This article originally appeared in Defense Analysis, Vol 11, No. 3, (1995):
229-240. It is displayed here with the permission of Brassey's (UK) Ltd
CLAUSEWITZ: TOWARD A THEORY
OF APPLIED STRATEGY
by Antulio J. Echevarria II
Concerned that an early death might prematurely
terminate his masterwork, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote a number
of introductory notes describing the purpose of his manuscript and the
direction he intended to take with future revisions. Four such notes inform
our understanding of On War and Clausewitz's intent: the "Author's
Preface" written between 1816-18;*1 the "Author's Comment" written in 1818;
the note of 10 July 1827; and the undated, unfinished note "presumably
written in 1830."*2 Thanks to the work of historian Azar Gat, the dating
of the last note has recently become problematic for Clausewitzian scholars.
Gat has argued that the undated note was written not in 1830, but prior
to the note of 10 July 1827, perhaps earlier in the same year. In his opinion,
the undated note reflects the "crisis" that Clausewitz encountered when
he realized that his theory of war failed to account for the fact that
limited wars have occurred more frequently in history than wars aimed at
completely defeating the enemy.*3 It is the note of 10 July 1827 which,
Gat believes, contains the solution to this crisis in the form of Clausewitz's
new ideas concerning the primacy of politics in war. On the other hand,
Clausewitz's widow, Marie, wrote that the undated note appeared to be "of
a very recent date."*4 In it, Clausewitz states that he regarded only Chapter
1 of Book I as finished. This disclosure, combined with the fact that Clausewitz's
brother-in-law, Count Friedrich von Brühl, found among Clausewitz's
papers a series of revisions intended for Book I, seems to support what
we know of his plan to revise On War according to the steps outlined
in the note of 1827.*5 Thus, the undated note appears to complement the
note of 1827, and for these reasons, Clausewitzian scholars such as Michael
Howard and Peter Paret had previously concluded that it was probably written
in the spring of 1830, as Clausewitz sealed and packed his papers in preparation
for his assignment to Breslau to command the artillery inspection located
there.*6
While we may never know for certain whether
the undated note was written before or after the note of 1827, its contents
still remain important to our understanding of Clausewitz as a military
thinker. Although the note of 1827 contains the essential elements of Clausewitz's
ideas as we know them today (e.g., the distinction between absolute and
limited war, and his belief that "war is nothing but the continuation of
policy with other means"), the undated note, whether placed before or after
the note of 1827, adds another dimension to Clausewitz's military thought.
In short, it suggests that he was on the verge of developing a theory of
applied strategy, or an operational-level theory for the conduct of war.
In particular, the last paragraph of the undated note reveals that Clausewitz
had identified several "statements" (Sätzen), (or "secondary
propositions" as Peter Paret has called them) which might be used to guide
the conduct of operations:
"It is a very difficult task to construct
a scientific theory for the art of war, and so many attempts have failed
that most people say that it is impossible, since it deals with matters
that no permanent law can provide for. One would agree and abandon the
attempt were it not for the obvious fact that a whole range of propositions
can be demonstrated without difficulty: that defense is the stronger
form of fighting with a negative purpose, attack the weaker form
with a positive purpose; that major successes help bring about minor
ones, ... ; that a demonstration is a weaker use of force than a
real attack, ... ; that victory consists not only in the occupation
of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy's physical and
psychic forces, ... ; that success is always greatest at the point
where victory was gained, ... ; that a turning movement can only
be justified by general superiority ... ; that flank-positions are governed by the same consideration; that every attack loses impetus
as it progresses [emphasis added]."*7
As it stands, the list is certainly incomplete.
Clausewitz might also have included other important operational concepts
such as center of gravity, concentration, and economy
of force.*8 Those that he did mention appear throughout the corpus
of On War, and, based on thematic similarities between the last
two paragraphs of the undated note and Chapter 1 of Book VIII, seem to
have been compiled, as does the undated note itself, while Clausewitz was
in the process of writing or rewriting Books VI-VIII. This essay examines
each of the secondary propositions, excepting Clausewitz's statement that
a "demonstration is a weaker use of force than a real attack,"*9 as it
is merely a definition, and suggests that they do in fact represent principles
-- as Clausewitz had defined the term -- for a theory of applied strategy.
