Mao Zedong's References to Clausewitz

by Zhang Yuanlin

The Prussian major general Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was and is regarded in China as the founder and main representative of modern war theory in Europe. *1 The translation of his theoretical main work on war has a long history there. *2 Mao Zedong *3 (1893-1976) is known not only as the political leader of the Chinese Revolution, but also as the military strategist and tactician of the same. Clausewitz and Mao lived in different times and belong to two distant nations. Do they both have a spiritual relationship? So far, some publications have touched this riddle, but have not solved it at all. The purpose of this article is to specifically examine and prove Mao Zedong's intellectual reference to Clausewitz.

I. Previous research on this topic I think it is advisable to first take a short look at the previous Mao-Clausewitz research before I deal with the concerns of the present work.

*1. See Li Yuri, Studies of the Classics of War Theories in the East and West. Guilin 1943, p.2; Jing En, The Progress and Limitation of the Clauses-War Doctrine. In: Chinese military science, issue, 2/1988, Chinese, p. 68 ff.

*2. See Zhang Yuan-Lin, The Chinese editions of Carl von Clausewitz's War. In: Austrian Military Journal, Issue 3/1990, p. 229 ff.

*3. In the present work, the author has decided to use the Chinese Pinyin transcription on the grounds that the Pinyin transcription has become more and more popular not only in the foreign language publications of the People's Republic of China, but also internationally. According to the rule of the Pinyin transcription one writes z. B. Mao Zedong instead of Mao Tse-tung, Jiang Jieshi instead of Tschiang Kai-check. However, original names and terminology remain unchanged in the quotations. THIS PAGE IS DONE USING PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH TEXT TRANSLATION. IT IS FAR SUPERIOR TO THE DOCUMENT TRANSLATION (BELOW).

[444]

It is unknown until recently, "o b the strategist of the long-lasting People's War, Mao Tse-tung, was a Clausewitz reader , " * 4 so some researchers touched on this topic in their previous Clausewitz research and noticed Uh certain nli chkeiten in some interpretations of Clausewitz and Mao. The famous Clausewitz researcher Werner Hahlweg who examined thoroughly and systematically Lenin's relationship with Clausewitz in the 1950s , * 5 noticed, for example, already in the 1960s, Mao's reference to Clausewitz and believed there ss Clausewi tz Mao Zedong was known. * 6 Ma o quoted and commented on the sentence about war as " continuing politics by other means". * 7 At that time, however, Hahlweg did not yet explain how Mao approached Clausewitz's core ideas about the relationship between politics . and the war came Au SSE rdem he admitted: "Indes is from these few AEU SSE conclusions did not let see with certainty whether Mao Tse-tung, busy beyond deeper with Clausewitz or more quotes him in the sense of a key word . " * 8 In the 1970s, Hahlweg continued on this subject. In his view, Mao is one of the leading guerrilla strategists and theoreticians and has made the ideas of the war useful for his purposes." Mao Tse-tung continued in his brochure on the conduct of the guerrilla war published in 1937, he invoked Clausewitz wherever it was important for him to explain the individual character of the wars, depending on the differences between peoples and eras fen. Clausewitz wrote in the work Vom Kriege that the wars had independent forms and conditions; therefore each period must have its own war theory. " * 9

* 4. Dietmar Schössler, Carl von Clausewitz with self-testimonials and picture documents. Reinbek near Hamburg 1991, p.128.

* 5. Werner Hahlweg, Lenin and Clausewitz. A contribution to the history of political ideas in the 20th century. In: Archives for Cultural History 36, 1954, Issue 1.3.

* 6. Carl von Clausewitz, Writings-Essays-Study-Letters. Docu ments from Clausewitz, Scharn Horst and Gneisenau-Nakhla ss well as from public and private collections. Edited by Werner Hahlweg. Vol. I, Göttingen 1966, p. 24.

* 7.Ibid

* 8.Ibid

* 9. Werner Hahlweg, The Clausewitz picture once and now. In: Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege . Bonn 1991, p. 160.

[445]

Finally schillings I externa SSE rte "his way, should Mao Zedong probably through the mediation of Lenin came to Clausewitz." Hahlweg his opinion, by which way Mao Zedong with Clausewitz came in contact * 10

Dirk Blasius wrote in the 1960s, a rather long article entitled "Carl von Clausewitz and the main thinkers of Marxism" and made it aware that his ss we must not neglect the thinker Mao, if you look with the theme "Carl von Clausewitz and the main thinkers of Marxism "befa ss t. In his view, lä ss t Mao's interpretation of the core concept of the rule clausewitz philosophy of war, namely the relationship between war and politics, Schlu ss on its in-depth study of the thought world of the work "On War" to. And Mao mu ss te first of Lenin with the thought processes of Clausewitz in contact come to be, " * 11 But Blaise could not assess the extent to which Mao Zedong beyond own Clausewitz studies for operation. However, he was not prevented the War theories of compare Mao and Clausewitz. He seems Mao in his practical theory of war at individual points of Clausewitz influenced ss t to be without because ss to this course clearly verify lie SSE . in his opinion agrees example Mao's concept of defense almost literally with Clausewitz ' match. Even Clausewitz's notion of "act of war" had been taken over by Mao. in addition, thought Blaise, since ss Mao's theory corresponds to the partisan war certain manifestations of the people's war described by Clausewitz. But "if a direct influence ss Clausewitz's on Mao in this points exists, "lä ss t is not from him" decide. " * 12 Total proceeds from Blasius 'Studies indicate that ss he intensely devoted to the comparison of Mao and Clausewitz, thereby further contributed about Mao and Clausewitz. But in the questions of whether or to what extent Mao Clausewitz studied, he could not give us a clear answer.

Sebastian Haffner verfa ss te "tung Tse-Mao, theory of guerrilla warfare or strategy of the Third World" for the book an essay entitled "Mao and Clausewitz," in which he sang out the terms of the war with Mao and Clausewitz and then the five principles of European warfare contrasted with the principles of Mao Zedong's people's war theory. " * 13

* 10.Ibid., P.347.

* 11. Dirk Blasius, Carl von Clausewitz and the main thinkers of Marxism. In: Wehrwissenschaft li che Rundschau 5/1966, pp. 345-346.

* 12.Ibid., P. 347.

* 13. Sebastian Haffner, Mao and Clausewitz. Introductory essay. In: Mao Tse-tung, theory of guerrilla warfare or strategy of the third world. Reinbek 1966, pp. 14-22; Reprinted in: Günter Dill (ed.), Clausewitz in perspective. Ullstein 1980, pp. 652-663.

[446]

Haffner's studies may to some Ma ß give to familiarize themselves with European warfare and the Chinese guerrilla suggestions, but they can do little to help us in fact in understanding the war theories of Clausewitz and Mao because he still Mao really had neither Clausewitz seemed to understand.

Wilhelm von Schramm mentioned Mao Zedong briefly at the end of his book "Clausewitz. Leben und Werk": Mao as a Leninist was "also a precise expert on Clausewitz and a friend of the philosophy of war . " * 14 But he did not provide any proof of this. His Behaup tu ng, Mao had "always clearly expressed, since ss the purpose of the continuation of politics by other with stuffs that world domination was , " * 15 me is completely new. In Mao's writings I have never read such a formulation. It is probably not there either.

