
PEKKA VISURI, Dr. Pol. Sc. is a retired Finnish Army Colonel. He has worked 15 years as researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, and from 2008 as project researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute of the University of Helsinki. He currently is adjunct professor at the National Defence University in Helsinki and specialized in security policy and strategy. His dissertation: (in English) From total war to crisis management. The evolution of defence doctrines in Western Central Europe and Finland 1945-1985 (University of Helsinki 1989). His latest publications include: Sverige och Finland vid skillevägen 1808-1812 (co-author, Esbo: Fenix, 2009), Suomi kylmässä sodassa (Finland in the Cold War. Helsinki: Otava, 2006), Suomen turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikan linjaukset (ed. 2. edition, Engl. Guidelines for the Finnish Security and Defence Policy, Helsinki: Otava, 2003) and Suomi ja kriisit (coeditor with Tuomas Forsberg et al, Engl. Finland and Crises, Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2003). E-mail: pekka.visuri@kolumbus.fi.

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CLAUSEWITZIAN WAR THEORY AND THE DEFENCE DOCTRINES OF SMALL STATES: CASE FINLAND

Pekka Visuri

The article firstly reviews the basics of Clausewitz’s theory on war and its relevance for the present security conditions in Europe. The interpretation of Clausewitz has been difficult because of his dialectical method and many contradictions in his unfinished book *On War*. For grasping the core ideas of Clausewitz’s theory it is important to know the genesis of the book. His conclusions were mostly drawn from the Napoleonic wars, especially from the struggle of Prussia against France.

One of the main features in Clausewitz’s theory was the emphasis he laid on the relation of defence to offensive. He argued that the defender has many favouring factors, beside the physical conditions also moral factors, e.g. better legitimacy and motivation to fight, in relation to the aggressor.

For explaining the small states’ defence problems the case Finland has been studied and assessed. Finland defended her independence and national survival against the Soviet aggression in the Second World War. This positive experience made it possible after the war to continue with the proved defence system which was based on the civic army. During the 1960s Finland accepted a strategic-operational doctrine of territorial or area defence, which had many ideas offered by a neo-Clausewitzian theorist André Beaufre.

After the Cold War the discussions also in Finland have often concerned the relevance of Clausewitz’s war theories in the post-modern conditions of the globalized world and especially in relation to the theories of high tech war-fighting, called RMA. After the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the appreciation of Clausewitz seems to be growing again, and the consequences are interesting also for the small states like Finland.

The continuing relevance of the Clausewitzian war theory in the post-Cold War Europe has been proved. It is still a useful method for analysis of the security and defence issues of small states in the profoundly changing political landscape and military technical conditions of the world.
“The aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country unopposed. To prevent his doing so one must be willing to make war and be prepared for it. In other words it is the weak, those likely to need defense, who should always be armed in order not to be overwhelmed. Thus decrees the art of war.”

“All warfare is based on deception.”

**Introduction: Views on war theories in the post-Cold War era**

The wars in the post-Cold War period have been often called “post-modern” because they have many features which differ from the “modern wars” which are also known as “Clausewitzian wars”. At the same time the term “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) has been used to describe the greatly increasing importance of the computerised information and precision guided technology in warfare. RMA, however, has turned out to be a rather confusing “acronym of choice in the US armed forces” covering a large scale of visions on future wars.

Another well-known description for the development of military affairs has been presented in the book *War and Anti-War (1993)* by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. They used the terms “first, second and third waves of warfare” corresponding to agricultural, industrial and information societies which have their own specialised ways to wage war.

The Gulf War 1991 and the end phases of Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, especially the Kosovo War 1999, seemed to prove that the RMA theories were correct. The precision guided weapons enhanced both effectiveness of the fire power and enabled striking against small targets without vast collateral damages. As the surveillance and communication technology improved the situational awareness remarkably it was no wonder that the American type military doctrines, “network centric warfare” etc, were totally overwhelming “traditional” strategy and battle doctrines.