Before proceeding further, however, we
must understand that, in general, Clausewitz recognized only two levels
of war: strategic -- the use of battles to achieve the military
and political objective of the war; and tactical -- the art of winning
battles. He saw the conduct of operations as an integral part of strategy,
or the art of war, but he used the terms "art of war"--Kriegskunst,
"strategy"--Strategie, and "conduct of war"--Kriegführung,
almost interchangably. But, in Books VI-VIII, which reflect most of his
mature theories, he focused almost exclusively on the conduct of operations,
or the practical excution of strategy. These books contain a number of
observations concerning "campaign plans"--Feldzugsplanen, "theaters
of war"--Kriegstheater, "individual armies' zones of operations"--einzelnen
Heergebiete, and "principles for the execution of strategy"--Grundsätze
der Mittel und Wege as they applied to defense and attack and to limited
and unlimited war--hence, the term applied strategy.
To fully understand the significance of
his list of propositions, we must also review Clausewitz's concept of theory.
"The primary purpose of any theory," he wrote, "is to clarify concepts
and ideas that have become confused and entangled."*10 Theory should explain
rather than prescribe. It should reflect reality or, in Clausewitz's
words, the "world of action," which is governed, as he saw it, by a logical
heirarchy consisting of laws, principles, rules, and prescriptions and
methods.*11 Laws are universal and absolute; they reveal the cause-and-effect
relationship between things, and determine action (e.g., Newton's Laws
of Motion). In Clausewitz's opinion, laws did not belong in a theory of
war, since the phenomenon of war consisted of "too much change and diversity"
to allow action to be traced to a single cause; nonetheless, he used the
term law on numerous occasions. Principles are deductions reflecting
only the "spirit and sense" of a law; they may be universal but they are
not absolute (e.g., all available force should be concentrated at the decisive
point). Principles provide a guide for action -- they allow for the diversity
common to combat situations but call upon the commander to exercise sound
judgment in their application. Rules are inferences based on experience.
Rules resemble principles--they are not absolute; they rest on a truth
but allow for exceptions (e.g., cavalry should not be used against unbroken
infantry), but they are more specific than principles. Prescriptions
and methods are merely the regulations and routines which armies develop
to handle their day-to-day business (e.g., standard operating procedures,
drill manuals, etc.). Each of these components represents a "nucleus of
truth" which theory must address.
[Figure 1 -- Clausewitz's
Structure of Theory]
Clausewitz's next task was to combine these
elements under a single, unifying theme -- a controlling element -- in
his words, a "point at which all lines converge."*12 This controlling element,
the foundation for his theory, had to maintain a balance between the "three
magnets" of the remarkable trinity -- blind emotional force, chance, and
reason -- which provided a framework, or model, for understanding
war's changeable and diverse nature:
[Figure 2 -- Clausewitz's
Remarkable Trinity]
"These three tendencies are like three
different codes of law, deeply-rooted in their subject and yet variable
in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of
them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict
with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally
useless."*13
Although the "remarkable trinity" itself
was not a theory, per se, Clausewitz believed that it provided the
basis for one. Originally, the concept of battle or the engagement
-- fighting itself -- supplied Clausewitz's single, unifying theme linking
the various components of his theory of strategy: "Strategy is nothing
without battle, for battle is the material that it applies, the very means
that it employs. Just as tactics is the employment of military forces in
battle, so strategy is the employment of battles . . . to achieve the object
of war."*14 Fighting, including the threat of a fight, became the
"essential military activity," and the destruction of the enemy's forces
served as Clausewitz's "overriding principle of war."*15
[Figure 3 -- Battle as
the Central Element in Clausewitz's Theory of War]
While Gat has correctly argued the Clausewitz's
crisis involved the threat that limited wars posed to his overall conception
of war, he overlooked the significance of the last paragraph of the undated
note. A passage from Chapter 30 of Book VI, reveals Clausewitz's problem
more clearly:
"Now we come to another question: whether
a set of all-encompassing principles, rules, and methods may be formulated
for these endeavors. Our reply must be that history has not guided us to
any recurrent forms ... A war in which great decisions are involved is
not only simpler but also less inconsistent ... In such a case, reason
can make rules and laws, but in the type of war we have been describing
this seems far more difficult. Two main principles for the conduct of major
wars have evolved in our own time: Bülow's "breadth of a base" and
Jomini's "interior lines." Even these, when actually applied to the defense
of an operational theater, have never proved to be absolute and effective.