The French sociologist and Clausewitz expert Raymond Aron has in his work "Clausewitz, Thinking of War" a separate chapter with the title "The People's Armament", in which he deals with the topic "Mao Tse-tung and the dialectic defensive-offensive" employed. Right at the beginning of this part fa ss te Aron of the available sources ago the state of his knowledge together, "I know ß not know if Mao Tse-tung Clausewitz has read or studied He cites the formula and refers to Lenin's books from 1915 to 1917. ... He uses a military language that repeatedly to the in on war recalls. But the concise definitions defense attack, time-space, internal and externa SSE re lines destruction-fatigue-are part of a henceforth common vocabulary. " * 16 " Mu ss to conclude that ss Mao Clausewitz studied? I do not want the affirmative. The thinking seems to me the same for the simple reason because ss it coincides with common sense, using the same terms." ' * 17 Mao took up Lenin's interpretation, even though he was foreign to Clausewitz and also to his spiritual world. ' * 18 Connecting SSE nd Aron compares some ideas of Mao with the von Clausewitz, in which he repeatedly referred to Mao as a Clausewitzianer. " * 19

* 14. Wilhelm von Schramm, Clausewitz. Life and work. Esslingen am Neckar 1976, p. 571.

* 15.Ibid

* 16. Raymond Aron, Clausewitz. Think the war . From the Franz ösischen translated by Irmala Arn untersperger. Frankfurt am Main, Berlin 1980, p. 424.

* 17.Ibid., P. 433.

* 18.Ibid., P. 424.

* 19.Ibid., P. 432,434.

[447]

Aron said, ". The military contribution to the theory of war, to the writings of Mao afford seems more original than the political This attracts me how it zusammengefa ss t have, the logical consequences of the Leninist interpretation of Clausewitz." * 20 Finally schillings I he judged in one sentence: "The Clausewitz's term, which was received by Lenin transmission in Marxism, determines the historical-political view of Mao Tse-tung, at least until victory in 1949." * 21 It is obvious, since ss it was Aron unknown whether Mao Clausewitz studied. By comparing some ideas of Mao and Clausewitz, he notes, since ss Mao in W esentlichen was a Clausewitzianer. But the way in which Mao came into contact with Clausewitz's train of thought Aron only indicated Lenin's interpretation of Clausewitz. Its lockable SSE ndes opinion on the influence ss of clausewitz rule concept to "the geschich tl I-political view of Mao" seems to lack me to foundations and justifications.

One can name other authors who mentioned Mao's relationship with Clausewitz in their research. But generally speaking, the above examples have essentially shown the state of Mao Clausewitz research in Europe. These examples reveal the successful research because ss caught the attention of many researchers, the relationship between Mao and Clausewitz. Based on the available works of Mao and Clausewitz and other sources of material they wanted to find out if Mao has a spiritual kinship with Clausewitz how Clausewitz Mao influenced ss t and what similarities and differences, the two. Her studies were the first attempts in this research direction and should be regarded as the first contributions or material sources for Mao Clausewitz research. Since Mao had made a note, since ss he quoted Clausewitz's formula of war as "the continuation of politics by other means" of Lenin's pamphlet, some researchers came to the Schlu ss inference, since ss Mao by Lenin with the thought processes of Clausewitz Came into contact. But they did not know whether Mao could get to Clausewitz by other means. Some researchers compared Mao's views on people's war, war and politics as well as attack and defense with the corresponding von Clausewitz and showed Mao's possible intellectual kinship with Clausewitz.

 

* 20.Ibid., P. 429.

* 21.Ibid., P. 436.

[448]

But they did not provide direct evidence that ss Mao had personally studied Clausewitz's work and made Clausewitz's thoughts useful for China. Their assessments were mainly based on guesswork. Dietmar Schössler, a leading Clausewitz researchers in Germany, has recently been the state of Mao Clausewitz research aptly zusammengefa ss t: "Until the end of the eighties could not be determined whether, for example, Mao himself anfertigte excerpts von Clausewitz So could. are only recorded as ss method of thinking and concepts Clausewitz and Mao were alike in strikingly similar, but the explanation offered only Lenin's role as mediator and on the observation that ss "clausewitzisch" proceed logically thinking strategists just ". * 22

II. Mao Zedong's references to Clausewitz

Before 1978, before the reform and opening of China, it was taboo to look at Mao Zedong scientifically and realistically. He was adored. Nothing could be said or done that could harm his fame even a little. At that time, Mao's biographies were mostly written by foreigners . Of course, the relationship between Mao and Clausewitz was not mentioned in public. Only since the 1978 beginning of the reform and opening up, China has made it possible in the People's Republic of China to study Mao objective and in RESIZE SSE rem to get amount of information about Mao's ideas. This enables the following investigation.

II.1 . Was Mao Zedong a Clausewitz reader?

After collecting materials about Mao's original writings, notes, and memories of Mao's contemporaries and carrying out an in-depth investigation, I can now definitely answer the question of whether Mao Clausewitz's work Read From War : Mao read it in spring 1938.

* 22nd Dietmar Schössler, Carl von Clausewitz (as note 4), p. 129.

[449]

In July 1937, the Japanese army, which had already occupied the northeast of China reached the city Beiping-later in Beijing (Peking) renamed-and wanted to subsequent SSE nd conquer the whole of China. At that time it was about the life or death of the Chinese nation. One of the most important anti-Japanese forces in the country was the "Chinese Red Army of Workers and Peasants" under Mao Zedong's leadership, which had previously been exposed to the encirclement and extermination campaign of the Guomindang Army under Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaischek's) leadership and finally after one difficult and successful "Long March" * 23 in October 1935 had founded a solid headquarters in Yan-An. But it soon faced a war of new character and quality, namely the national war of resistance against Japanese aggression. At that time, Mao was reading a lot of philosophical, political, and military books to summarize the experiences from the previous civil war, to establish the right politics and strategy for the next fight in the changed situation. According to the information available, Mao read the following works here in Yan-An: "Anti-Dühring" by Engels, "On the Dialectic Question" by Lenin, "On the Development of Monistic Historical Conception" by Plechanov, "On the Method of Thinking" and "Popular philosophy" of Ai Siqi, including schillings I of the writings of Kant, Hegel and Feuerbach. * 24 Mao also intensively studied some Chinese and foreign military theory and war history books, especially "Sunzi about the art of war" and Clausewitz's work Vom Kriege .

Gao Lu, one of the authors of the anthology "Mao Zedong reading," has given an important reference to Mao's studies of the work Vom Kriege at the time. In his article "Mao Zedong and logic" Gao Lu mediated as Mao studied in his whole life and logic is the science li care che discussion of the logic. He casually mentioned the following: "In the spring of 1938, Mao Zedong had finished reading Li Da 's book" Abri ss der Sociologie "and was reading Clausewitz' work Vom Kriege .

* 23. Much has been written about this "25,000 Li March," as the Chinese call it, for example: 1). Chen Changfeng, With Chairman Mao on the Long March. 2nd ed. Beijing 1972; 2). Edgar Snow, Red Star over China . Frankfurt am Main 1974; 3). Har rison E. Salisbury, The Long March. The U ntold Story . Translated from English by Guo Jiading, Chen Zhenjiu and Zhang Yuanyuan. Beijing 1985; 4). Han Suyin, The Morning Tide. Zurich 1972; 5). the descriptions of Mao Zedong himself, which can be found in his "Selected Work" (Vol. I, Beijing 1968, German, pp. 181-187).

* 24. Gong Yuzhi, Feng Xianzhi and Shi Zhongqiuan, Mao Zedong reading . Sanlian publishing house for life, reading and new knowledge. Beijing 1986, Chinese, pp. 69-70.

