From: Carl von Clausewitz and Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington. On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815. Ed./trans. Christopher Bassford, Daniel Moran, and Gregory W. Pedlow. ClausewitzStudies.org, 2010. ISBN-10: 1453701508. ISBN-13: 9781453701508. 318pp. List price: $18.00.
Notes to Section V, "The Campaign of 1815," by Carl von Clausewitz
Notes to Chapters 1-9
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 After the French army failed to offer any resistance to Napoleon’s advance from southern France toward Paris, King Louis XVIII fled to Belgium on 19 March 1815.
 Napoleon’s Mémoires, 19, claims that the French army’s “effective strength was 149,000 men, capable of putting into the field an army of 93,000 men of all arms.”
 Napoleon signed an armistice with the Allies on 4 June 1813, which lasted until Austria declared war on 13 August 1813.
 A Landwehr is an organized militia or reserve system, like the one that Clausewitz himself had helped organize in Prussia after the defeat by Napoleon. This system enabled Prussia to field armies in 1813-14 much larger than the small standing forces Napoleon had permitted that state to maintain. It was based on universal service but shorn of the revolutionary rhetoric and energy that had inspired the French levée en masse (the universal mobilization by which the French Revolutionary regime saved itself in 1793-94). The levée en masse is analyzed in Alan Forrest, “La patrie en danger: The French Revolution and the First Levée en Masse," in Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron, eds. The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization Since the French Revolution (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8-32.
 General Jean Comte de Rapp commanded the corps‑sized Army of the Rhine in 1815.
 This refers to the period after the Battle of Waterloo.
 Observation corps (corps d’observation) were light formations deployed on the frontiers to observe enemy movements and provide initial resistance prior to the arrival of the main army.
 The Vendée is a region in western France where royalist resistance to the Revolution had been especially strong. After Napoleon returned to power, it was again the scene of an armed uprising. He was forced to send a large force there to regain control.
 Field Marshal Leopold Josef Count Daun, Prince of Thiano (1705-1766), commanded Austria's army during the Seven Years' War. He was known for his extremely cautious approach in the campaigns against Prussian King Frederick the Great. Clausewitz regularly used Daun, a commander of great reputation in his day, to exemplify what he regarded as the exaggerated caution of pre-Revolutionary warfare. See for instance On War, 172, where Clausewitz notes that “Daun’s campaigns are, to some, models of wisdom and foresight; to others, of timidity and vacillation.”
 See Napoleon, Mémoires, 53, 55, 59.
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 51-53, cited in Hahlweg, Schriften 2:954n.
 The Prussians gave this name to the Battle of Waterloo in honor of the location where Wellington and Blücher supposedly met at the end of the battle. “La Belle Alliance” was a tavern, named in honor of an advantageous marriage in the previous century. For Prussians the name also signified a victory that had resulted from a "good alliance" of Prussian and Anglo-Allied forces. The Duke of Wellington, however, chose to name the battle “Waterloo” because that was where his headquarters was located and where he wrote his official report after the battle. The fact that it was not a French name may have also played a role in the selection. French writers frequently referred to the battle by its actual location, “Mont St. Jean.” These three different names for the battle remained in use throughout the 19th century, but the Waterloo designation gradually attained preeminence thereafter.
 Alexander the Great, King of Macedonia from 356 B.C. to 323 B.C., was famous for his offensive campaigns. Czar Alexander of Russia, on the other hand, had presided over the famous retreat that had drawn Napoleon’s forces all the way to Moscow, and to their eventual destruction, in 1812. In Clausewitz’s history of that campaign, he does not portray this action as a positive decision by anyone, but merely as the natural reaction of an army confronting an overwhelmingly superior opponent. This is an illustration, perhaps, of how difficult it is for any political leader, much less one as self-willed as Napoleon, to deliberately allow an enemy army to enter his country. Carl von Clausewitz, "The Campaign of 1812 in Russia" (excerpted), in Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, eds./trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),113-204.