Yet this is where, as purely formal principles, they should be at their
most effective ... It is plain that circumstances exert an influence that
cuts across all general principles ... We admit, in short, that in this
chapter we cannot formulate any principles, rules, or methods: history
does not provide a basis for them."*16
From this passage it is clear that Clausewitz's
crisis involved the tri-namic tension between history (change over time),
the "influence of circumstances," and the applicability of "general principles"
to the conduct of war itself. The undated note, then, reflects his belief
that a theory of war was possible; and that, as his list of secondary propositions
suggests, it could be found at the level of applied strategy. The remainder
of this essay will thus discuss the significance of each proposition.
1. The Relationship
between Defense and Attack*17
By claiming that the defense was the stronger
form of war, Clausewitz challenged directly the military norm of his day
(and many others) which maintained that the opposite was true. He reasoned
that a combatant chose the defensive form of warfare because he was not
strong enough either materially or morally to attack. The advantages provided
by the defensive form of war (e.g., cover and concealment, shorter lines
of supply, time, choice and preparation of the terrain, etc.) compensate
for the defender's material or moral weakness, at least partially. Moreover,
the defender's aim is merely self-preservation, a condition which
is met even before the attacker begins to move and, in some cases, can
be met even if the defender's army is defeated in battle (e.g., Saddam
Hussein and the Iraqi army). The attacker, on the other hand, enjoys few,
if any, of the advantages of the defender and, in fact, has the burden
of launching and sustaining the attack, for which he generally needs a
significant advantage, either moral or material, or both. Thus, the defensive
form of warfare is stronger because it affords more advantages to the side
that adopts it while at the same time making fewer demands. But because
the characteristic feature of the defense is waiting, and its goal
preservation, it possesses a negative purpose. The offensive form of warfare,
on the other hand, seeks to obtain or to conquer; hence, Clausewitz
assigned it a positive purpose.
Stating that one form of warfare is stronger
than another is of course not the same as advocating the one over the other.
Clausewitz was quick to point out that neither form of war existed independently.
A well-conducted defense, he wrote, usually consisted of many offensive
blows (e.g., counterattacks and spoiling attacks): "One cannot think of
the defense without that necessary component of the concept, the counterattack.
... Even in a defensive position awaiting the enemy assault, our bullets
take the offensive."*18 Likewise, attackers must occasionally employ defensive
measures to gain time or to re-locate forces, particularly if the resources
to press forward continuously and evenly across an entire front are not
available (e.g., Allied defensive operations in the Ardennes in the fall
of 1944). Thus, "the act of attack, particularly in strategy, is a constant
alternation and combination of attack and defense."*19
2. Relationship between
Major and Minor Successes
The proposition that major successes help
bring about minor ones derives from Clausewitz's general assumption that
war, like every real phenomenon, consisted of a number of interdependent
elements, when one was affected so, too, were the others, even if only
minimally. Statements like, "small things always depend on great ones,"
or conversely, "that great tactical successes lead to great strategic ones,"
reflect this belief.*20 In turn, Clausewitz's exprience as a soldier taught
him that the material and moral superiority gained from large victories
often led to smaller ones. For example, the defeat of the main Prussian
army at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 led to a number of smaller garrisons and
depots falling rather quickly into French hands. As Clausewitz wrote:
"The outcome of a major battle has a greater
psychological effect on the loser than on the winner. This, in turn, gives
rise to additional loss of material strength, which is echoed in loss of
morale; the two become mutually interactive as each enhances and intensifies
the other. So one must place special emphasis on the moral effect, which
works in opposite directions on each side: while sapping the strength of
the loser, it raises the vigor and energy of the winner. But the defeated
side is the one most affected by it, since it becomes the direct cause
of additional loss. Moreover, it is closely related to the dangers, exertions,
and hardships -- in brief, to all the wear and tear inseparable from war.
It merges with these conditions and is nurtured by them."*21
With this passage, Clausewitz did more
than anticipate the modern offensive phases of exploitation and pursuit.