[450]

On March 24, he has the work On War . Read to the 111th page " * 2 5 Gao Lu quoted au SSE rdem in his note Mao's reading diary of 28 March 1938: On War , s 112-122 read.." * 26 As far as I know ß , was reported publicly here in the publication for the first time when Mao personally the work On War was reading. The statements by Gao Lu are trusted because he had worked for a long time with Mao as a scientific secretary and much of the content of reading and unpublished writings of Mao wei ß . The book "Mao Zedong reading" has a certain Ma ß an official character, although some authors have written in their own name. The well-known Chinese politician Deng Xiaoping showed an unusual interest in the publication of this book and personally wrote the book title for the cover with a brush.

Would not it just a hint or an indirect proof, since ss Gao Lu about Mao's study of the work On War casually mentioned, we are now, however, have a direct and official proof of Mao's study found this work, after an anthology titled "Mao Zedong marginal notes (compiled and published by the research Office documents to the Central Committee of co philosophical works " mm was unistic party of China) in 1988 published. This Sa mme LBand COVERED ss t Mao's philosophical glosses for 10 plants. It included Mao's reading diary from February 1 to April 1, 1938.

Here I go into this reading diary in detail. Due to the long-standing tense and dangerous situation in China at the time, Mao could not keep his diary continuously, which he mentioned at the beginning: "February 1st, 1938. I haven't kept a diary for 20 years. Today I want to start again to acquire scientific knowledge me .... " * 27 Conne li e SSE nd , that in his reading diary from February 1 until March 16, 1938, Mao wrote down how he" Abri ss sociology "of Li Da read. On March 18, 1938, he began reading Clausewitz's work Vom Kriege . He recorded this in his reading diary:

* 25. Gao Lu, " Mao Zedong and Logic. " In: Mao Zedong reading (as note 24), p. 122.

* 26.Ibid

* 27. Mao Zedong's glossy margins for philosophical writings. Ed. By Research Office documents when Zentralkom m ITEE the Communist Party of China. 1st edition Beijing 1988, Chinese, p. 279.

[451]

The 18th beginning with the reading of Clausewitz's work 'Vom Kriege'. Foreword and directory, page 1-19. First book on the nature of war, from page 24. Today I finished reading the first chapter, up to page 55.

Read the 19th.

20th page 57-91.

The 21st page 92-102.

Read the 22nd nothing.

The 23rd page 103-111.

Read the 24th. * 28

 

In the following three days, namely on March 25, 26 and 27, 1938, Mao Clausewitz's work Vom Kriege put aside and read Pan Xinnian's book "Logic and Logic Theory" (published in October 1937), which he completely found new, done. In the following days, Mao continued reading "Vom Kriege".

The 28th of the war pp. 112-122.

Read the 29th.

The 30th read nothing.

The 31st page 123-167.

April 1st. Page 168 - . * 29

 

The last date of the reading diary is April 1, 1938. On this day, Mao read the work Vom Kriege from page 168. However, it was not recorded how many pages he read on that day. There is also no evidence whether he subsequently SSE nd the main work of Clausewitz to the last page read through.

This reading diary was printed according to Mao's own handwriting. The original was written in a booklet with lines and is 7 pages. It is now in the central archive of Chi nas. The question of whether Mao no longer kept a reading diary after April 1, 1938, or whether the rest of the reading diary was lost remains open.

From Mao's reading diary shows that ss it more time for reading the work On War has taken from Clausewitz to complete, as he did with his other reading.

* 28.Ibid., P. 282.

* 29.Ibid., P. 283.

[452]

Except for the first day (March 18, 1938), when he read 55 pages, he read fewer than 45 pages each day. But when he read "Logic and Logic Theory" by Pan Xinnian, it only took 3 days for 240 pages, an average of 80 pages per day. That is, he read "Logic and Logic Theory" much faster than From War . In my opinion, the reasons for this are as follows:

a) The work Vom Kriege is a book written by a foreigner, the wording of which is different from the Chinese. The different types of expression cannot, in principle, be changed through language mediation. Add to that the poor quality of the Chinese translation at that time. To read it and understand mu ss te he use more time;

b) Mao Zedong gave the world famous classic work great SSE attention, it did not want to treat superficial but study it in detail and really vers tehen. This is probably also due to the fact that ss Mao personally organized a "Seminar on Clausewitz's work, Vom Kriege " during this time , which I will discuss in more detail later.

With the publication of Mao Zedong's reading diary, the riddle of whether he read Clausewitz's work Vom Kriege was finally solved.

II.2. Which Chinese version of the work On War read and possessed ß Mao Zedong?

To clarify Mao's win Clausewitz studies, it is necessary to further investigate what Chinese version or versions of the work On War by Clausewitz, Mao read and possessed ß .

Mao never studied abroad. He was once the organizer of the study abroad, but first wanted to familiarize himself with the situation in China and only then started studying abroad. But later the Chinese situation got him out of his plans. He hardly knew a foreign language. Although he had a bi ss learned chen English. However, his level was not sufficient to read the English edition of the work Vom Kriege . So he could not read the work in foreign languages, but only in Chinese. Which Chinese edition possessed ß and read Mao? He himself did not give any information about this. To answer this question, there is no alternative but to verify the available documents and information.

[453]

According to my investigation, there were 4 Chinese editions in China and an unpublished translation of Vom Krieg when Mao read it in 1938. To the above question to answer and the following analysis to erleichte rn , procure Let us first an overview of these issues.

According to historical materials, Clausewitz's work Vom Kriege was first introduced to the Bao Yanger Army School in China via Japan in 1910. " * 30 The first Chinese edition of the work was published in 1911 by the" Society for the Training Studies of the Army "(in 10 volumes edited). in the following year (1912) the Mitg have li eder of the association of Military studies in Guangdong voluntarily raised money to correct the above-mentioned issue and reprint. '' * 31

The second edition of the work appeared three years later (1915), and its translator, Lieutenant Colonel Qü Shouti, was an instructor in the Army Army School in Baodingen. The then interim vice president of the Republic of China, Li Yuanhong, * 32 and deputy chief of the army Jiang Zhuobin, " * 33 wrote forewords for this issue. * 34

The Baodingen Army Officers' School had organized the translation of the work Vom Kriege and used the translation text as teaching material even before Qü Shouti's edition . The third edition in two volumes followed in 1934 in Shanghai. The translator Liu Jo-shui, who was particularly interested in philosophy, also translated the work from Japanese. Liu was full of admiration for Clausewitz's' science and method in war research. '' * 35

* 30. See preliminary note by the Military Studies Association in Guangdong. In: Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege . Edited by the Association for Military Studies in Guangdong. Guangdong 1912, p. 1.

* 31.Ibid

* 32. Li Yuanhong (1864-1928) was elected Vice President of China when the Nanking provisional government was established on January 1, 1912. He became president after Yuan Shikai died on June 6, 1916. A short time later, however, he was overthrown by Zhang Xun.

* 33. "Jiang Zuobin (1884-1942) has been deputy chief of the Army Command since the establishment of the Nanking provisional government on January 1, 1912. In 1916, after Yuan Shikai's death, he became deputy chief of the general staff.

* 34. Foreword by Li Yuanhong and Jiang Zuobin. In: Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege . From the Japanese by Lieutenant Colonel Qü Shouti. Zhonghua publishing house. Shanghai 1915, Chinese, pp. 6-8.

