i.e. the complex human social activity that is oriented and defined by the control of the public power) are hiding behind it«. Only politics can link the various appearance forms of wars into one type and it is politics that give these various forms of armed violence the inner logic and unity. »Politics define the intention, means and scope of wars«.

Clausewitz studied the multidimensional relations between war and politics. In his opinion politics define all basic characteristics of war, and war is and »will always remain a dependent, secondary expression of politics«. Undoubtedly the best known postulate, but also the most commonly misinterpreted one is the main postulate of his theory which reads as follows: »War is a political act and an efficient political tool, a continuation of political relations with other means«. Following Clausewitz’s death the Prussian generals and
field marshals Moltke, Schlieffen, Seeckt and Ludendorf were considered to be his followers in military science and expertise. However, according to Bebler\(^{27}\) the four of them lacked the political and philosophical depth and dialectics of thought that was so typical for Clausewitz. All four rejected Clausewitz’s warnings as regards the supremacy of politics during war, and interpreted the previously mentioned postulate in such a way that politics have (once the war has started and until it ends) to allow the war to do the talking. In the work of Schlieffen, Clausewitz’s term »absolute war« became the basis for developing the extremely intense attack strategy of total war, a war that leads to the final destruction of the enemy, while his differentiation between strategy and tactics, defence and attack were in the later German military school changed into a rigid pattern.\(^{28}\) In his discussions on war Clausewitz stated that war is nothing more but a duel on a larger scale. The first and main goal of war is to dominate over the opponent and make him incapable of any further resistance,\(^{29}\) make it impossible for him to defend himself.\(^{30}\) War forces our opponent to fulfil our will. The main task of the armed forces is to protect the country, i.e. defend it.\(^{31}\)

The work *On War* consists of a collection of eight books. Clausewitz finished the first six books before his death and they were given the final editing and were published by his widow Marie von Clausewitz. The last two books, books seven and eight, were merely outlined by Clausewitz, and were also published as such. When studying the applicability of the Prussian military theoretician for the Slovenian defence system one needs to take into account certain specifics. Due to the short period in which RS has been independent the war experience of its defence forces are relatively limited - mainly to the defence during the liberation of Slovenia, i.e. a period during which the defence system was only emerging. Thus Clausewitz’s theory that is linked to the study of the war phenomenon cannot be applied directly in its entirety. His discussions that deal with the organisation and operation of the defence system present something else of use. As the military and political priority of RS on the break of the millennia was to become full NATO members the architects of our defence system have found themselves under the influence of our recent experience and the various advisors from the member states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The conglomerate of these influences contributed to the current situation of the Slovenian defence system.

In his theoretical starting point Clausewitz\(^{32}\) views armed forces as regards their strength and composition, its state outside of combat, their supply
and their general attitude towards land and territory. He defines the dominance of the forces in numbers as the key factor; »the principle to be as strong as possible in the decisive combat has to now be placed slightly higher than it was placed in the past«.33 He talks about »that division and formation of the different arms into separate parts or sections of the whole Army, and that form of general position or disposition of those parts which is to be the norm throughout the whole campaign or war«.34 This consists of the arithmetic and geometric element of division and positioning. The division arises from the permanent peacetime organisation of the armed forces, which consists of battalions, squadrons, regiments, etc. If necessary these individual parts are joined into larger parts, to the whole. Clausewitz ascertained that the unit becomes rigid if it does not have a sufficient number of elements. On one hand the top leadership is weakened if the parts of the whole are too large, and on the other hand the strength of the order is weakened in two ways with every new commanding level: firstly due to the loss that occurs as a result of the new transition and secondly due to the prolonged time the order needs to travel.35 «The order of battle of an army is therefore the organisation and disposition of it in mass ready prepared for battle».36 »The main principle as regards the organisation is that anywhere where a confrontation can be imagined, across the entire war territory, the armed forces are disposed in such a way that the units are at any given point capable of independent confrontation«.37 According to Clausewitz the precondition for this is fulfilled by merging three military units, with an organic division of the whole and an appropriate command.38

In war the battle is not a battle man on man, but a much more diversified whole. Two types of units can be distinguished in this large whole: the first are defined according to the subject and the second by the object.39 All war activities are thus directly or indirectly connected to combat. »The army is recruited, dressed, armed, trained, it sleeps, eats and is marched, just so that it would fight on the right side, at the right time«.40 In combat all activities are oriented towards the destruction of the opponent or to the destruction of his armed forces. »to conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy is always one of the main means of warfare «.41