He in fact recognized an overall interconnectedness of events within a
particular theater of war, especially in terms of morale, such that a victorious
outcome in one battle might contribute to success in others as well.
3. Conditions
of Victory*22
Clausewitz derived his proposition that
"victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in
the destruction of the enemy's physical and psychic forces" from the conditions
of victory as he defined them for both the strategic and tactical levels
of war. On the strategic level, Clausewitz wrote that victory in war required:
1) the complete or partial destruction of the enemy's armed forces; 2)
the occupation of his country; and 3) the breaking of his will to fight.
The political object, the original motive, for which the war was fought
determines the extent to which each of these objectives is to be pursued.*23
On the tactical level, victory involves: 1) the enemy's greater loss of
material strength; 2) his loss of morale; and 3) his admission of the same
by abandoning his intentions.*24 The loss of the enemy's moral and physical
forces, as Clausewitz pointed out, need not be actual. It can, and often
is merely the threat of loss which is sufficient to bring about the surrender
or capitulation of enemy forces. Moreover, for Clausewitz, breaking the
enemy's morale possessed far more significance than the destruction of
his material strength: "In the engagement, the loss of morale has proved
the major decisive factor ... [it] becomes the means of achieving the margin
of profit in the destruction of the enemy's physical forces which is
the real purpose of the engagement [emphasis added]."*25 Indeed, the continued
resistance of the French population after the battle of Sedan supports
Clausewitz's emphasis on the psychological or irrational element of war.
While the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs provides significant advantages
to technology-based societies, the concept of a Peoples' War remains its
Achilles heel, thereby underscoring the crucial role that cultural values,
ideologies, and belief systems play in motivating a society for war.
4. Turning Movements
and Flank Positions*26
Envelopments and turning movements are
similar in nature. Their basic definitions have not changed since Clausewitz's
day. Envelopments are maneuvers around or over the enemy's position, avoiding
his strength, to strike at his flanks and rear. A turning movement is a
variant of the envelopment in which the attacker avoids the defense entirely
in order to seek key terrain deep in the enemy's rear and along his lines
of communication, thus forcing him to abandon his position.*27 "The enveloping
or turning movement," Clausewitz wrote, "may have two objectives. It may
aim at disrupting, or cutting, communications, causing the army to wither
and die, and thus be forced to retreat; or it may aim at cutting off the
retreat itself."*28 Because such movements expose one's own lines of communication
to attack, Clausewitz argued that "flanking operations, which have always
been more popular in books than in the field," are rarely practicable,
and "dangerous only to very long and vulnerable lines of communication."*29
Even the threat of being cut off, he maintained, should not be overrated;
"experience has shown that where the troops are good and their commanders
bold they are more likely to break through than be trapped."*30
Clausewitz defined a flank position as
"any position that is meant to be held even though the enemy may pass it
by: once he has, the only effect it can have is on his strategic flank."*31
This definition included all fortified positions since they are, in theory
at least, "impregnable," and any unfortified position which happens to
be cut off, regardless of whether it faces parallel or perpendicular to
the enemy's line of advance (e.g., the Prussian position on the Saale during
Napoleon's advance in 1806). He considered such flank positions effective
if they cause the attacker to hesitate, but risky, particularly in the
case of unfortified ones, if the attacker proceeded unchecked, since, as
Clausewitz explained, "the defender will pretty well have lost his chances
of retreat."*32
The development of rapid-firing, long-range
rifles and machine guns in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
made flanking operations more appealing to armies who wanted to close with
the enemy while avoiding his deadly frontal fire. Moltke the Elder (Chief
of Staff of the German General Staff, 1857-1888) seems to have perfected
the technique of tactical envelopment in Germany's wars against Austria
and France in 1866 and 1870 respectively. To Count Alfred von Schlieffen
(Chief of Staff of the German General Staff, 1891-1905), however, flank
attacks became something of an obsession -- they were the "essential element
in all of military history."*33
Rather than treat the act of "falling on
the enemy's rear" as an accomplishment in itself, "a prize exhibit," or
a formula for success, Clausewitz soberly argued that flanking operations
in general were most effective only under the following conditions: 1)
while on the strategic defensive; 2) toward the end of a campaign, when
the enemy's lines of communication have been extended; 3) especially during
a retreat into the interior of the country; and 4) in conjunction with
armed insurrection.*34 All of these conditions, save the last, were present
in MacArthur's famous landing at Inchon during the Korean conflict, a classic
turning movement that saved UN forces from defeat. As the lethality of
the battlefield continues to increase, envelopments (including those vertical
in nature) and turning movements are likely to gain even greater significance
as forms of maneuver.