* 35. Preliminary remark by the translator. In: Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege . From the Japanese by Liu Jo-shui. Xinken publishing house. Shanghai 1934, Chinese. P. 3.

[454]

During the resistance war against Japan (1937-1945), several Chinese editions of Vom Kriege were published in rapid succession . Many people thought that since ss should the Chinese understand the wisdom of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz war theory of good and dominate, to defeat the technically superior Japanese aggressors. But for most readers, Vom Kriege was a book with seven seals. The existing translations were not at all satisfied.

In 1937 the publisher of the military books published a new translation of the work (the 4th edition). Au SSE r the written Yang Yanchang preface added the translator nor the known introduction of the German Chief of Staff, Count von Schlieffen for the 5th German edition and foreword by Lt. Col. a. D. Paul Creuzinger for the 11th German edition. * 36

In the 5 versions presented above, the translation text used as teaching material in the Baoyanger Army School was hardly accessible to Mao. * So 37 we can him out of our investigation exclusively SSE n .

Among the remaining four versions mu ss Mao Zedong in my study at least the output of the work On War , have read, which was translated by Liu Joshui into Chinese and published in 1934 in Shanghai. Arguments for this assumption are:

1). The page number of the foreword and the table of contents of the work Vom Kriege , which Mao noted in his reading diary, is completely identical to the page number of the foreword and the table of contents of this edition. * 38

2). The page number of the beginning and end in chapter 1, which Mao noted in his reading diary, almost coincides with the page number of beginning and end in chapter 1 of this edition: In his reading diary, Mao wrote: "First book on the nature of war , from page 24. Today I finished reading the first chapter, up to page 55 " ; * 39 The first chapter in Liu's edition extends from page 23 to page 55. * 40

* 36. See Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege . From Japanese by the Guomindang Army Translation Bureau. Publisher for military books. Nanking 1937, Chinese.

* 37. See QU Shouti, foreword and instructions for use. In: Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 34), Chinese, pp. 9 and 13.

* 38.See Mao Zedong's marginal glosses (see note 27), pp. 1-19.

* 39.Ibid., P. 282.

* 40. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 35), Chinese, pp. 23-55.

[455]

Page 24 in Mao's reading diary was obviously a mistake.

3). Some Chinese expressions that Mao used in his reading diary or in his book "On the protracted war", " * 41 are completely identical to those of Liu's edition". * 42 We will take this up again in another context.

4). Last but not least, Liu mentioned Lenin's excerpts from the work Vom Kriege and Friedrich Engels' remark on Clausewitz 'Werk' in his preface . * 43 This could also be a Anla ss to be, since ss Mao Liu's output chose and read.

Some documents also give evidence as ss Mao au SSE r Liu's output, other versions of the work On War would have kö nn s. For example, the edition printed by the Guomindang Army Army Academy was used as teaching material in the "Seminar on Clausewitz's Work, From the War , which I will discuss in more detail. * 44 Because this edition is written in classic Chinese and poorly translated Professor He Sijing, who had studied in Germany, was asked to partially translate the work Vom Kriege directly from the original German text into Chinese and to make the translation manuscript available to the seminar. This happened. '' * 45 almost free because ss Mao during his studies of the work on war used and in 1938 not only Liu's output, but also the army Academy of Kuomintang army and the translation manuscript of professor He possessed ß . From 1938 to 1976, China had ( including schillings I Taiwan) again six editions of the work on war by Clausewitz, namely:

* 41. See Mao Zedong's marginal glosses (see note 27), p. 282; Mao Zedong, Selected Works. Vol. II, ed. By the Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the publication of Mao Zedong's Selected Works. Publisher for foreign language literature. Beijing 1968, German, pp. 181 and 192.

* 42. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 35), Chinese, pp. 28 and 35.

* 43. Preliminary remark by the translator. In: Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 35), Chinese, pp. 4 and 5.

* 44. This is based on General Mo Wenhua's letter of May 25, 1987, which has not yet been officially published.

* 45.Ibid

[456]

1) the edition translated by Fu Daqing and published in 1940;

2) the edition published in 1941 by the National Defense Publishing House in Guilin;

3) the edition translated by Li Yüri from Japanese and published in 1943; * 46

4) the edition translated by Huang Huanwen and published in 1947;

5) the edition translated by Zhang Baiting and Niu Xianzhong from English and published in Taiwan in 1956;

6) the edition translated from German by the military science academy of the People's Liberation Army of China and published in 1964. " * 47

Among these 6 issues possessed ß Mao least two issues in my estimation. There are indirect indications for this. According to the article "A Little-Known Personality of China — Fu Daqing" from the weekly newspaper "Excerpts from Newspapers and Magazines" from February 7, 1989, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) * 48 sent Fu Daqing by telegram at the beginning of the anti-Japanese war (1937) called, to Chongqing at ko mm interpreting s and for the group of consultants to Soviet military. Had as Fu out there because ss Mao Yan-An, the work On War studied Clausewitz and had suffered from being able to read a good translation, he offered to translate the work from Russian into Chinese and Mao and to make it available to other leaders of the Communist Party and the Eighth Army. When Fu's translation appeared in 1940, it was described by Mao's closest companions, the then supreme commander-in-chief Zhu De (Tschu Teh), * 49 who had studied in Germany, and the then chief of staff, Ye Jianying, as "the best translation text in China" . * 50

* 46. ​​See preliminary note from the translator. In: Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 35), Chinese, p. 5; See review by Cheng Suichu. In: Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege , abridged and translated by Huang Huanwen. Shangwu publishing house. Shanghai 1946, Chinese, SU

* 47. See Zhang Yuan-Lin, The Chinese Editions of The War (As Note 2), p. 229.

* 48. Zhou Enlai (1898-196), the former long-time Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China. He studied in Paris, Göttingen and Berlin in the 1920s.

* 49. Zhu De (1886-1976), one of the co-founders and chief leaders of the People's Liberation Army and the People's Republic of China. Regarding his studies in Germany, he studied sociology in Göttingen for two semesters in the period 1922-1925 and then heard lectures on sociology and military science in Berlin for a total of two years.

* 50. See the article "An Unknown Personality — Fu Daqing." In: Excerpts from newspapers and magazines. Weekly newspaper from February 7, 1982, Chinese, p. 2 .

[457]

It is logical that ss Fu Daqinq's version was also made available to Mao.

Au SSE rdem mu ss te Mao, the translation of the Military Academy of Sciences of the People's Liberation Army of China, whose first edition was published in 1964 possess. This version is most likely still in the possession of Mao's private library. But I cannot confirm this at the moment.

II. 3. Did Mao Zedong organize a "Seminar on Clausewitz's work Vom Kriege "?

If it's Investigate rn should appear quite amazing because ss Mao a Clausewitz reader was, it would perhaps be surprising since ss Mao even personally hosted a seminar on Clausewitz's book "On War" in the spring 1938th

The situation was constantly changing. In order to meet the new challenges, Mao wanted to increase his theoretical level according to the new tasks. He also wanted to promote the studies and training of his party and army in the areas of philosophy, politics, war theory and war history in Yan-An. After the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, several lectures, symposia and seminars were held in Yan-An. The "Research Society for the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression" was founded. Mao himself organized at least two seminars in 1938, namely: "Seminar on Clausewitz's work Vom Kriege " and "Seminar on philosophical questions." Many of Mao's writings actually came from his lectures at the time.