 With the Seven Years' War going badly for Prussia in 1761, King Frederick the Great of Prussia was forced to withdraw his army into a heavily fortified camp at Bunzelwitz, near the Prussian fortress of Schweidnitz in Silesia. He hoped that, with the passage of time, the already shaky coalition against him might fall apart. It did precisely that the following year, when Tsarina Elizabeth of Russia died. She was succeeded by her nephew, Peter III, whose pro-Prussian sympathies were well-known to Russia’s generals and had made them reluctant to cooperate in Austrian plans to attack and destroy Frederick’s army. The position at Bunzelwitz thus provided just enough of a tactical excuse to allow Russia’s generals to act on their political premonitions. In contrast to Clausewitz’s frequent criticism of what seemed to him the doctrinaire caution of warfare under the Old Regime, he often used Frederick’s withdrawal to Bunzelwitz as a positive illustration of prudence based upon a sound understanding of the overall political and strategic situation. See On War, 389, 497.
Notes to Chapters 10-19
 The actual designation of this unit was the Hanoverian Reserve Corps, consisting of 13 battalions organized in four brigades. Clausewitz inserted a footnote here: “It must have been used to garrison Ostend, Ypres, Antwerp and Mechelen.”
 Wellington’s marginal note: "I do not know whether the examples required can now be afforded. It does not seem to me of much importance."
 Wellington’s marginal note: "This is an important chapter."
 In Clausewitz’s original text the distances were given in Prussian miles [Meilen], an obsolete measurement equivalent to 4.6 English miles or 7.4 kilometers. We have converted all distances from Prussian miles into English miles.
Clausewitz does not name the sources from which he obtained his order-of-battle information, and he is clearly aware of their inadequacy. In this instance, they caused him to exaggerate a contrast between Blücher and Wellington that was more imaginary than real. Wellington’s deployment was actually slightly less extended than Blücher’s. The forces in the most distant locations, such as Antwerp, Ostende, Nieuport and Ypres, were relatively small and generally consisted of lower-value Hanoverian militia units not intended for use in the front lines. Thus the width of the positions of his main combat units was less than 60 miles, and the depth less than 40. Conversely, Clausewitz’s figures of 35 miles for the width and depth of the Prussian cantonments are too small. The frontage occupied by the Prussian 1st and 3rd Corps was over 55 miles, and the depth of the position was over 50 miles. See the excellent map of the Allied cantonments on 12 June 1815 in F. de Bas and J. de T’Serclaes de Wommersen, La Campagne de 1815 aux Pays-Bas, 2 vols. plus atlas (Bruxelles: Librairie Albert Dewit, 1908), Atlas map 1.
 In his original manuscript and the 1835 published edition, Clausewitz mistakenly had “St.Tron” [Saint-Trond].
 Images of Napoleon as a gambler recur throughout Clausewitz’s work. He is often at pains to show that a willingness to make big bets may be a form of prudence, arising from a superior understanding of the situation and the adversary, rather than mere recklessness. See especially Clausewitz’s defense of Napoleon’s conduct in the Campaign of 1812, Historical and Political Writings, 201-4.
 This refers to Wellington’s Waterloo Dispatch of 19 June 1815 (reproduced in Section II above).
 Clausewitz is referring to the force under Prince Frederick of Orange, which was left at Hal and did not participate in the fighting on 18 June.
 Zealand is a watery province in the south-west corner of the Netherlands, consisting of islands and peninsulas deeply carved by the sea. The implication is that it would have been difficult to reconstitute a beaten army in such terrain.
 This is the “most unfavorable” circumstance Clausewitz referred to earlier: in effect, the achievement of complete tactical surprise by the French.
 The center of the 3rd Corps was in the town of Ciney, 28 miles from Sombreffe, but the most distant billets were in Fronville, over 40 miles away.
 This last sentence is not in Clausewitz’s original manuscript but is found in all published editions of his work. See Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:976n.