However, warfare is accompanied by a myriad of activities, the main purpose of which is not to destroy the enemy but to serve the war. These activities are linked to the maintenance of the armed forces.42 Activities and objects that belong to the battle itself are marches, camps and cantonments. Other activities that belong merely to maintenance are feeding, hospital care,
and the supply of weapons and equipment. One of the most important ideas in Clausewitz’s theory is his clear distinction between strategy and tactics. He defines strategy as the »is the employment of battle to gain the end of the war; it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in accordance with the object of the war, and to this end it links together the series of acts which are to lead to the final decision...«.43 In his opinion the best strategy is: to always be superior, generally as well as at the decisive point.44 The key to success lies in the concentration of forces. »Nothing should be separated from the bulk, if this is not demanded from the purpose«.45 Clausewitz sees the strategic reserve as an important element of successful warfare. This reserve has a double role: firstly it prolongs and revives the battle, and secondly it can be used in unforeseen cases. He divides the reasons that condition the use of combat into various elements: moral, physical, mathematical, geographic and statistical elements. It is interesting that Clausewitz places great stress on moral forces. He ascribes moral forces as one of the most important objects of war.46

As already previously stated the main and only task of the defence forces is to protect the country, i.e. defend it. Book six is dedicated to defence. By dedicating an entire book to defence he indicated the great importance he ascribed to it. In his opinion the actual notion of war does not emerge with the attack, for this does not have combat nor appropriation as its final and absolute purpose, the notion of war only emerges through defence, for this has combat as its direct goal, for defence and combat are obviously two sides of the same coin. Any defence is oriented merely against the attack, it therefore assumes combat, while attack is not necessarily aimed at defence, but towards the appropriation and does therefore not necessarily assume combat. Thus it is in the nature of things that whoever is the first to trigger the act of war also sets the first laws for war, and this is always the defender.47

When these theoretical starting points are used to confront the current Slovenian defence system, we can expose certain similarities as well as certain differences. As already stated in the introduction, the RS defence system has based its legitimacy on the defensive war for independence and sovereignty. This 1991 confrontation was recognised by the international community as an example of respecting all rules of international warfare as well as humanitarian law.48 RS legally limited its operation also in the process of forming its defence capabilities. As the carrier of defensive or military power the Slovenian army has a very clear task – the defence of the territorial entity and sovereignty of
RS\textsuperscript{49}. The constitutional norms (Constitution of RS) restrict the international activities of the Slovenian armed forces, for it defines that its operation in international operations and missions is only possible if they are supported by the UN Security Council\textsuperscript{50}.

However, since the Slovene armed forces have first cooperated in international operations and missions in 1997 a number of tasks have been added. Today RS represents a reliable partner in ensuring international security through various international operations and missions, with which it is consistently moving away from its defined task. Thus, it is not unusual for the citizens of the RS and individuals in the Slovenian political elite to be asking themselves\textsuperscript{51} whether the Slovenian armed forces are a necessary element for ensuring national defence and security.

Following the introduction of the professionalization of the Slovenian armed forces a few important changes in the organisation of the defence capabilities were indicated by the move away from Clausewitz's theoretical starting points. The first change is linked to the direct responsibility of defending the state or its cooperation in the defence of the state. It is true that today's security challenges are different to what they used to be and that the defence systems are thus organised differently – they are based on small, professional and highly trained armed forces, however the tie or relation between the defence system and the inhabitants of RS (the Prussian theoretician paid great attention to the tie between the armed forces and the inhabitants), is undergoing important changes. This can be noticed on three levels: the interest for working in Slovenian armed forces is small, the youth is less and less likely to opt for voluntary service in the military service, and the public opinion is less inclined to support the activities of the Slovenian armed forces in international operations and missions. Authors such as Moskos\textsuperscript{52} and Haltiner\textsuperscript{53} have drawn attention to such events in a period when the Western countries were increasingly opting for the abandonment of the conscription system.