General Mo Wenhua, a participant in the two seminars organized by Mao, recalled the "Seminar on Clausewitz's work Vom Kriege " in a letter dated May 25, 1987 :

 

[458]

It was in Yan-An in early 1938. The seminar was held in Chairman Mao Zedong's home on Fenghuang Mountain in Yan-An. Among the participants there were au SSE r Chairman Mao still Xiao Jinguang, Luo Ruiqinq, Teng Daiyuan, Mo Wenhua and Ye Zilong * 51 given, inter alia. In the seminar, copies of the version published by the Army Academy of the Guomindang Army and the manuscript translated from the original German into Chinese by Professor He Sijing were used as teaching material. The seminar took place once a week. The meeting normally lasted from around 7 p.m. to after 11 p.m. Each time, Professor He first distributed the teaching material and then explained one section after the other. After explaining the subject matter, one participant gave a presentation; afterwards they discussed questions and problems. At the end of the meeting, Chairman Mao had summarized his own opinion geäu SSE rt . Then the session was over. The seminar only dealt with the first part of the work Vom Kriege . The chairman Mao spoke above all about the concentration of forces and the strategic stages of the war, among other things. " * 52

Maos Clausewitz studies promoted Clausewitz research and translation of Clausewitz's writings in the academic community in Yan-An. For example, in July 1939, the publishing house for military and politics of the Eighth Army published the translation of Jiao Minzi "Introduction to the Russian edition of the work Vom Kriege von Clausewitz" in the 7th issue of the "Zeitschrift für Military and Politics" . In the 12th issue of 1939, in the 1st and 2nd issues of 1940 in the same journal, Professor He Sijing's essay "Lenin and Clausewitz" appeared in continuations. The publishing house published au SSE rdem the Yang Zuocai transferred into Chinese brochure "Lenin and Clausewitz's work On War . Extracts and marginal notes" in October 1939 and translated by Xiao Guangwei brochure "appendix of the work On War by Clausewitz" * 53 in November 1940. These last two brochures belong to the "Series for the Anti-Japanese War." The same publisher reprinted the edition of the work Vom Kriege in August 1941, translated by Qü Shouti .

* 51. CVs of these participants see encyclopedia of Chinese soldiers. Edited by Wu Lusong. Sinhua publishing house. Shanghai 1989. (Chinese)

* 52.As note 44.

* 53. This brochure contains the following writings from Clausewitz: 1. The most important principles of warfare, to complement my lessons with Sr. Königl. Your Highness the Crown Prince; 2. On the organic division of the armed forces; 3. Sketch of a tactical or combat plan; 4. Guide to Combat Tactics Tactics.

[459]

At that time, some parts of the work Vom War , which were translated by Fu Daqing, such as "On the culmination point of victory," "War is an instrument of politics" and "The most important principles of warfare," were published in the weekly "Volksmassen" * 54 in the 22nd issue of III. Volume, published in continuations in the 9th and 15th issues of Volume IV. The "Kang-Da," the military and political university of the Chinese people for the war of resistance against Japan in Yan-An, collected a number of essays on a small anthology entitled "Studies of the Clausevitzian work on war and made it available for reading.

Mao was not a pure soldier. He studied at that time among other things, military theoretical books, including schillings I of the work On War , not only in order to makes pertinent to acquire isse; rather, he was concerned with waging the resistance war with the wisdom of military philosophy so that the militarily superior occupying power should be driven out. To put it more specifically: Mao wanted to draw useful information from the essence of the experience of war and the military philosophy in order to refute the misconceptions prevailing in China at the time about "the inevitable subjugation of China" or "a quick victory over Japan" and a political - military and strategic guideline that corresponded to the reality of China. It is a burden of these studies that ss Mao then drew up the strategy against the Japanese occupying power. This strategy is mainly contained in his document "On the protracted war", which answered the following questions in particular: Why should the resistance war against Japan be a protracted war? Why could China win in the end? How should one lead the long-lasting war to final victory? This writing was the result of his complex, purposeful studies and his study of concrete practice in China; Maos Clausewitz studies have also contributed to this.

II.4. There were other ways that Mao Berühr u ng with Clausewitz's thoughts lead could.

First, it can be said that while reading the writings of Lenin and other Marxist writers , ss Mao came into contact with Clausewitz's thoughts , which some Clausewitz researchers such as Werner Hahlweg and Raymond Aron already mentioned in their writings.

 

* 54th "Popular Masses," the weekly paper of the Chinese Communist Party during the resistance war against Japan (1937-1945).

[460]

Au SSE rdem could Mao by reading military books, regulations and articles of the Kuomintang army on the thoughts of Clausewitz sto SSE n . It is clear from my investigation because ss the Kuomintang army war theory of Clausewitz no less appreciated the leadership of the Kuomintang and generals as Mao and his followed and studied.

Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) was a diligent ßi ger Clausewitz reader. According to his own statement, Jiang had read Clausewitz's work on war several times before 1919 and highlighted many places in it with circles or dotted lines. * 55 Later he read it repeatedly and even commented on it with 13 notes (one note on the first book of the work Vom Kriege ; two notes on the second book; three notes on the third book; three notes on the sixth book; one note to Book VII; three notes to Book VIII). * 56

Jiang Jieshi even wrote an essay entitled "My Impressions While Reading Clausewitz's Work." In it he said, among other things:

"Clausewitz's theory of war, in which there is a full philosophical atmosphere, is a real philosophy of war; it can be used not only for warfare, but also for political, diplomatic, economic and various social activities. You could devote yourself intensively to your studies and your work Understanding from the ground up would be an inexhaustible and resourceful aid to our revolutionary cause and all strategies, so soldiers, party members, civil servants, and all revolutionary cadres who are fighting on the front line against the enemy must thoroughly study Clausewitz's theory of war . studying in terms of my own military thought I was of two books most influenced ss t, the first is 'Balcks tactic' * 57 the of a simple Zivili most, not written by a well-known military, but from the simple German soldier very respected and considered a valuable book rde ... The second is the work Vom Clausewitz's War . " * 58

* 55. Luo Yun, essence from the work Vom Kriege by Clausewitz. Xiangyun publishing house. Taibei 1965, Chinese, p. 114 ff.

* 56. Niu Xianzhong, preliminary remark. In: Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege . Translated by Niu Xianzhong. Taibei 1980, p. 1177 ff .; See Lou Yun, essence from the work Vom Kriege (as note 55), Chinese, pp. 18, 26-29, 32, 36, 37-38, 41-42, 60-62, 72-73, 79- 81, 93, 99, 102-103, 110-111 and 114-118. "

* 57. I have not yet found this book. During my investigation I could only a lieutenant William Bal c to track k from Germany, in 1923 a short treatise entitled Little War brought out, in which he described the guerrilla as based on his own experiences mere accompaniment of great conceptual War. See Willi at Bal c k, Little War , clothes and eq rwissenschaftliche Releases Vol. 3, Vol. March issue 1,923th

* 58. Luo Yun, essence from the work Vom Kriege (as note 55), Chinese, p. 115.

[461]

Au SSE r Jiang Jie-shi, there were still some Chinese military theorists who were interested in the period of the Republic of China (1912-1949) for the theory of Clausewitz. For example, Jiang Baili (1882-1938), who was acting director of the Army Academy of the Guomindang Army in 1938, included so much of Clausewitz's thoughts in his books "On National Defense" and "New Interpretation of Sunzi's Military Theory" , * 59 as ss they commented: "the war conception of Jiang Baili is similar to that of Clausewitz You can say there. ss they with Jiang Bailis words geäu SSE rte 's view of Clausewitz." * 60 Numerous Guomindang Army generals had studied abroad. Even Jiang Jieshi had studied in the Japanese military school.