Notes to Chapters 20-29
 The order to Bülow spoke merely of moving his corps “into close cantonments” near Hannut and concluded with the statement that “it would be most appropriate for your Excellency’s headquarters to be located in Hannut.” The order thus contained no sense of urgency, although it did add that the French were expected to go on the offensive soon. Gneisenau also failed to mention that he had ordered the concentration of the Prussian army at Sombreffe, leaving Bülow still believing that the concentration would occur in Hannut, as had been stated in previous orders. Oskar von Lettow-Vorbeck, Napoleons Untergang 1815, 2 vols. (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler, 1904), 1:198, 279-281). But Bülow’s dilatory action may also partly be explained by a somewhat delicate consideration that Clausewitz does not mention: Bülow, commanding a corps, was senior to Gneisenau, Blücher’s chief of staff, from whom the order to move had come. On Gneisenau’s side this meant that the order may have been phrased too much in the nature of a routine request, while Bülow may have felt the need to demonstrate that he was not at the immediate beck and call of someone who was nominally his junior. The operational subordination of field commanders to general staff officers remained an issue in the Prussian army until the 1870s, when the extraordinary personal ascendancy of the elder Moltke, chief of the Prussian (later German) Great General Staff (Großer Generalstab), established it firmly.
 Müffling was the Prussian liaison officer at Wellington’s headquarters. See C[arl] von W[eis] [Carl Friedrich Freiherr von Müffling genannt Weis], Geschichte des Feldzuges der engl.-hannover.-niederländ.-braunschweig. Armee unter Wellington und der preuß. Armee unter Blücher 1815 (Stuttgart: no publisher, 1817); in English as C. de M., History of the Campaign of the British, Dutch, Hanoverian, and Brunswick Armies, Under the Command of the Duke of Wellington, and of the Prussians under that of Prince Blücher of Wahlstadt, in the Year 1815, by C. de M, edited and translated by Sir John Sinclair (1816; reprinted London: Lionel Leventhal, Ltd., 1983).
 Jean Sarrazin, Histoire de la guerre de la Restauration depuis le passade de la Bidassoa par les Alliés, 7 october 1813, jusqu'à le loi d'amnestie du 12 janvier 1816 (1816), 395; see Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:982n.
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 77, gives the combined strength of Wellington’s and Blücher’s armies as 224,000.
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 78, states, “Blücher’s Hussar qualities—his activity and bold character—formed a great contrast to the circumspection and slow marches of the Duke of Wellington. If the Prussian-Saxon army was not attacked first, it would be more active and eager in rushing to the aide of the Anglo-Dutch army than the latter would be in aiding Marshal Blücher. All of the actions of Napoleon therefore had the goal of attacking the Prussians first.” See also Wagner, Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen, 4:12.
 Clausewitz’s original sentence reads: “General Ziethen's outposts were drawn back from the vicinity of Binche via Thuin and Ham to the Sambre, two and one-half hours from Charleroi.” This confuses the relationship between the Sambre River and the town of Charleroi, which is on the river, not two-and-a-half hours away. That would have Ziethen’s men marching in the wrong direction.
 Two Prussian generals named Pirch fought in the Waterloo Campaign. Prussian accounts typically designated the senior one, Major General Georg Dubislaw Ludwig von Pirch, commander of the 2nd Corps, as Pirch I. His younger brother, Major General Otto Karl Lorenz von Pirch, commander of the Second Brigade in General Ziethen’s 1st Corps, was referred to as Pirch II.
 Clausewitz's note: "These letters are all references to August Wagner's maps of the battle." This refers to the excellent maps contained in Wagner, Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen, which have not been included in any prior published edition of this work. See Map 1, above, which is a detail of Wagner’s map of the Battle of Ligny
Notes to Chapters 30-39
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 90.
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 94.
 M. Gamot, Réfutation, en ce qui concerne le Maréchal Ney de l’ouvrage ayant pour titre: campagne de 1815, ou relation des operations militaries qui ont lieu pendant les cents jours, par le general Gourgaud, écrite à Sainte-Hélène (Paris, 1818), 12ff; cited in Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:997n.
 The original French, “corps,” has sometimes been misinterpreted as referring to an army corps (“corps d’armée”), which would suggest that Napoleon had grossly underestimated the size of the Prussian force facing him. By itself, however, “corps” may refer to any substantial body of troops. Here it clearly refers to a force far larger than a single corps.
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 90-93.
 Clausewitz regarded the destruction of the Prussian army in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstädt (7-13 October 1806), as exemplifying what the total defeat of an army entailed—not just death and destruction on the battlefield, but its ultimate dismemberment as a fighting force. See his “Observations on Prussia in Her Great Catastrophe,” in Historical and Political Writings, 30-84, and chapters 44 and 52 of the present work.