However, the experiences from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 2001-2010 have again lowered expectations that high-technology together with network centric war-fighting could achieve a real revolution in military affairs, maybe “an end of the doctrine development”. Instead, the interest to study classic war theories has grown as it happened during 1960s when André Beaufre and Raymond Aron applied Clausewitzian theories to the stalemated cold-war conditions in Europe. The aftermath of the Vietnam war in the late 1970s
brought up a Clausewitz renaissance in the United States\textsuperscript{5}, so that we can now wait for a similar neo-renaissance, too.

The published debate on new revolutionary visions on war has been concentrated mostly on the US military policy. The United States is no doubt the leading world power and, therefore, it is important to observe her developments even if it cannot be followed straightaway by other countries. The security problems of smaller and poorer states are totally different. Their problems must be solved by other, much more cost-effective means than in a framework of that high technological military force which only the great powers must have and also can afford. A very important question for the small states is also the nature of their security policy which should be based on more peaceful means than the major powers are used to do.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the main features and continuing relevance of Clausewitz’s theory for the defence policy and doctrines of the small states in the “post-modern situation” in Europe and in the globalized world politics. The emphasis is laid on the Finnish experience during the World War II and Cold War which has been building a basis for the present defence policy, too.

**Genesis of the Clausewitzian theory on war and the problem of its further relevance**

We can accept the thesis that the phenomenon war is always an expression of the culture of the respective societies. Therefore, also the theory on war which Carl von Clausewitz developed during and after the Napoleonic wars reflects, at the first place, the circumstances in Central Europe during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Clausewitz was a “regimental officer” who grew up in the Prussian cultural milieu which was a mixture of enlightenment and romanticism. His compatriot was Karl Marx. Both wrote remarkable theories on politics, though from quite different viewpoints, and they both have roused very much confusion and false interpretations.\textsuperscript{6}

For grasping Clausewitz’s philosophy it is important to know his career and the genesis of his book *On War*.\textsuperscript{7} Crucial was his experience during the Napoleonic wars, and the most important occasion was the failure of the Prussian troops in the battle by Jena and Auerstedt in 1806. Clausewitz had to analyse the reasons why the famous, well trained and disciplined professional army shaped by late Frederick the Great could not repel the offensive of the revolu-
tionary French army which was organised on the basis of compulsory conscription. Only the genius of Napoleon was not a sufficient explanation for French success, even if it was one important factor. The reform movement of Prussian military in which Clausewitz had a remarkable role assumed then many features of the French civic army’s organisation and tactics. Clausewitz saw also the importance of the state and society for an effective army.8

Already the battles of the first coalition against France in 1793 influenced Clausewitz’s mindset about the war so much that he decided to begin war studies. He saw as 13 years old corporal a very confusing “real war” which differed totally from the disciplined “ideal war” for which the cadets were trained on the barrack fields in Potsdam.9 Those impressions are well expressed in the introductory but very central part of his magnum opus On War, in the “book one” which is titled On the Nature of War (original German title: Über die Natur des Krieges). After the famous definitions of war and strategy Clausewitz raised the friction from the sidelines to a central explanation for many difficulties we know are connected with the warfare also today in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The appreciation of the present relevance of Clausewitz’s theory is not an easy task, mostly because of his dialectic method. For example, his distinction between “absolute war” and “real war” has fascinated many interpreters who have found difficult to understand its real meaning for the nuclear age.10 The same problem concerns generally theories on war and peace as well as definitions on aggression and defence. Clausewitz made apparently clear, ”absolute” terms more relativistic by using controversial questions which were based on historical experience. For example, the quotation from the book On War which tells how “the aggressor is always peace-loving” is typical for Clausewitz’s dialectics and was based on his personal experience as a prisoner of war after the lost battle in Jena and Auerstedt in 1806.11