Research has also noticed gradual changes in the relation between the defence system and the state or the political elite that administrates with it. As stated by Clausewitz, politics have to lead the army and this is one of the main postulates of contemporary democracy that is also backed by international organisations. However, the professionalization process is increasingly standing in the way of this relation. Parliamentary control is legislatively founded, however, its de facto execution is often considered less important than it truly is. To a certain degree this state can be ascribed to the following factors: the
young democracy and with it the political elite are still learning about true political responsibility, the defence sector is becoming less and less important in the daily political events and with this the opportunities for promoting the work of the legislative and in this case supervisory branch of power are diminishing, at the same time the defence sector has ever better cadre at its disposal (due to the professionalization), that (un)intentionally shows its capabilities also by avoiding direct control. We can state that the legislative basis in RS enables such control; however a lot more needs to be done in this field if we want to raise the awareness of the political elite, civil society and the media in this area.54

Slovenian military education and Clausewitz

Military education and the education of officers are of key importance for the operation of the armed forces. Already Clausewitz recognised the importance of the education of officers. When judging the position and deciding as regards war one of the officer’s central and most important characteristics is his ability to create a strong link between the intellect, moral and physical courage and strong will.55

When discussing Slovenian military education we need to first define this term. While numerous other countries have based their education on military academies (that as a rule represent the beginning of the officer’s career and are as a system excluded from the civil educational system), RS represents an exception, for it does not have a system of military academies. In Slovenian armed forces the officers’ education is entirely incorporated into the civil educational system, right to the very end of university education and the appropriate title (B.A.). In other words, the basic expert knowledge, as well as the socialisation process of the youth, is entirely in the hands of civil education and could be compared to the American model for officers at the Reserve Officer Training Course. At this the Defence Studies programme at the Faculty of Social Sciences is an exception, for it has (in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence of RS and the Slovenian armed forces) created a military module. This university programme is the only one in RS, in which entirely military contents are included within the civil system.

Within this programme Clausewitz appears in the lectures at numerous subjects, for his theoretical findings and understanding of war and defence systems are essential for any defence studies student. They encounter
Clausewitz at the subject Polemology, which is a compulsory subject for 1st year defence studies students, and an optional subject for the students of other courses at the faculty (in higher grades). This subject pays a lot of attention to Clausewitz as he presents one of the more important themes in the first, introductory part of the lectures, in which the students are getting acquainted with the great thinkers, who have dealt with the theory of warfare throughout history. An important component of the lectures is represented by Clausewitz’s biography, for his military career was an important factor that influenced the development of his line of thought and the formation of his theory. Clausewitz is mentioned as an example of an 18th century individual, who - in a period in which noble descent was demanded if one wanted to make it through the rank of officers in the armed forces - managed to establish himself at the top military positions, even though he was assumed to be of middle class descent. At the subject Polemology Clausewitz is treated as one of the great military theoreticians, and the students are acquainted with some of the basic terms that he defined, such as: military force, social force, the nature of war. The importance of preparing for war is emphasised, and the goals of war are discussed, as are the means used in a war in order to achieve these goals. A part of the focus is dedicated to defence, the relation between defence and attack within the tactics, the relation between defence and attack in the strategy, and the reciprocal effect between defence and attack.

On the 1st level of studies Clausewitz is also mentioned in the subject Military History, in which his role in the professionalization of the Prussian armed forces is discussed (for he was one of the key authors of the military reforms under the leadership of the Prussian defence minister Scharnhorst and an exceptionally important military pedagogue). His research work is also important as an example of the studies of combat and its analysis. The subject Military History is a compulsory subject for the 1st year defence studies students, and an optional subject for the students of other courses and higher grades.

3rd year defence studies students encounter Clausewitz within the subject Theory of Tactics, in which great attention is paid to the tactics (many of them are still applicable in the contemporary military organisation) of various military theoreticians, amongst which the most visible role is taken by Clausewitz. In the 4th year the students encounter the Prussian theoretician once again at the subject Military Logistics, in which they analyse his findings in the field of military logistics and his understanding of its position within the military organisation. At this it should be emphasised that his views in the field
of military logistics are faced with the views and findings of his contemporary in the field of military theory – Antoine-Henri Jomini.

The expert education and training of future officers in the Slovenian armed forces begins with their entry into the program at the School for Officers which is performed by the Doctrine, Development, Education and Training Command. The precondition for their entrance into the school for officers is a completed university course at one of the civilian faculties. The School for Officers trains the candidate as a platoon commander which represents the starting point in the career of an officer. A military career can be further pursued with various other courses carried out by the Doctrine, Development, Education and Training Command: with the headquarters school, the higher headquarters school and the general staff school.