 This passage recurs almost verbatim in On War, 120, illustrating Clausewitz’s concept of “friction.”
 See chapter 31.
 This last sentence comes from Clausewitz’s original manuscript. For some reason it was not included in the published editions of the work. Halhlweg, Schriften, 2:1015.
 Gamot, Réfutation, 19, cited in Hahlweg, Schriften 2:1017n.
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 181, cited in ibid.
 Gamot, Réfutation, excerpted in Hahlweg, Schriften 2:1017n.
 Clausewitz is referring to French General Dominique Vandamme's crushing defeat at the battle of Kulm on 30 August 1813, when his 32,000-man force, attempting to cut off an apparently beaten Austrian army after the Battle of Dresden, advanced into Bohemia without support and was surrounded by overwhelmingly superior Allied forces. For one version of this incident, see David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 2.
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 115-117, cited in Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1025n.
 Observations sur la relations de la campagne de 1815, publiée par le general Gourgaud; et refutation de quelques-unes des assertions d’autres écrits relatifs à la bataille de Waterloo; par le comte de Grouchy (Paris, 1819), 5ff, cited in Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1025n. Grouchy’s account was published in English as Doubts of the Authenticity of the Historical Memoirs Attributed to Napoleon and First Refutation of Some of the Assertions They Contain (Philadelphia: J. F. Hurtel, 1820).
 Gamot, Réfutation, 20; excerpted in Hahlweg, Schriften 2:1017n.
 Clausewitz’s manuscript and the 1835 edition of his works both have the 16th, which must be wrong. The error was corrected in the 1862 edition but was resurrected in Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1027.
 The 1862 edition contains the following footnote: “Because both corps had to use a single road.”
 Given the detail with which Clausewitz analyses this phase of the campaign, it is surprising that he fails to note that, had the cavalry alone pursued the Prussians immediately, it would at least have been able to identify the direction of its retreat correctly.
 The 2nd Corps was part of Ney’s force, and thus far away from the Ligny battlefield.
Notes to Chapters 40-49
 Napoleon wrote in his Memoirs, page 135, that he “had preferred to turn the enemy’s left first, rather than his right, in order to cut them off from the Prussians, who were at Wavre.” He added that he also did not want to push the English toward the Prussians—which would have been the case had he attacked the right wing—but away from them, toward the sea. He also considered the English left to be their weakest side and noted that he was expecting some of Grouchy’s forces to arrive on this side of the battlefield.
 In reality La-Haye-Sainte fell to the French only once, after a series of heavy assaults. The timing of its fall remains one of the mysteries of the battle. Many English accounts place the fall of La-Haye-Sainte at around 5:30 p.m., but Dutch engineer W. B. Craan, who prepared a highly detailed map of the battle based on interviews with participants in 1815-1816, wrote that the farm fell much earlier, at 3 p.m. See Arthur Gore, An Historical Account of the Battle of Waterloo Fought on the 18th June, 1815 … Intended to Explain and Elucidate the Topographical Plan Executed by W. B Craan (Brussels: T. Parkin, 1817), 41. The differing accounts may have caused Clausewitz’s impression that the place changed hands repeatedly.
 Here Clausewitz is referring to the fact that Napoleon had already been forced to divert a substantial portion of his original force of around 70,000 men to face the growing Prussian threat to his right flank, an issue that his account has not yet addressed.
 Although the Prussian 4th Corps, commanded by General von Bülow, was bivouacked farthest away from the Waterloo battlefield on the night of 17 June 1815, placing it at the head of the Prussian advance made considerable military sense. The 4th Corps had not participated in the Battle of Ligny and was therefore the strongest Prussian corps in terms of manpower and ammunition supplies.