An actual question now is e.g. the nature and meaning of “info-war”. How does it relate to Clausewitz’s concept on war? Another problem is to apply Clausewitz’s war theories in the contemporary discussions about conflict and crisis management measures as well as the “war against terrorism”.
The Essence of Clausewitz’s views on strategy for application to new situations

A successful application of Clausewitz’s theory for present and future conflicts depends on the findings of the real meaning of that theory, i.e. the ability to catch the core ideas presented by Clausewitz and their relationship to present and future circumstances. We know very well how much the opinions can change over time and according to environment. Clausewitz presents a theoretical menu for choice, and it demands a careful consideration, how to apply his findings to an actual situation.

Helmuth von Moltke, Alfred von Schlieffen and other German strategists before the WW I picked out the idea of the operational surprise and battle of annihilation. Yet, the way they used Clausewitz’s theory was basically anti-Clausewitzian and resembled more the positivist principles of warfare presented by Antoine-Henry Jomini.12

Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin and Mao Tse-tung found the analogy between war and commerce as well as connection of war and politics. Those Marxists changed Clausewitz’s formula on “war as continuation of politics” to “politics for continuation of war” and applied the theory on war for making revolution and people’s war.13

Michael Howard has emphasized the usefulness of Clausewitzian thinking in enlargement of the definition of strategy from pure operational military field to more comprehensive strategy. This is basically the same idea as in Liddell Hart’s “grand strategy” but Howard wanted to define the term “strategy” proper to contain also the logistic, social and economic aspects in addition to pure military affairs. The reference to Clausewitzian “trinity” of people, army and government14 explains the basis for this kind of reasoning.15

Neo-Clausewitzian theoreticians during the Cold War - and in the nuclear age - liked to point out the holistic way of thinking in Clausewitz’s theory. Most famous and most important for Europeans, too, was André Beaufre whose “total strategy” responding to English “grand strategy” offered useful concepts also for small states. During the mid 1960s Beaufre and Aron argued that the nuclear weapons have not ceased the importance of seeking appropriate, practical strategy against the “nuclear stalemate” resulted from the deterrence, especially the doctrine of “mutual assured destruction”. According to them there were also alternatives to the great power strategy which was based on massive nuclear deterrence and capability for mechanised warfare: “Strategy
is a duel of wills”. One variation of strategy supported also by Beaufre was the French independent nuclear doctrine of dissuasion which was developed during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{16}

The Vietnam War showed the limits of massive (conventional) fire power without clear strategic aims, a systematic leadership and a firm political will. It also opened the way for new operative-strategic thinking in the USA, but the results were not seen until mid 1980s.\textsuperscript{17}

Some neo-Clausewitzian theoreticians have applied the core ideas of the book \textit{On War} for a rather universal theory on strategy. Edward Luttwak\textsuperscript{18} picked up the anti-positivism and dialectics from Clausewitz to explain why “controversial logic” is the key for understanding strategy and warfare. According to Luttwak there is a different and controversial logic of action on the different levels of strategy, beginning from the bottom (technical level) upwards through tactical, operational and regional (theatre) strategy to grand strategy (security policy). Essential is the whole scope of actions and management of situations, where all elements of strategy influence each other. An action or a technological innovation can always be eliminated or circumvented by countermeasures on other levels of strategy. The point is that there can never be good universal strategies for all cases on all levels and sectors of strategy, but we must find a common ground for preparations in anticipating crises and have knowledge over the whole scope of strategy for choosing appropriate strategies for various cases and circumstances.