The German military advisers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Kriebel (1929-1930), General Wetzell (1930-1934), Colonel General Hans von Seeckt (1934-35) and General von Falkenhausen (1935-1938) also worked in China. * 61 Among them, at least Hans von Seeckt can be regarded as a Clausewit z prospect. * 62

The provisions of the Kuomintang army took much of the foreign Mili tärtheorien on, so that ss Mao same the Schlu after his reading ss drew inference, since ss "the military regulations, issued by the reactionary Chinese government or by the reactionary Chinese military academies , "merely" set out the general laws of war and, moreover, they have been copied, in particular, from foreign sources. " * 63 Without a doubt, these provisions cannot be lacking in the Clausewitz sources. By examining the military books and regulations of the Guomindang Army, Mao was also able to come into contact with Clausewitz's ideas.

* 59. Jiang Baili attended a military school in Japan from 1901-1906. Then he did further training in Germany and even an internship as a company leader in the German army. In 1910 he returned to China. In 1912 he became the director of the army officer school in Baoding. In 1938 he became the acting director of the Guomindang Army Army Academy. He died of an illness in November of the same year. He was a Chinese national patriotic military theorist.

* 60. Lu Huchun, studies of civil military ideas. Publisher of the University for National Defense. Beijing 1987, Chinese, p. 82

* 61. See China manual. Edited by Wolfgang Franke with the collaboration of Brunhild Staiger. A publication by the German Society for East Asian Studies. Bertelsmann University Publishing House. Düsseldorf 1974, p. 876.

* 62. See Hans von Seeckt, thoughts of a soldier. Extended edition. Leipzig 1935, p. 23 ff: "Clausewitz, on his 150th birthday," p. 23 ff.

* 63. Mao Zedong, Selected Works. Vol. I, Beijing 1968, Chinese, p. 211.

[462]

Mao's followers also had quite a few abroad, especially in Germany, France, Ru ss country, studied, including: Zhu De (the former supreme commander of the Red Army and the Eighth Army or the People's Liberation Army.) In Germany, Zhou Enlai (the former Prime Minister) in France and Germany; Liu Bocheng (Marshall) in Ru ss country ... Many intellectuals, as the aforementioned Professor He Sijing, came back because of the War of Resistance against Japan from abroad to China.

Interestingly, there ss , as a military advisor (1932-1939) worked for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and a former German officer named Otto Braun from Ismaning, near Munich, in China the Chinese name "Li De" grew up. He was allegedly sent to China by the Communist International. He was the only foreigner to take part in the Long March. He exerted a great SSE n influence ss from the party and army leadership were when the returning from Moscow dogmatists at the head of the Communist Party of China. But when Mao Zedong took over the leadership of the party and the army in 1935, "Li De" was removed from the center of power at the same time. He later worked in Yan-An as a professor at the military and political university. * 64 It has been said since ss he was then a nimble tongue possessed ß and often in conversations the big SSE n figures such as Caesar, Napoleon, Frederick the Great SSE n , Clausewitz and quoted Moltke. * 65 Later Otto Braun also showed his interest in Lenin's Clausewitz studies by publishing Lenin's Clausewitz studies in Berlin in 1957. * 66 The possibility because ss Otto Braun also contribute to Mao's study of the work On War made, I do not exclusively SSE n .

 

 

* 64. See the lexicon of China's modern history. Beijing 1987, Chinese, p. 460.

* 65. Harrison E. Salisbury, The Long March (see note 23), p. 44.

* 66. See WI Lenin, Clausewitz's work on war , extracts and marginal glosses. With a foreword and comments by Otto Braun. Ministry of National Defense Publishing House. Berlin 1957.

[463]

Last but not least, Mao was very well read. From time to time he was able to read something about Clausewitz from extensive books, newspapers and magazines during the war. * 67 Through the above-mentioned ways, Mao could more or less touch Clausewitz's thoughts.

II.5. To what extent, in what way and under what circumstances did Mao Zedong Clausewitz 'views incorporate into his theory of war?

Mao Zedong's study of the work Vom Kriege left clear traces in his work "On the protracted war".

Shortly after his study of the work On War , so in May 1938, verfa ss "About the protracted war" in which he led te Mao Zedong an important military theoretical work entitled Clausewitz directly or indirectly.

When Mao analyzed the section of this document "War and politics," the relationship between the two, he wrote: "With the sentence, the war is a continuation of politics' is said because ss is the war policy as ss of war even an action of political tischem character is; ... But war has its own characteristics, and that is to say, since ss does not gleichges with politics per se can be ow. , The war is a mere SSE continuation of politics by other means. ' * 68 The sentence with single quotes in this section is precisely the well-known Clausewitz formula. But the question is whether Clausewitz was quoted here directly or indirectly. The phrase "War is a mere SSE continuation of politics by other means" in this section was the following Fu ßn ote provided. "See VI Lenin, Socialism and War, Chapter I, and the collapse of the Second International, Section. 3. " * 69 It has since ss Mao quoted indirectly here by Lenin Clausewitz. But it was also entirely possible that ss Mao familiarized himself with the well-known Clausewitz theorem through his own study of the work Vom Kriege . This sentence, which is in the read of Mao first chapter of the First Book in the work On War is already certainly made a deep impression on him, so that ss this impression during his writing of the treatise "On the protracted war" still fresh could stay.

 

* 67. See Chen Changfeng, with Chairman Mao on the Long March. 6th ed., Beijing 1960, Chinese, pp. 9 ff. After the memory of this bodyguard Mao, Mao Zedong went to the post office personally, each time as soon as the Red Army was in a city during the Long March, which at the time was also one Functioned as a bookstore, or he sent people there to buy newspapers, magazines, and books. From other sources wu ss to te, because ss Mao Yan-An often his friends in big had asked cities to buy books and send them to him to Yan An.

* 68. Mao Zedong, Selected Works (see note 63), German, pp. 177 and 178 .

* 69.Ibid., P. 227.

[464]

In the same chapter, Mao expressed that "one should not separate war from politics for a minute ." * 70 "If in the military who lead the resistance war, pay a trend that is to underestimate the policy to isolate the war of politics and to make the war to something absolute, so is the false and mu ss corrected will." * 71 It is remarkable that ss Mao mentioned here a tendency of the war to "something absolute". This indicated as ss Clausewitz's statement about the Absolute of war '' * 72 may have created Mao's attention and reflection.

In the chapter "The goal of war" Mao used a wording that is very similar in content to that of Clausewitz. "The goal of the war is," wrote Mao, "nothing more than ' self-preservation and the annihilation of the enemy. '" * 73 It is striking that there is a quotation mark in this sentence, but no indication of the source. I assume, since ss Mao here Clausewitz's formulation "destruction of the enemy's force and the preservation of their own" * 74 in an abbreviated and modified form sinngemä ß took over.

Subsequently SSE nd quoted Mao "to make the enemy defenseless" The Clausewitz formulation verbatim from the Chinese translation of the work On War , when he declared "the destruction of the enemy": "the enemy destroy hei ßt disarm him or see him rob a resistance force , ' but not physically destroy him to the last man. " * 75 Here, "depriving of its resistance" is also provided with a quotation mark. It seems that Mao's use of words is very different from Clausewitz's ("to defend the enemy"). But in fact it is just a translation. I compared Mao's quote in Chinese with the corresponding passage in the edition of the work Vom Kriege, translated into Chinese by Liu Jo-shui , and found that ss Mao quoted the sentence from this edition directly and literally. * 76

 

* 70.Ibid., P. 178.