 Belgian historian Bernard Coppens believes that Napoleon did not react this early to news of the Prussians—or possibly did not even receive it this early—and thus took no measures to protect his right flank. Contrary to Napoleon’s claims that he sent the 6th Corps out to guard this flank, Coppens argues that the 6th Corps was already on the right side of the French line, behind the 1st Corps, and simply turned to face the Prussians when their attack began late in the afternoon. He provides French and Prussian eyewitness accounts in support of this allegation. He also shows that Napoleon’s initial account of the battle in 1815 did have the 6th Corps in such a location. By 1821, however, he had placed their starting position much farther to the west to account for the fact that they were only on the right edge of the French line when the Prussians began their attack. Bernard Coppens and Patrice Courcelle, La Papellotte, series: Waterloo 1815, Les Carnets de la Campagne, no. 4 (Brussels: Tondeur Diffusion, 2000), 11-12, 67-71.
 There is no chapter 43 in Clausewitz’s manuscript, nor in any published version of his text (other than Peter Hofschroer's problematic version, strangely mis-titled On Wellington, which arbitrarily inserts one where none existed).
 Jean-Baptiste Berton, Précis histoirique, militaire et critique des batailles de Fleurus et de Waterloo dans la campagne de Flandres en juin 1815 (Paris: 1818), 54f; cited in Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1041n.
 This is the wording in the 1835 and subsequent published versions of the book. The original manuscript contains a somewhat shorter and slightly different account for the three sentences beginning with “Equally unsuccessful”: “The 4th Corps (Gérard) was supposed to attack the position at Bièrge. The [13th] Division (Vichery) was used to attack the mill but could not gain control of the crossing, and later—that is to say between 8 and 9 p.m.—moved to Limale, where it was joined by the other two divisions, which arrived considerably later after having been directed there from La Baraque.” In Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1046n.
 Pierre Alexandre Édouard Fleury du Chaboulon, Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de la vie privée, du retour et de règne de l’empereur Napoléon en 1815, 2 vols. (London: Longman, 1820), 2:196; Hahlweg cites a later edition in Schriften, 2:1050n.
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 182; excerpted in Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1052n.
 Grouchy, Observations, 55f.
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 115-117.
 Grouchy, Observations, 72f., states his doubts that such letters were even written.
 Clausewitz’s arguments are accepted by most modern historians, who share his belief that the alleged messages described in Napoleon’s memoirs have no basis in fact and were simply designed to shift the blame for defeat at Waterloo to Grouchy. For the most recent examination of this issue, see Bernard Coppens, Plancenoit, 40-41. However, Grouchy’s assertion that he received no written orders at all on 17 June is also incorrect. A message sent by Napoleon shortly after midday ordered Grouchy to search in the direction of Namur and Maastricht and pursue the enemy. “It is important to discover what Blücher and Wellington are intending to do and if they propose to reunite their armies to cover Brussels and Liege and attempt to give battle. In that case keep your two infantry corps united in terrain having several avenues of retreat and place detachments of cavalry in-between to maintain communications with the headquarters.” The existence of this message did not become known until the 1840s, which is why Clausewitz was unaware of it. Had he been, however, it seems unlikely that it would have altered his general view that Napoleon’s intentions with respect to Grouchy’s force were marked by hesitancy and cross-purposes, which he subsequently sought to represent as a daring but poorly executed plan. See Charras, Histoire de la Campagne de 1815, 5th ed. (Geneva, 1907), 240-241, and the detailed discussion of this message in John Codman Ropes, The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History (1893; reprinted Tyne & Wear: Worley Publications, 1995), 355-361, which strongly criticizes Grouchy's truthfulness.
 For the original, see Grouchy, Observations, 10-13; cited in Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1057.
 Napoleon, Mémoires, 185-186.
 Compare to On War, 79, in which Clausewitz considers at length his own proposition that “war does not consist of a single short blow.” In this passage, that insight is still presented as historically contingent, and is applied to battles and armies rather than to war as such. Yet the generality of Napoleon’s problem is apparent throughout Clausewitz’s discussion: Napoleon needs, somehow, to strike a single blow that will transform the politics of Europe. The problem of how to break Wellington’s center is no more than a tactical manifestation of this overarching, and ultimately insoluble, dilemma.
 Clausewitz's original manuscript contained a footnote citing some of Napoleon’s great victories: “The battles which lead to this opinion are those of Marengo, Austerlitz, Eylau, and Wagram. Marengo, Austerlitz and Wagram were actually defensive battles in which Bonaparte acted offensively.” In Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1064n.