**The influence of Clausewitz on small states’ strategy during the Cold War and after**

A path from Beaufre’s total strategy and dissuasive deterrence went to “security policy” of the European neutral and non-aligned (N+N) countries during the late 60s. The strategy of conventional deterrence in those countries was “dissuasive” and “relative”, as opposed to the “absolute” deterrence which was based on nuclear capabilities for a destructive retaliation.\textsuperscript{19}

The aim of N+N countries was the same as the major powers had, i.e. to prevent war and aggression, but they tried to do it through a combination of policy of neutrality and a non-provocative defence system which had sufficient capacity to deter a potential aggression during a crisis or regional war. What could happen during a general war with nuclear arms was not so important because it was, in any case, too unpredictable and disastrous for all parties.
Another path starting from Clausewitz’s theory and Beaufre’s idea of
dissuasion was the doctrine of territorial or area defence which was based on
conventional, dissuasive deterrence.

Dissuasion (called in German “Abhaltestrategie”) was a kind “deter-
rence by denial” which aimed to deter a potential aggressor by a “threshold
against attack” over which it would be too risky to advance, because of big
losses and waste of time compared with possible gains.

There was a long and passionate debate in Western Germany during
the 1980s about “alternative strategies” or “non-offensive defence” (NOD) as
a means of diminishing the dependence on nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{20} The ideas of
NOD were basically the same as in the doctrines of territorial or area defence
in neutral and non-aligned countries Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and
Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{21}

Most interesting for the themes of this article are the differences pre-
seated by Clausewitz between offensive and defensive or between the aggres-
sor and the defender. They are very much like the difference between tactics
and strategy. We can well argue that many geographical and technical factors
which Clausewitz saw as crucial for the superiority of defence against offensive
are no more valid. The distances and the terrain obstacles are nowadays not so
difficult to overcome as they were for the armies during the Napoleonic wars.
Still, we have seen how a high-tech offensive force of the US military was
eventually exhausted in the Vietnam War. The Americans were superior in the
technical and mostly tactical fields, too, but they lost the war on the strategic
level.\textsuperscript{22}

The problems of war, or more generally armed conflicts, still remain. Is
a “Clausewitzian war”, i.e. a war between states, further possible in Europe?
An answer by Clausewitz and the realistic school of political thinking is based
on the nature of human mind. If it could be changed, then also the possibility
of war could be diminished or even totally dismissed. However, the warning
according to Clausewitz concerns the impossibility of foreseeing the develop-
ments if the men ever begin fighting each other. War as continuation of policy
is an unpredictable phenomenon.\textsuperscript{23} Escalation from conflict to crisis, from
crisis to war and from local war to general war is always possible, if the very
nature of human mind cannot improve and lead to more peaceful behaviour.
In the real life of the post-Cold War Europe we have already seen wars be-
tween the successor states in the disintegrated Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
The conditions and frequency of wars as well as the technique of warfare can change over time but we have no reason to be sure that either internal or interstates wars cannot occur in the future Europe.

It is, however, most relevant to ask how the Clausewitzian theories on war could be applied to the peace-time security policy and crisis management, for example, in the context of the EU’s foreign and security policy.

**Defender versus aggressor: the human factor**

A central point in the Clausewitzian philosophy is the importance of the human factor in strategy and warfare. This is also the key issue in the differences between great powers and small powers as well as between aggression and defence which do not depend on the actual conditions of Clausewitz’s time.

The emphasis on the moral and other human factors was not original by Clausewitz; they were also the main element in Sun Tzu’s theory. However, it was Clausewitz who most clearly elaborated the effects of the human behaviour on strategic and war theories.

Clausewitz emphasized the human factor as a main source of escalation in war. According to him the beginning of war is not like a phenomenon of nature but an act of human behaviour in social context. “Two different motives make men fight another: hostile feelings and hostile intentions.” We can influence the nature of war if we can regulate those factors. In the war a tendency to escalation prevails, i.e. the fighting, destruction, stress and other factors like those make both duelling parties ever more hostile to each other. On the other hand, in a “real war”, there are also many factors, e.g. weariness of the troops, fear, insufficient motivation, and lack of supply and other elements of friction, which restrain the escalation tendencies. These human factors also make defence superior over attack.