Before the candidates can start with their education at the School for Officers, they have to successfully pass the selection process and the basic military training. The School for Officers lasts for one year and provides the candidates with military knowledge suitable for performing basic officer’s responsibilities. In order for an officer to be promoted to captain, he has to successfully complete the headquarters programme (five months), he can become a major after successful completion of the higher headquarters course, and a colonel (or higher) once he has successfully completed the highest level of military education – general staff school.58

Discussions on the appropriateness of the existing education programme for officers in Slovenian armed forces appear every now and then. And yet when all factors and specifics of Slovenia, its armed forces, the changing security measures in the international security environment and finally also the needs of the Slovenian armed forces are taken into account, the current concept of the basic education of officers at civil universities (which is with the necessary special higher education and specialist knowledge and skills parallel or added to by the military organisation with its educational capabilities) seems to be sufficient.59 This system has a number of important advantages. Firstly, with the education in various university courses the necessary diversity in the composition of officers is ensured. This ensures that the military organisation will efficiently perform the various tasks in various work posts, and it will be capable of selecting the most appropriate individuals in the increasingly changing (operative) circumstances. Secondly, this ensures the important continuous cooperation between the military organisation and the various national intellectual centres, which in turn contributes to the strengthening of the civil-military
cooperation and partnership and ensures greater general public support. Thirdly, it is of key importance for the officers to obtain a degree in a profession that is acknowledged and highly sought after in the civil workforce market, for once they retire from their military career this will enable them to perform a stress-free and successful re-socialisation into the civil environment (regardless of the increased competitiveness in the civil labour market) and will lead to successful re-employment. These findings should be joined by the note that Clausewitz’s theory is not encountered by the future officers of the Slovenian armed forces during their basic military education and training. Thus it is slightly unusual that the role and importance of this military theory (and consequentially Clausewitz) is not dealt with by a military institution but a civil one.

Conclusion

In 100 years the territory of the current Republic of Slovenia has seen five states that differed from each other in all aspects. The empire, kingdom and socialist republic have all fallen. However, regardless of the differences in the state organisation, political systems, size, living standards and national homogeneity, certain similarities in the formation and operation of the defence systems of the various states could be noticed. This is where one can feel the important components of Clausewitz’s understanding of the defence system and especially the armed forces as its most important component. Even more, the period in which SFR Yugoslavia and its defence system existed, offers a surprising transfer of Clausewitz’s findings into the world of reality. The defence of the homeland was the basic postulate of all citizens who were included in the Yugoslav defence system in its various forms. Similar holds true for the status of the defence system itself and its cooperation with the civil surroundings. In Yugoslavia the civil-military relations were established according to the principles of close cooperation, and this provided the defence system with an exceptionally high level of legitimacy right up to the moment when the defence system was politicised and manipulated in order to achieve unification in an otherwise nationally and ethnically inhomogeneous state. A part of the experience gained by the Yugoslav defence system could be (in a modified version) transferred to the level of the new state, i.e. the independent and sovereign Republic of Slovenia and its defence system. However, due to the emphasised discontinuity of the young Slovenian political elite this was not realised. The
Slovenian defence system was thus funded on completely different postulates, based on the examples of certain Western European states. Many an attempt to transfer these experiences to the level of the Republic of Slovenia has proven to be unsuccessful. However, we can conclude that the Slovenian defence system is organised efficiently and that it functions successfully, regardless of its smallness. The question is how many Clausewitz’s principles have been preserved within this system? The international security challenges have changed the security architecture in numerous aspects, and this is reflected in the defence systems. Thus, we could foresee the transience of Clausewitz’s findings. However, certain principles discussed in this article can still be applied to contemporary defence systems, especially in the field of civil and military relations. Unfortunately, the study carried out by the Prussian military theoretician and his conclusions are moving further and further away from the defence system itself. The only exception is represented by the defence studies, which preserve his importance in the pedagogical process or at least indirectly ensure the understanding of Clausewitz and the basics of his military theory.

Notes:

3 Frelih, Marko, Longaticum in rimski obrambni sistem – Claustra Aplium Iuliarum (Longaticum and the Roman defence system– Claustra Aplium Iuliarum), Matformat d.o.o., Logatec 2003, p. 32.
5 (Kladnik 2007, 42).
YPA had approximately 22,000 soldiers only in the territory of Slovenia, while the entire 5th area – Slovenia and Croatia – was covered by 45,000 soldiers, 1,160 tanks, 3,000 pieces of artillery and 500 anti-aircraft guns (Kladnik 2007).