 In the original manuscript (see Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1068n), this paragraph is numbered 7 and is preceded by a draft paragraph 6, which Clausewitz deleted. Perhaps he did so because he did not like to “second-guess” decisions taken in battle too explicitly:
6. If, knowing all that occurred, we were to propose an improved plan for Bonaparte, which is no real achievement but more to be considered as a useful employment of the experience gained, we would make the following points. 1. The attacks on the right and left wings, thus on Hougoumont and La Haye, which were only diversionary attacks, should be made with fewer troops. A cavalry division and an infantry brigade would have sufficed to fix the troops on these wings in place. 2. Organize the attack on the center with the remaining 6 divisions so that 3 would constitute the reserve and be able to deliver the decisive blow after the first 3 had taken the time to prepare this decision, which is always the conditio sine qua non. 3. As soon as Blücher's troops at Saint-Lambert are discovered, place Lobau’s corps between Frischermont and Pajeau in order to make their main resistance there. It is not very likely that the battle would have been won with this disposition, but at least there would have been some possibility of victory, and the form of the entire struggle would have been less disadvantageous.
Notes to Chapters 50-58
 Joseph Vicomte de Rogniat (1776-1840) was a French engineer general and military writer. Chapter 10 of his Considérations sur l’art de la guerre (Paris: Magimel, Anselin, et Pochard, 1816) refers to this issue. Cited by Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1073.
 This last sentence was not in Clausewitz’s original manuscript, which instead contained the following sentence: “Generals Exelmans and Gérard could never have suggested such a thing, and Grouchy also denies this fact.” Hahlweg, Schriften, 2:1074.
 See On War, Book One, "On the Nature of War," Chapter Two, "Purpose and Means in War," 90-99. Given Clausewitz's quite false reputation as a proponent of "Total War" (a term he neither invented nor used) and other extreme measures, we must note the way (90) he defined "destruction of the enemy force": "They must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight. Whenever we use the phrase "destruction of the enemy's forces" this alone is what we mean." Note also that in this paragraph of his Campaign of 1815, he is referring to particular circumstances, i.e., "when a major decision is at stake." (This was certainly the case in 1815, especially from Napoleon's point of view.) In the cited chapter of On War (96), he comments that "there are many reasons why the purpose of an engagement may not be the destruction of the enemy's forces" and that "objectives can often be attained without any fighting at all."
 The battle of Montenotte (12 April 1796) was Napoleon's first victory in the Italian campaign. He defeated an Austro-Piedmontese force while an Austrian force under General Jean Pierre Baron von Beaulieu (1725-1819) stood nearby.
Napoleon, Mémoires, 170.
 Fleury du Chaboulon’s account of the events in Charleroi after the battle is found in his Mémoires 2:194. No mention of the time is found here, however, so Clausewitz must have taken that from Napoleon, Mémoires, 169.
 Fleury du Chaboulon, Mémoires, 2:325.
 See On War, Book 1, chapter 1, and Book 8, chapter 6.
 Clausewitz here refers to two episodes in Bonaparte’s early rise to power, signified by the respective months of the Revolutionary calendar in which they occurred. On 13 Vendémiaire [5 October] 1795, Bonaparte assembled a scratch force of cavalry and artillery that crushed a Royalist uprising threatening to overthrow the Revolutionary Convention—a deed accomplished, in Thomas Carlyle’s famous phrase, by “a whiff of grapeshot.” 18 Brumaire [9 November] 1799 was the day of the coup d’état by which Napoleon, having already established himself as the French government’s military protector, overthrew it and made himself First Consul of the Republic. In Clausewitz’s day these events were so famous that no explanation of them would have been required.
 In Clausewitz’s original manuscript, this sentence was followed by one reading “Longwy was taken by the Russians under General Langeron,” but all the words except Longwy were struck out by Clausewitz, perhaps because he was not sure of their accuracy. The published editions placed Longwy after Hesse-Homburg without the period separating them, thus incorrectly giving the impression that Longwy was part of the Prince’s name. In fact, “the Prussian garrison of Luxembourg [which had not been French-occupied in 1815], led by Prince Louis of Hesse-Homburg, effectively besieged Longwy, which finally surrendered to Prince August of Prussia.” (Thanks to Bruno Colson for the latter correction.)