Some military scientists have tried to assess the superiority of defence and come e.g. to relation 3:1 for the benefit of the defender. So the attacker should have at least three times more power against defender if he will make a breakthrough. This kind of calculation is, however, possible only when the opposing parties are rather similar and geographical or weather obstacles are not very much favouring one party. It is totally nonsense to define formulas on power relations between attackers and defenders if the parties are qualitatively asymmetrical, e.g. nuclear versus conventional forces, or in the case of sea power versus land power. According to Clausewitz also the human factor
makes all calculations in war utterly uncertain. The computers can hardly eliminate this profound problem.

An interesting coincidence with the common thought on the superiority factor needed for successful attack is a statement by Napoleon that “moral is to material as three to one”. A quite opposite view has been presented by a well-known proponent of mechanised warfare J.F.C. Fuller who stressed the importance of material “which forms 99 per cent of victory”.26

Technological development has surely diminished the superiority of defence over attack, if not changed the whole relationship. Nuclear weapons are by nature offensive and nearly unlimited in their lethality. Only a threat of retaliation by a nuclear counter-attack is eventually the most effective defensive means against nuclear weapons. However, one of the most important lessons learned in the nuclear age has been the practical ineffectiveness of the weapons of mass destruction as real means of warfare. The nuclear strategy is full of controversies, for example, if we consider the roles of offensive and defensive measures. It seems to be true that the apparently offensive nuclear weapons are useful only as defensive deterrence means.

At present the attacker with high-tech conventional weaponry can see distant targets, move troops and weapons rapidly and destroy unveiled enemy forces by using accurate and lethal munitions. The most exposed are immobile objects of the command structure as well as communication lines.

However, there are many reasons to argue that the offensive capability of major powers cannot always be used effectively. First and foremost, it is the dependency of military power on economics, and, in return, a modern, a well-functioning economy is dependent on freedom of information and access to foreign market, and also at least to some degree on democracy in the society. These economic-societal factors do not favour aggressive and offensive strategy and warfare, especially if it demands very much resources and time, with large number of casualties, too. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated this phenomenon clearly.

The general atmosphere at present is against initiating an aggression against a state. It is also forbidden in international law, though it is often difficult to say who is really aggressor and who is only defending national integrity and interests. Also coalitions and duties of collective security make the difference unclear, as we can refer to alliance warfare in the Second World War, Gulf War 1991 and Afghanistan from 2001. It seems to be ever more difficult
to legitimise an offensive war domestically or internationally. This is a principal advantage for small states at least in the stable situation in Europe and in relatively small crises, but in a severe international crisis, not to mention a new world war, the ban of aggression is an insecure guarantee against major powers who are struggling for their basic interests and even their existence.

It has been a common sense that motivation is a crucial factor for the efficiency of troops in battle, even if it is not so easy to assess exactly. In the present conditions the moral of the army is far more important than earlier when the leaders saw their units and also the tight formations favoured the maintenance of discipline. The problem is now: which elements of motivation for national defence are still relevant and how the battle moral can be created in small states in front of the overwhelming great power forces? For explanation we can analyse some Finnish experiences from the last century.

**Historical experience as a source of motivation: case Finland**

Finland was until 1917 an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire. The war of Finland’s independence in 1918 was mostly civil war and caused deep societal traumas. Between the world wars Finland, however, was rapidly recovering from that aftermath and became a stable democracy, which was not usual in the rim states of the Soviet Union.

In the beginning of the Second World War in autumn 1939 the Soviet Union demanded some Finnish border areas near by Leningrad and a naval base westward of Helsinki. The Finnish Government mobilised rapidly the whole wartime army of 10 divisions with some 300 000 men and refused to give up state’s territories.

The Soviet Union invaded Finland at the end of November with an army of nearly 30 divisions, totalling half a million men. They believed in short war and quick collapse of the Finnish defence power. The correlation of forces and resources was extremely unfavourable for the Finns. The Soviet Union of some 200 million inhabitants fielded against Finland at the end of the Winter War 60 mechanised and infantry divisions with almost unlimited stocks of material. Finland with four million people could at last mobilise 13 divisions, but they lacked heavy weapons and munitions.