5. The Diminishing
Force of the Attack, The Culminating Point of the Attack, and the Culminating
Point of Victory*35
Clausewitz saw the diminishing force of
the attack, the culminating point of the attack, and the culminating point
of victory as related concepts. Anticipating the modern concept of strategic
consumption, Clausewitz wrote: "All attackers find that their strength
diminishes as they advance."*36 He then went on to identify seven factors
which cause the depletion of the attackers strength: 1) occupation of the
enemy's country; 2) the need to secure lines of communication; 3) losses
incurred through combat and sickness; 4) the distance from replacements
of both material and personnel; 5) by sieges and investment of fortresses;
6) by a reduction of effort (moral and physical); and 7) by the defection
of allies. Yet, he was also quick to point out that "a weakening of the
attack may be partially or completely cancelled out ... by a weakening
of the defense."*37 Thus, the depletion of the attacker's strength, while
demonstrably true, has no meaning unless it is considered in relation to
the strength of the defender.
Drawing directly from his observations
concerning the diminishing force of the attack, Clausewitz concluded that
most attacks do not lead directly to the end of hostilities, but instead
reach a culminating point at which the "superior strength of the attack[er]
... is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace."*38 By way
of corollary, Clausewitz determined that the moral and physical superiority
gained through a successful battle generally augmented the strength of
the victor, adding to his superiority, but only to a certain extent, and
this he called the culminating point of victory.*39 This circumstance,
he pointed out, was particularly evident in wars in which it was not possible
for the victor to completely defeat his opponent. The same factors that
contributed to reducing the strength of the attacker also played a role
in diminishing the moral and material superiority that a military force
gained through victory:
"[Thus,] the utilization of a victory,
a continued advance in an offensive campaign, will usually swallow up the
superiority with which one began or which was gained by the victory....
This culminating point in victory is bound to recur in every future war
in which the destruction of the enemy cannot be the military aim, and this
will presumably be true of most wars. The natural goal of all campaign
plans, therefore, is the turning point at which attack becomes defense
[-- the culminating point of the attack]."*40
In short, attacks that did not result in
peace must end in defense. To proceed beyond the culminating point of the
attack merely invited disaster, for it was erroneous to assume "that so
long as an attack progresses there must still be some superiority on its
side."*41 Clausewitz continued: "It is therefore important to calculate
this point correctly when planning the campaign. An attacker may otherwise
take on more than he can manage ... ; a defender must be able to recognize
this error if the enemy commits it, and exploit it to the full."*42 Both
Napoleon's and Hitler's campaigns in Russia serve as ample illustrations
of what can happen when an attacker exceeds his culminating point.
Unfortunately, Clausewitz's step toward
a theory of applied strategy remained only that; and it is impossible to
say precisely where he would have gone with his list of propositions. On
the one hand, he might have used a triangular structure similar to that
of the remarkable trinity, which explained the nature of war, to clarify
applied strategy. Clausewitz might thus have set his list of principles
in opposition to his elements of strategy (Book III) which, because they
vary with each situation, account for the uniqueness of strategic operations
in general: 1) the moral -- intellectual and psychological factors (e.g.,
genius of the commander and spirit of the army); 2) the physical -- army
size and composition; 3) the mathematical -- geometric factors (e.g., angles
of impact and flanking fires); 4) the geographical -- the influence of
terrain; and 5) the statistical -- support and maintenance.*43 In addition,
Clausewitz's concept of a center of gravity, Schwerpunkt, which
became an integral part of his later discussions regarding the conduct
of war, offers perhaps the best controlling element for a theory of applied
strategy. His framework for a theory of applied strategy might thus have
looked like this:

[Figure 4 -- A Possible
Framework for Applied Strategy]
Clausewitz defined Schwerpunkt as
'the center of all power and movement (Zentrum der Kraft und Bewegung)
... upon which everything depends.'*44 The concept itself originated with
Clausewitz's belief in the near-metaphysical interdependency of all elements
and all levels of war; it also reflects the extent to which the holistic
and harmonizing tendencies of German idealism had influenced him. Paradoxically,
the center of gravity represents both the predominant strengths and weaknesses
of the geo-political or politico-military position of each belligerent
state relative to its allies and opponents: if it is removed, impaired,
or destroyed, then the alliance or state that it supported would collapse.