* 71.Ibid.

* 72. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 35), Chinese, p. 35.

* 73. Mao Zedong, Selected Works, Vol. II, Beijing 1968, German, pp. 181 and 182.

* 74. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege . Bonn 1991, p. 228.

* 75. Mao Zedong, Selected Works (see note 73), p. 181.

* 76. See Mao Zedong, Selected Works , Renmin Verlag. Beijing 1969, Chinese, p. 447; Liu Jo-shui's Chinese edition of Vom Kriege (as note 34), p.31.

[465]

Au SSE rdem was Mao's view, since ss the Self-heat managemen t and the destruction of the enemy basis of all military actions were akin to that of Clausewitz. Clausewitz's original sentence reads: "So the annihilation of enemy forces is the basis of all acts of war , the ultimate base of all combinations that rest on it like the ground on its counterparts." * 77 When Mao formulated the importance of annihilation and self-preservation, he said: "The war game - self-preservation and annihilation of the enemy - is the purpose of war and serves as the basis for all acts of war, all from technical to civilian to the strategic ones steeped in this being. " * 78 The italic part "Basis of all acts of war" is strikingly similar to that of Clausewitz. These two formulations can be translated into the same Chinese words, without even a bi ss chen losing the content. Obviously, as above, this is again a problem of translation.

The term "probability" is an important topic in Clausewitz's work Vom Kriege , which has been neglected in previous Clausewitz research. But Mao apparently already paid attention to this term in 1938. In the chapter "initiative, flexibility and Planmä ßi ness " quoted Mao directly the term "probability" of Clausewitz quotation marks, while with the problems of Gesetzmä ßi ness and threaded ss standardize the war employed: "We acknowledge there ss in compared to all other social phenomena of war is a phenomenon that is harder to manage is the one that with fewer threaded ss is characterized comprehensive, or more, 'involves probability in itself. " * 79 The text comparison shows that ss matches that the word "probability" quoted by Mao in Chinese translation of Chinese Liu. * 80

 

* 77. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 74), p. 225. Emphasized by the author.

* 78. Mao Zedong, Selected Works, Vol. II (as note 73), Chinese, p. 183. Emphasized by the author.

* 79.Ibid., P. 192.

* 80. See Mao Zedong, About the protracted war . Renmin publishing house. Beijing 1952, Chinese, p. 64; Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 35), Chinese, pp. 35 and 45.

[466]

Au SSE rdem has published in 1989 "Encyclopedia of Mao Zedongideen," published by the board of the Research Association for the theory and practice of Mao Zedongideen, also confirmed there ss Mao in his article "On the protracted war" the term "probability "has introduced. * 81 The term "probability," which was used in the field of war theory, was very new and striking in China at the time, so it was a foreign word. Perhaps this was the reason why ss Mao quoted him directly with quotation marks.

In the work Vom Kriege you can read a sentence like this: "... in such dangerous things as war is one, the errors that arise from good-naturedness are the worst." * 82 When the translator Liu Jo-shui translated it into Chinese, he did not do it correctly. The sentence he translated into Chinese now reads : "... in matters as dangerous as the war is, the errors which, like Duke Hsiang of the state of Sung " * 83, arise out of good naturedness are the worst. " * 84 in this sentence you can remember easily, since ss Liu (the italicized phrase see) arbitrarily added in the translation of a corresponding Chinese allusion to a historical event. it is interesting because ss Mao in the chapter "initiative, flexibility and Planmä ßi ness " Duke Hsiang also mentioned that he had a similar sentiment to that of Clausewitz's above sentence, and when Mao explained how to mislead and surprise the invaded Japanese troops and then effectively beat them, he said "We are not people like the Duke Hsiang of Sung State and have nothing left for him to foolish notions of honor." * 85 It seems likely, since ss Liu Übersetzu ng gave Mao a suggestion here; Such an impression could arise, especially if one compares the Chinese text by Mao with the text translated by Liu into Chinese.

* 81. Cf.. Encyclopedia of Mao Zedongideen . Beijing 1989, p. 101.

* 82. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 74), p. 192.

* 83. The Duke Hsiang was ruler of the state of Sung in the spring and autumn period in the 7th century BCE. The state of Sung waged a war against the strong state of Chu in 638 BCE. The troops were prepared Sung ts in battle up alternate t, as the Chu troops were still in the process over a Flu ss to set. One of the dignitaries of Sung, the wu ss te because ss Chu many Sung but had few troops, proposed to seize the moment and attack the Chu troops as long as they were not ready with the Hinüber setting. But the Duke Hsiang replied , D . As is not a noble man does not attack a human being at the moment when it is in trouble, "When the troops Tschus the Flu ss had überquellt, but not yet drawn up in battle array, suggested the Dignitaries once again plan to attack the Chu troops. Hsiang replied again: "That is not possible, a noble man does not attack troops that are not in a battle order." Only when the Chu troops were completely ready to fight did Duke Hsiang give them had orders to attack. the result, as ss suffered a heavy defeat, the state Sung and the Duke Hsiang was wounded himself. [See. Mao Zedong, Selected works (such as a nm . 73), p 228.]

* 84. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 35), Chinese, p. 25, emphasized by the author.

* 85. Mao Zedong, Selected Works , Vol. II. (As note 73), German, p. 195. Emphasized by the author.

[467]

From the above analysis shows that ss Mao's famous essay "On the protracted war" a direct spiritual relationship with the work On War has.

II.6. Mao Zedong's criticism of Stalin's judgment on Clausewitz

In his speeches, Mao Zedong occasionally mentioned Clausewitz. The fact that ss Mao against the dead ale denial of the German Mili occurred tärwissenschaft and especially against the utter negation of war theory of Clausewitz by Stalin, made his position on clausewitz is war theory, German military science and classical idealist philosophy clearly.

On 30 January 1946, the Soviet military historian Professor Colonel JA Razin wrote to Stalin, since ss he would not accept the tendency of the complete negation of clausewitz rule military thought in the Soviet military theoretical circle, and appe ll ated, after Lenin's statement, the military theory of Clausewitz scientifically to treat. In response, Stalin violently criticized Rasin and refused Rasin's appeal. He wrote: "Should we objectively criticize Clausewitz's military doctrine? Yes, we should. From the point of view of the interests of our cause and the science of war of our time, we are obliged not only to criticize Clausewitz, but also Moltke, Schlieffen, Ludendorff, Keitel and the other carriers of the military ideology in Germany. in the last 30 years Germany has twice forced the world a bloody war and both times suffered defeat Is that a coincidence? of course not. does this fact since. ss not only Germany i m whole, but also his military ideology failed before history? Absolutely. " "As for Clausewitz in particular," continued St ali n fo rt, "so of course he is a mili outdated tärische authority. Clausewitz was eventually schillings I a representative of the manufacturing period of the war ... It would lächerli ch, now Clausewitz in the Teaching to go. * 86 Stalin's position on Clausewitz and German military science was criticized by Mao on January 27, 1957 in his "Speeches at a Conference of Secretaries of the Party Committees of the Provinces, Cities and Autonomous Territories".

 

* 86th Stalin about Clausewitz. In: Neues Deutschland, 9 May 1947, No. 107, p. 4.