The Finns repelled the attacks successfully during the first two months of war and they even destroyed several enemy divisions in the battles along the long eastern border of Finland. After many weeks’s war of attrition the Red
Army eventually could achieve a breakthrough which pushed the front about 50 kilometres toward the city of Wiborg. There the front again stabilised, and both parties of war were ready to negotiate on ending of hostilities. The peace treaty which ceded the most parts of Karelia from the Finnish territory was made in Moscow on 13 March 1940.²⁷

The tough defence of Finland against the Soviet aggression has been called ”the wonder of Winter War”. It was based on the firm determination of the people to repel the threatening occupation and forcing of the Stalinist Soviet system to Finland. The excellent battle moral was a result of the socio-economic consolidation in the 1930s and the effective preparation for a total war. General conscription and voluntary military training made it possible to build up a proportionally large army. It was trained with Finnish original tactical methods and equipped with such material, i.e. skis, tents and machine pistol ”Suomi”, which were practical in forest battles. Many tactical and organisational principles in the Finnish army were brought from Germany during the First World War and originated from the Prussian tradition.

Finland joined the war again in 1941 when Germany invaded Russia. That time the Finnish troops, together 16 army divisions, advanced over the Finnish border to the Soviet territory, deep into Eastern Karelia where the fronts remained until June 1944. Then the Red Army began a major offensive with 40 divisions which had 450 000 men, 800 tanks and 10 000 artillery pieces. The main thrust was again made from Leningrad towards Wiborg. After an advance of 100 kilometres and seizing of Wiborg the attackers were stopped in two weeks’ fighting, some ten miles north of Wiborg. The battle moral of the Finnish troops was at first rather low, but it improved clearly as the army was withdrawn from east into the Finnish territory and began to defend the own homeland. The road to Helsinki became blocked and the Soviets had to interrupt their offensive in July without achieving a decisive breakthrough.²⁸

After the fronts were stabilised Finland had soon a right time to get rid of war because the supporting power Germany was already going towards her final collapse. Also the Soviets saw that they had no chance to break the Finnish resistance without additional troops and, thereby, risking the advance to Central Europe. Field Marshal Mannerheim as president of the republic agreed on truce with the Soviet Government, and the Finnish-Soviet war ended on the 19 September 1944. Finland had to accept again the peace treaty made in Moscow 1940 with some additional area losses and forced leasing of a naval
base in Porkkala near Helsinki, but the terms of peace were better than for example for Rumania at the same time.29

The eventual success of the defence battle in summer 1944 was precondition for Finland to remain outside the Soviet bloc after the war. Finland had to establish good relations to the Soviet Union with a treaty on friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance 1948, but it was not a military pact and did not result to any military co-operation with the Soviets. The most important fact was that the society and legal system of the state overcame the war as intact. During the 1950s Finland got back the naval base Porkkala and could then step by step orient towards an intensive Nordic co-operation. In the 1970s Finland organised the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and got a status as a member of the group of the neutral states.

The defence forces were organised on the well-proved principle of conscription with large land forces while the air defence remained relatively weak. The national defence doctrine was based on the territorial system which after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops in 1968 was especially developed towards capability to repel also surprise attacks. Theoretically seen, the doctrine was clearly defensive and non-provocative while building a relatively effective conventional deterrence. The aimed dissuasive effect was similar as in Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Yugoslavia.30

There was a difference in doctrines compared between the European neutrals and Israel during the Cold war. For geographic reasons Israel had to develop offensive armed forces which were capable to strike also pre-emptively and fight with mobile operations. The small countries between the military blocks in Europe preferred territorial defence because they had no possibilities to wage mobile war against the major powers. Yet, the tactics both in Israel and, for example, in Finland followed Clausewitzian principles of a flexible command.31