Post 2004


Grizold, ibid., pp. 135-6.

Data for June 2010

Any individual, a citizen of the Republic of Slovenia, without dual nationality, can become a member of the voluntary contractual reserves. As a rule the contracts are signed for a period of 5 years (see How to become a contractual reserve? Accessible at:


Krajlah, Dejan, Clausewitz in vojskovanje v Evropi v XVIII in v začetku XIX. stoletja: diplomska naloga (Clausewitz and warfare in Europe in Kladnik, Tomaž 2006. Slovenian Armed Forces in the Service of Slovenia, Defensor d.o.o., Ljubljana, p. 4.


See ibid.
Brglez, Alja, O vojni naposled tudi pri nas doma (On war also in our backyard). In: O vojni (On war), Carl von Clausewitz, 311-335. Ljubljana 2004: Studia Humanitatis, p. 317.


Ibid., p. 6.

Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 9.

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibid., p. 10.

Summarised from Ibid..


Ibid., p. 18.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid., p. 167.

Ibid., p. 169.

Ibid., p. 171.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 174.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 37.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 72.

Ibid., p. 103.

Ibid., p. 126.
ITCY has studied several assumed cases of violations of international warfare and humanitarian law, but no prosecution was started against anybody involved in the 1991 liberation war of RS.

The tasks of the Slovene army are defined in Article No. 37 of the Defence Act which states: “The tasks of the Slovenian army are the following: perform military education and training for armed combat and other forms of military defence; ensure the necessary or demanded readiness; perform military defence in the event of an attack on the state; in natural and other disasters participate in the protection and rescue efforts in accordance with its organisation and equipment; perform obligations adopted by the state through international organisations and treaties.” (Defence Act).

Due to the aforementioned legislative restrictions RS was not permitted to cooperate in the 2003 military action of the coalition forces in Iraq. Legally questionable was also the permission given to the allied air force to fly through the Slovenian airspace during their 1999 attack on Serbia, as this NATO operation was not backed by the UN Security Council. (Türk, Danilo, Temelji mednarodnega prava (Basics of international law). Ljubljana 2007: GV založba, p. 523).

In spring 2010 the Slovenian weekly magazine Mladina published a call to sign the petition »Abolish the armed forces« on its homepage. The petition received a great response. By the end of August 2010 the petition was signed by almost 9,000 individuals, including certain opinion makers and renown intellectuals. A detailed look at the contents of the petition reveals that it is not a call for the Slovenian armed forces to be completely abolished, but a call for its reorganisation in the sense that the armed forces are preserved in the form of individual units, the basic task of which is to contribute in international operations and missions. (See petition Abolish the armed forces)


54 Prebilič, V., Civilno-vojaški odnosi po vstopu v Nato in EU - praktični vidik civilnega nadzora nad oboroženimi silami z analizo razmerij med zakonodajno in izvršno oblastjo ter evroatlantskimi povezavami (Severnoatlantsko zavezništvo in EU). Raziskovalni projekt (šifra: M5-0187) (Civil and military relations following the inclusion into NATO and the EU - practical aspect of the civil control over the armed forces and the analysis of the relation between the legislative and executional power and the Euro Atlantic connections (NATO and EU). Research project). Ljubljana 2008: Obramboslovni raziskovalni center.


56 The study of defence studies has been educating the cadre for the national security system already since 1975. Later on the defence studies have seen great changes and the course was adjusted to fit the international security studies, the Slovenian needs for military and defence knowledge. In the war for the liberation of Slovenia its graduates found themselves at the very top leadership of the armed conflict. In 2005 the defence studies programme offered two new Bologna programmes. The first, the so-called general defence studies, is aimed at educating for political and international security competencies, while the second, the military defence studies, offer more contents from the field of military practice, skills, training, military science and the use of the armed forces. It includes knowledge from the fields of defence studies, international security, political science, sociology and anthropology. It was formed so that it is comparable to the programmes of military academies in Western Europe who have transformed their programmes for officers in accordance to the Bologna reform (Jelušič, Ljubica, Kaj lahko obramboslovje prispeva k povečanju profesionalnosti častnikov in častnic Slovenske vojske (razprava) (What can defence studies contribute towards the increase in the professionalism of officers in the Slovenian armed forces (discussion)). In: *Bilten Slovenske vojske*. 1., 2008, pp. 176-177).
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