[468]

Here Mao pointed out, since ss Marx, Engels and Lenin have tirelessly studied all sorts of things, Contemporary and Historical. The three components of Marxism grew out of the study of classic German philosophy, classic English political economy and French utopian socialism and from the struggle with them. "In this respect, Stalin was not so good. For example, in his day classic German idealist philosophy was described as a reaction of the German aristocracy to the French Revolution. This assessment negated the classic German idealistic philosophy in bulk. Stalin negated the German one Military science. He said it was no longer of value and that Clausewitz's books no longer needed to be read because the Germans had been defeated. " "Stalin was," schlu ß concluded Mao, "strongly biased in metaphysics and he taught many to indulge in metaphysics." * 87

Mao's criticism of Stalin is remarkable. Stalin's total negation of German military science is unacceptable to Mao. The root cause of the defeat of Germany in the two world wars is because ss was wrong his policies. That does not mean there ss the whole Mili tärwissenschaft Germany was wrong and it does not contain a single positive aspect. "The art of war at its highest point," said Clausewitz z. B. in his work Vom Kriege , "becomes politics." * 88 In the world wars, Germany lost mainly because of its wrong policies. This is just one example of this, as ss ' war theory also includes the German military science to the Clausewitz, contains valuable insights.

In Mao's view, Stalin's devastating verdict on Clausewitz should not be accepted. The military science is a science that deals in proze ss developed the repeal of the previous military scientific inheritance. The critical analysis and recording of the previous military scientific heritage, including schillings I the mili tärtheoretischen heritage of Clausewitz, is a prerequisite for the further development of military science.

In these "speeches" Mao asked au SSE rdem Stalin-sidedness of the dialectics of Lenin and Clausewitz opposite and raised again the bek annte out Clausewitz thesis.

 

* 87. Mao Zedong, Selected Works , Vol. V, Beijing 1978, German, p. 415.

* 88. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 74), p. 994 .

[469]

In the eyes of those like Stalin, said Mao, "War is war, and peace just peace, both closing ßt . Mutually exclusive and does not depend at all together war could not not turn into peace and peace in war. Lenin quoted Clausewitz, war is a mere SSE continuation of Poli policy by other means'. the struggle in peacetime politics, the war is also politics, albeit with special means. " * 89 As Clausewitz formulated the dialectical relationship between war and peace, he pointed out, since ss "are war and peace basically terms that no gradation are capable of." * 90 These two quotes demonstrate that ss M ao and Clausewitz also have a similar opinion about the dialectical relationship between war and peace.

II.7. Clausewitz in Mao's conversation with Helmut Schmidt

Clausewitz made a deep impression on Mao, so that ss it in his twilight years in conversation with Helmut Schmidt also pointed to Clausewitz. In October 1975, the then German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visited the Volksrepub li k China for the first time officially. Mao received him. In a conversation, Mao and Schmidt exchanged their opinions, above all about the strategy of the Soviet Union and effective counter-strategy. They also talked about Kant, Hegel, Marx and Clausewitz. After Schmidt's opinions about the Soviet Union, Europe and the USA, among others geäu SSE rt had, Mao said: "It seems to me you are a Kantian But idealism is nothing good I myself am a student of Marx, I learned a lot from him.! . I do not believe in idealism, I am interested in Hegel, Feuerbach and Haeckel. In relation to our topic Clausewitz was right. * 91 the last sentence said Mao vermut li ch the Clausewitz thesis "the war is a blo SSE "what you through the continuation of politics by other means, subsequent SSE hands AEU SSE tion can significantly notice of Schmidt." Clausewitz, "said Schmidt," was a genius, one of whom owned German officers with political genetic endowment. Marx, Engels and Lenin have interpreted his famous phrase as if war nothing Ungewöhn li ches but blo ß the continuation of politics by other means.

 

* 89. Mao Zedong, Selected Works (see note 87), p. 416.

* 90. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (as note 74), p. 988.

* 91. Quoted from Helmut Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte , 6th edition Berl in 1988, p. 359.

[470]

On the other hand, I prefer to read Clausewitz's sentence as a lesson to the military, namely: Even in war, the primacy of political leadership and not - as Ludendorff meant - the military. " * 92

III. In conclusion SSE walls viewing

1). Mao Zedong was a Clausewitz reader. In relation to his relationship with Clausewitz, Mao not only came into contact with Clausewitz's thoughts through Lenin's mediation, but he also read Clausewitz's work Vom Kriege personally. Is amazing because ss Mao au SSE r his own studies even organizer of a "seminar on Clausewitz's work On War was" in spring 1938 in Yan An. There are also indications that ss Mao probably read the work Vom Kriege before or in 1936 .

2). Clausewitz's work On War was one of the theoretical sources of Mao's military ideas. The view that ss Mao did not quote Clausewitz directly in his writings is untenable. The investigation shows that ss Mao not only known in his writings Clausewitz thesis "The war is a mere SSE continuation of Poli policy by other means" cited at least twice, but also some of Clausewitz's concepts such as "Wahrscheinli chkeit," "the Defeat opponents, "" annihilation of enemy forces and preservation of their own, "" basis of all acts of war "etc. directly or in a modified form.

From the study also shows that ss there with some ideas of Clausewitz and Mao similarities in linguistic expression. These similarities suggest that ss Mao some theoretical issues such as war and politics, destruction in his treatment of the enemy and self-preservation, probability and Ungewi ss drew beauty, defense and attack Clausewitz help.

3). Mao Zedong's Clausewitz studies in 1938 were linked to his philosophical, political, military- theoretical, and historical studies. The aim of the studies of Mao was to raise its theoretical level and to summarize on this basis experience of previous wars and work out the strategic concept, weakened the Japanese occupation forces with China and eventually schillings I conquered.

 

* 92.Ibid

[471]

This strategic concept is mainly engaged in Mao's famous essay "On the protracted war," he Clausewitz to his studies subsequently SSE nd in May 1938 verfa ss containing te. In a Ma ß can also say, since ss Mao Clausewitz studies were also a part of its effort to develop its own military theoretical system.

4). The investigation results in passing, since ss Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaischeck) a diligent ßi ger Clausewitz reader was. He made many comments on Clausewitz's work on war and even wrote an essay on Clausewitz's theory of war.

5). It is not inconceivable well as ss Clausewitz's thick work On War in China including schillings I edited Taiwan several times and has been read in certain circles when Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi, the leaders of China, Clausewitz prospects were.

It is not entirely unfounded to say that since ss the German philosopher of war with his thoughts, especially his thoughts on the defense, by Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi in the Chinese War of Resistance against Japan in a certain Ma ß participated.

6). The negation that ss Clausewitz's war theory is one of the sources of Mao's military ideas can be found in quite a few articles in China, but it contradicts reality. The influence ss but to exaggerate as if Mao's military thought had mainly originated in Clausewitz Clausewitz on Mao, lacks even any basis. These two one-sided and often ideological reasons do not correspond to the scientific spirit and the principle of objectivity. As the author of this essay, I feel obliged to add these sentences here.

7). I systematically examined Mao Zedong's references to Clausewitz on the basis of the available materials. Still, I dare not here to tell categorically because ss those illustrated above references Mao are already fully Clausewitz. The main reason is because ss Mao behind left works not only issued five-volume "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" (Mao Zedong Xuanji) exist. There are still a lot of writings, telegrams, speeches, instructions, dedications, letters, extracts and glosses that have not yet been officially published. It can therefore not be ruled out, since ss new information on Mao's relationship with Clausewitz in the next few years made known or later. The author will continue to follow developments in this direction.

 

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