Soon after the Cold War Finland improved her air defence by purchasing modern anti-aircraft missiles and 64 US-designed fighter-aircraft F 18 Hornet. The land forces got a lot of tanks and other weaponry from the surplus stockpiles left by the DDR army (NVA). The geostrategic conditions around Finland had not so much changed as they did in Central Europe. Therefore, during the 1990s Finland kept relatively high preparedness for military defence despite the improving political atmosphere. Finland had also good reasons to
continue the policy of military non-alliance even as member of the European Union from 1995.

A government report on defence policy (1997) stated that the basics of the defence system should be maintained but the wartime troops would be reduced somewhat, i.e. from 540 000 to 430 000 men. Also the new requirements for taking part in international peace-keeping duties had to be met with some improved rapid deployment troops. Still, there were maintained, together with the reserves, 22 operational army brigades with some 200 local defence units which were an effective force for the territorial defence. The defence expenditure were circa 1,5 % of GNP.

During the first decade of the 21th Century Finland kept the defence system from the Cold War almost intact, with war-time troops of 350 000 men. However, the profoundly improved security situation in Europe made it already possible to reduce the defence readiness remarkably, but the potential for the mobilisation of large reserve troops was still maintained.32

A very important shift in the defence doctrine and readiness has been made with more emphasis onto the peace-time crisis management and duties where the military could be used as a reserve force for disaster management and other internal tasks. It was presented in the document *The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society* (2006). Also the cooperation concerning crisis management duties with EU member states and institutions has become very important.

As far as references to the Clausewitzian theories are concerned it is most remarkable that a consensus on the defence doctrine has been highly appreciated in Finland. Also the primacy of politics over military is secured by many means. They have contributed to a stable continuation of the security policy and defence system.

The Finnish defence doctrine has also other features of Clausewitz’s theories. For example tactics has been learned according to the Prussian tradition, i.e. as “Auftragstaktik”, and the Clausewitzian thinking has prevailed in strategy and leadership system, with only smooth recent changes towards American staff and administration procedures.
Views on the future defence and security problems of small states in Europe

Imaging the future wars and other conflicts has always been difficult. We have examples of fundamental errors, e.g. the overestimation of the offensive capability before the Great War. The debate opinions were very much contradicting on the importance and implications of new technologies.

One of the most influencing causes for the confusions in those debates has been the difficulty to make precise estimations over the importance of various factors in the latest wars. The Gulf War 1991 was very much showed in the media but the scientific analysis took time. After many years’ research we have better knowledge on the details and basic factors which made the coalition forces so superior to the Iraq forces. Still, there have been long-living legends which overemphasize the high-tech capacity of American military and underestimate the human factors, i.e. tactics, motivation and leadership. Most interesting is the observation that also in the air war against Iraq 1991 the “Clausewitzian friction” was very much influencing the results and we have no reason to assume that friction will be diminishing in the future.

An interesting view was presented by George and Meredith Friedman (1998). They predicted that the American supremacy will prevail by using the most advanced technology. Especially the long-distance weapons basing on the space technology and capabilities for info-war should be superior. However, there would be a renaissance of the light infantry, too. That is the area in which also the small, technologically advanced countries can be effective. It is possible to produce with relatively low costs modern computerised weapons and effective means for communication and intelligence.

The post-modern crises and wars have various faces and unimaginable progress when they occur. Also the post-modern war is a political phenomenon as Clausewitz described his contemporary wars. I will argue that Sun Tzu was also right when he pointed out the human factors and especially deception as most important things in war. The wars in Yugoslavia from 1991 as well as wars in Chechenya, Iraq and Afghanistan have shown very well the continuing relevance of those arguments. Those wars were very differing by nature so that also conclusions have been rather controversial.