Although he argued that the 'destruction of the enemy's fighting force
is the best way to begin,' Clausewitz saw moral and physical force as separate
but related sources of strength; hence, he recognized more than one possibility
for a center of gravity, namely, an enemy's army, his capital, alliance
systems, personalities of leaders, and public opinion.*45 In general, however,
these last pertain more to the level of strategy than applied strategy.
We can only wonder whether in subsequent revisions of On War Clausewitz
would have developed the concept further.
On the other hand, he might simply have
developed his list of propositions into a more sophisticated set of principles
of war to replace those that he had prepared for the Crown Prince.*46 Indeed,
many of the chapters in Book III correspond to the principles of war as
we know them today.*47 In any case, Clausewitz certainly needed to rewrite
Book III (Strategy), formally addressing the relationship between the principles
of applied strategy and strategic operations in general, paying particular
attention to conflicts short of war.
Conclusion
Clausewitz's approach to theory itself
differed from others in that his attempted to account for all the impediments
to action, all the imponderables -- genius, chance, friction, uncertainty,
etc. -- and all the variations in scenario that result from the particularity
of individual circumstances and prevent war from becoming a science. Given
the predelictions of the day, Clausewitz's response to the crisis in theory
was itself rather astonishing -- he redefined the term 'theory.' Rather
than using it to mean formula or established procedure, as most Enlightenment
and post-Enlightenment thinkers of his time had done, he redefined it in
broader terms to indicate a 'framework for study' or a 'basis for conceptualization.'
In this sense, he did indeed provide the 'revolution' in the theory of
war that he so desired.*48
At any rate, the undated note, whether
placed before or after the note of 1827, shows us that Clausewitz was a
multi-dimensional military thinker, torn between the desire to make sense
of his world by systematizing it, and the need to avoid applying rigid
principles to a changing and diverse phenomenon. He, like so many of his
contemporaries, attempted to harness the intricacies and inconsistencies
of war through the use of reason. That he was far more successful in this
endeavor than most owes to the fact that he did not allow his theory to
predict, but required it to explain; he did not merely search for universal
principles, but sought to strike a tri-namic balance between them, historical
change, and the force of circumstances.
Endnotes
1. According to Peter Paret,
this preface actually pertained not to On War itself but to a lost
collection of essays dealing with the role and limits of theory. Nevertheless,
it has become a part of On War and serves to inform us about Clausewitz'
approach to theory. Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man,
His Theories, and His Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985), 360.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On
War, Ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 70.
3. Azar Gat, "Clausewitz's
final Notes," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (1/89): 45-50.
The essay also appears in Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought
from the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989),
255-63. Gat borrows heavily from Raymond Aron on this score. Raymond Aron, Penser la guerre, Clausewitz, 2 Vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1976).
The English edition, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, Trans. by Christine
Booker and Norman Stone (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1985),
is somewhat confusing due to a poor translation. A German edition is also
available: Clausewitz, Den Krieg denken.
4. See Marie's "Vorrede,"
in Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege. Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals
Carl von Clausewitz, 19th Ed., Ed. by Werner Hahlweg (Bonn: Ferd. Dümmlers
Verlag, 1991), 173-181.
5. In the note of 1827, Clausewitz
stated that he would undertake the revision of Books I-VI (which were already
in clean copy) only after he had further clarified his ideas through the
writing, or rewriting, of Books VII and VIII. Vom Kriege, 177, or On War, 70.
6. See the English translation
of On War offered by Howard and Paret.
7. On War, 71.
8. Center of gravity appears
most frequently in the last three books, esp., On War, VI,27, 485;
VIII,4, 596; and VIII,9, 617. Concentration is refered to as a "law" of
strategy, On War, III,11, 204. Economy of force is mentioned in On War, III,14, 213.