Then came the “war against terrorism” which was declared in September 2001 by the US president George W. Bush and fought with high intensity and rapidly growing costs. The president explained the so called Bush doctrine
in many speeches saying for example that pre-emptive strikes are legitimate against terrorists and their allies, adding that “the offensive is the best defensive”. In spite of initial attempts to keep that war limited and clean it soon escalated both horizontally - to many areas of the world - and vertically - to comprise dirty methods and very high political and economic costs. It turned out to be some kind a post-modern world war, in which the United States and the allies have been fighting against many Asian movements and states without clear aims and exit strategies. The war has proved again the validity of the Clausewitzian term “friction” and the difficulties to foresee the developments in the armed conflicts.

According to the Clausewitzian tradition it is important to acknowledge that there are no universal solutions to the security dilemmas of different states. The defence policy of small countries must be in accordance with the aims of national security policy, foreseeable geostrategic circumstances and societal factors. That is why, for example, Finland has to maintain a defence system which is appropriate exactly to the Finnish circumstances and is not only a reflection of the international trends.

The most important thing also in future is maybe the cohesion of the society, as part of so called Clausewitzian trinity of people, government and armed forces. As result of an analysis of cost-effectiveness in a crisis situation a major power hardly has good reasons to commit itself to a risky attack against a stable nation which has followed a non-provocative security policy and has a relative well armed civic army prepared to defend resolutely the independence of the state and the living conditions of the people.

There are still many problems as well as chances in application of the Clausewitzian theories to the changing conditions in Europe and World. At present the most important task for EU countries is to analyse the possibilities to improve the crisis management capabilities for external and internal affairs. There are too many and too complicated arrangements for example concerning counter-terrorism measures.

It would be useful to apply the Clausewitzian thinking to the planning practices in the area of crisis management and disaster mitigation. Starting from the thesis that a plan can be valid only until the first contact with the enemy we can develop a planning procedure which contains the basic emergency preparations including an adequate training and is flexible for rapid changes according to the actual situations.
The management of security crises and natural disasters is not the same thing as leading of traditional war operations but they both have common elements which make it possible to apply the Clausewitzian war theories to the emergency planning and management of crises also in the EU framework. This is maybe the most important heritage of Clausewitz’s philosophy for the European states in the future.

Notes:


The most comprehensive (neo-Clausewitzian) attempt has been made by Raymond Aron in *Penser la guerre Clausewitz*, Paris 1976 (English version *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*, 1985). Aron described the nuclear war as “absolute” and the period of crisis before it as “real war”. A critical study on neo-Clausewitzian theory by Anatol Rapoport (1968: pp. 60-63) dislikes the quasi-rationalism which was based on Clausewitz and used in many American theories on nuclear war-fighting related to actual circumstances of the Cold War.

See especially the description, how the prisoners of war the Prince August of Prussia and his adjutant Clausewitz were addressed by the victorious emperor Napoleon in the Castle of Berlin after the battle. Von Schramm, ibid., pp. 121-124.


Clausewitz, ibid., p. 89.


The term “total strategy” refers to a combination of political (diplomatic), economic, psychological and military means coordinated towards security objects of the nation. It contains the same idea as “security policy” (national security policy) had in neutral countries in Europe. See e.g. for Switzerland: Däniker, Gustav, *Dissuasion. Schweizerische Abhältestrategie heute und morgen*, Huber, Frauenfeld 1987, pp. 30-34; for Austria: *Landesverteidigungsplan* 1985, pp. 19-21; for Sweden: Andrén, Nils, *Maktbalans och alliansfrihet. Svensk utrikespolitik under


23 Clausewitz, ibid., pp. 75-89.


25 Clausewitz, ibid., pp. 75-89.


28 See e.g. Tillotson, ibid., pp. 215-211.


Howard, 1991: pp. 97-112

Literature:


Heuser, Beatrice, Reading Clausewitz, Pimlico 2002.


Howard, Michael, Clausewitz, Oxford University Press 1983.