9. The last paragraph of
Book VI, Chapter 24, refers to a chapter on demonstrations in which Clausewitz
had intended to show the differences between an attack and a demonstration.
But the chapter has either been lost or was never written. Incidentally,
Clausewitz' definition of a demonstration does not agree with the US Army's FM 100-5 which states that a "demonstration is a show of
force in an area where a decision is not sought ... [and which] threatens
attack but does not make contact." FM 100-5 Operations (Headquarters,
Department of the Army, June 1993), 7-8.
10. On War, II,1,
132.
11. On War, II,4,
151-5. Clausewitz' definitions of law, principle, and rule appear to be
drawn from Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Practical Reason, Book
I, Chapter I, "Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason."
12. On War, II,2,
141.
13. These tendencies, in
turn, corresponded directly with the nation's government, the passions
of its populace, and the skill and prowess of its military. On War, I,1, 89.
14. Carl von Clausewitz,
"Bemerkungen über die reine und angewandte Strategie des Herrn von
Bülow oder Kritik der darin enthaltenen Ansichten," Verstreute
kleine Schriften, Ed. Werner Hahlweg, (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag,
1979), 77.
15. On War, IV,1,
pp. 225 and 258. The mere possibility of an engagement, Clausewitz believed,
produced the same results as an actual one. On War, III,1, 181.
16. On War, VI,30,
516-17.
17. Discussions concerning
the nature of defense and attack appear numerous places throughout On
War, but the theme receives special attention in Book VI, Chapters
1-5. See also On War I,1; VII,1-2; and VIII,8.
18. On War, VII,2,
524, and VI,1, 357.
19. On War, VII,2,
524.
20. On War, VIII,4
and 9, esp. pp. 596 and 623; and IV,3, 228.
21. On War, IV,10,
253.
22. The conditions of victory
appear in On War, I,1 and 2; IV,3, 227; and IV,11, 258.
23. On War, I,1 and
2, pp. 80, and 90-9.
24. On War, IV,4,
233-4.
25. On War, IV,4,
231.
26. Turning movements are
discussed in Book V, Chapter 16, "Lines of Communication." Flank positions
are discussed in detail in Book VI, Chapters 14, "Flank Positions," and
24, "Operations on a Flank."
27. FM 100-5, pp.
101-102.
28. On War, V,16,
pp. 346-7.
29. On War, V,16,
347.
30. On War, V,16,
347.
31. On War, VI,14,
415.
32. On War, VI,14,
416.
33. Generalfeldmarschall
Graf Alfred Schlieffen, Briefe, ed. Eberhard Kessel, (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958), 312.
34. On War, VI,24,
465.
35. All are addressed
in Book VII. The diminishing force of the attack is Chapter 4; the culminating
point of the attack is Chapter 5, which contains a note reflecting Clausewitz'
desire to develop the idea of the culminating point of the attack further
in a chapter entitled, "The Culminating Point of Victory." An essay by
that title was in fact found and included as Chapter 22 of Book VII.
36. On War, VI,25,
469.
37. On War, VII,4,
527.
38. On War, VII,5,
528.
39. On War, VII,22,
566.
40. On War, VII,22,
570.
41. On War, VII,22,
571.
42. On War, VII,22,
572.
43. On War, III,2,
183.
44. On War, VIII,4,
595-6.
45. On War, VIII,4,
596.
46. "Die wichtigsten
Grundsätze des Kriegführens zur Erganzung meines Unterrichts
bei Sr. Königlichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen," Vom Kriege, Hahlweg,
p. 1047. The English edition, Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War,
trans. by Hans Gatzke, (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1942 &
1960) contains some inconsistencies.
47. For example, Chapter
6, "Boldness," resembles the principle Offensive; Chapter 8, "Superiority
of Numbers," Chapter 11, "Concentration of Forces in Time," and Chapter
12, "Unification of Forces in Time," relate to Mass; Chapter 9,
"Surprise," and Chapter 14, "Economy of Force," are of course their namesakes;
and Chapter 10, "Cunning," has much in common with Simplicity, Security,
and Surprise.
48. On War, Note of
1827, 70.
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